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Part I
Dissertation Overview
1

Dissertation Overview
Substantial changes in the financial sector and its relation to the real economy have
characterized the last decades. Especially, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 followed by
economic disruptions triggered a public debate about the financialization of the economy.
These events also fostered academic research on the topic. In particular, it has been
acknowledged that the interlinkage of the real economy and the financial sector is not only
beneficial. This cumulative dissertation assesses the interrelation of the real economy and
the financial sector by looking from a theoretical perspective at three different aspects:
First, over the last decades, there was structural change towards and within the finan-
cial sector. On one hand, the GDP share of the financial sector (finance and insurance)
in the U.S. increased from below 3% in the 1940s to above 7% nowadays (data from
BEA). On the other hand, the structure within the financial sector has changed. This
is, “new” finance (consisting of securities, commodity contracts, investments and funds,
trusts, and other financial vehicles) gained in importance compared to more “traditional”
finance (consisting of Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation and related activities
and insurance carriers and related activities). In the U.S., the within finance value added
share of the “new” finance subsector increased from 8% in the 1970s to around 22% in
recent years (based on data from BEA). Clearly, economists want to understand what
drove this two-fold structural change.
Second, another salient feature of financialization is the immense increase in the num-
ber of financial products over the last decades. For example, the number of listed securities
at the Swiss Exchange SIX rose from around 3,000 in 1995 to nearly 35,000 in 2014 (data
from SIX). Although exchange traded financial products only partly mirror the whole de-
velopment, they clearly reflect a strong product innovation dynamic within the financial
sector. It raises the questions what has driven this drastic proliferation of new financial
products and what are the consequences for the economy?
Third, the interconnection between the real economy and the financial sector is also
relevant at the entrepreneurial level. Access to financing is crucial for entrepreneurs;
it impacts on firms’ production and shapes important characteristics of firm dynamics
such as size distribution, growth and volatility of growth of firms. A crucial problem of
external financing through banks loan is information asymmetry between the borrower and
the lender. The questions arise how the asymmetry affects the optimal lending contracts
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offered by banks to entrepreneurs and how it impacts on firms’ production.
The three different aspects of the connection of the real economy and the financial
sector are discussed in this dissertation in three independent chapters:
In the first chapter Explaining structural change towards and within the financial sec-
tor (which is joint work with Josef Falkinger and Yingnan Zhao) we analyze whether the
two-fold structural change towards and within the financial sector is triggered by com-
mon drivers. We want to understand if possible drivers come from the supply side (i.e.,
relative price effects) or from the demand side (i.e., income effects) and how the drivers
are linked to increased inequality. The questions are answered in a 3-sector / 3-factor
OLG-macroeconomic model. Thereby, the baseline analysis focuses on a “perfect-world”
which considers fundamentals rather than frictions as drivers. The three sectors are the
goods sector, used for consumption and investment, and two finance subsectors which
provide services for the transformation of savings into future consumption possibilities.
The three factors are high- and low-skilled labor used in all three sectors and capital used
in safe and risky return-generating technologies in the goods sector. Young households
work, consume and save and old households consume savings plus returns on savings.
The saving and portfolio decision of the young households is based on quasi-homothetic
preferences. The demand for financial services arises from the need of transformation of
savings: Financial services from the “traditional” subsector 1 are needed to transform
safe savings and financial services from the “new” subsector 2 are needed to transform
risky savings. In the general equilibrium the skill premium (i.e., relative wage of high- to
low-skilled labor), for which demand equals supply in all three sectors and the three factor
markets are cleared, is determined. Comparative-static analysis reveals channels which
simultaneously drive the two-fold structural change with respect to finance and increased
inequality: The main mechanism is that with increasing income people demand relatively
more high-skilled services from the financial sector and especially from the finance subsec-
tor 2 (income effect). More specifically, the channels which drive the two-fold structural
change and inequality simultaneously are: (i) uniform productivity progress across factors
and sectors raising the wage level, (ii) skill-biased technical change that increases the skill
premium and (iii) market completeness which makes risky savings more attractive. In
several extensions, frictions are added to the “perfect-world” baseline model (fixed costs,
rents or participation constraints in the financial sector, distorted portfolio choices or set-
up capital for firms), which further impact on inequality and the sectoral structure of the
economy. Finally, the theoretical model is brought to the data. The numerical exercise
illustrates the increase in inequality and the two-fold structural change as observed in the
U.S. over the last decades.
In the second chapter titled An equilibrium model with diversification-seeking house-
5holds, competing banks and (non-)correlated financial innovations I focus on the drastic
increase in the number of financial products. In an equilibrium model, the determinants
and possible consequences of the number of financial products are analyzed. The model
endogenizes the number of financial products and thereby allows distinguishing between
fundamentals and (wrong) beliefs as determinants of the number of financial products.
In the benchmark model, financial products are based on independent real investment
projects with technological uncertainty. A financial innovation is a new risky financial
product based on a new investment project. There is a diversification effect as more inde-
pendent financial products are issued. Households with mean-variance preferences invest
their endowment into a financial portfolio. They demand, for a fee, a bundle consisting
of the risky financial products and a safe asset to generate returns for later consump-
tion. Households are diversification-seeking in the sense that they invest relatively more
in the risky bundle if there is more diversification what makes them better off. Banks
supply the financial products and manage financial portfolios for a fee. They are char-
acterized by a convex cost function and act in a competitive market. The equilibrium
number of financial products and the corresponding fee are determined by competition
(zero profit) in the banking sector and the investment behavior (optimality condition) of
the households. Comparative-static analysis of changes in the fundamentals shows that
the number of financial products increases if (i) real investment projects are more produc-
tive (higher return or lower risk), (ii) a larger volume of wealth is invested, or (iii) costs in
the banking sector are lower. The benchmark model is extended to assess the impact of
correlated derivatives and wrong beliefs on the number of financial products. Correlated
derivatives are financial products, which are based on already existing financial products
rather than on new independent real investment projects. Households have wrong beliefs
if they neglect (part of the) correlation. The model predicts that correlated derivatives
waste resources because they do not add to diversification and that they bias portfolio
choices if their correlation is (partly) neglected. Furthermore, under correlation neglect
banks deceive households by issuing more correlated derivatives instead of new financial
products based on real investment projects because this lowers their costs of provision.
Thus, new financial products are not always the result of changes in fundamentals. They
can also be induced by investors’ neglected correlation and the subsequent caused cost-
minimizing “cheating” behavior of banks. At the normative level, these results support
policy recommendations (e.g., patenting or rating of new financial products) which help
to protect investors and the real economy from correlated financial products. Finally,
the model allows analyzing the consequences of new financial products. It can explain
a positive relationship between aggregate output, its volatility, the size of the banking
sector and the number of financial products.
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In the third chapter Bank lending and firm dynamics in general equilibrium (which
is joint work with Yingnan Zhao) we look at the interrelation of the real economy and
the financial sector at the entrepreneurial level. A model with dynamic long-term lending
contracts between banks and firms is developed, which addresses asymmetric information
in a general equilibrium framework. There are ex-ante identical, risk-averse households
who decide to become either worker or entrepreneur. Workers supply labor, consume
and save. Entrepreneurs run firms and produce by employing labor and capital. Their
production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale; the productivity realization is
state-contingent and private information to the entrepreneurs. There are risk-neutral
banks that offer annuity deposits to workers and use workers’ savings plus own bank eq-
uity to finance firms’ production. To resolve the information asymmetry (banks cannot
observe the realized state of productivity), banks offer to entrepreneurs profit-maximizing
long-term dynamic lending contracts with bank loans and repayments. The optimal con-
tracts are determined by recursive dynamic programming with promised value as state
variable. The promised value is the continuation utility of an entrepreneur from its future
consumption of net revenue (output generated by using bank loans minus repayments).
Optimal contracts are promise keeping, incentive compatible and fulfill the limited liabil-
ity and the credibility constraints. The general equilibrium model is analyzed numerically.
First, the three partial parts are solved: (i) Workers consume and save more, but supply
less labor, if they hold more current period deposits. (ii) Entrepreneurs employ a capital
intensity for production independent of the level of bank loans they receive. (iii) The
recursive optimal contract is characterized as follows: The higher today’s promised value
the higher are the level of bank loans and state-contingent future promised values. State-
contingent repayments first increase in the level of promised values and then decrease. The
contract induces entrepreneurs’ truth-telling about productivity realizations by postpon-
ing reward for a high productivity and by postponing punishment for a low productivity.
Second, the three partial parts are combined to determine the general equilibrium: By
simulating the economy with many households of different ages (for the entrepreneurs this
includes different histories of productivity realizations), the equilibrium interest and wage
rates as well as the share of entrepreneurs are determined by clearing in the labor and the
capital market and by zero profits for banks. In equilibrium, the interest rate is around
4% and the share of entrepreneurs is around 8%; numbers are in line with literature and
empirics. Furthermore, the simulation of different paths of life of entrepreneurs allows de-
termining the distributions of firms in the economy and firm dynamics: On average, older
firms are larger and grow less but in a more stable way than younger firms. In addition
to numerically solving the model and providing economic explanations for the results,
computational issues of the considered in dynamic programming problem are discussed.
7This dissertation adds to a better understanding of the interrelation of the real econ-
omy and the financial sector by connecting them in different theoretical general equilib-
rium models. It is worked out how fundamentals – both from the real economy and the
financial sector – as well as (distorted) beliefs and behaviors – of both households and
banks – lead to changes in the financial sector and its relation to the real economy. In
particular, it is shown how the interactions of agents from the real economy and from
the financial sector affect the sectoral structure of the economy; how they determine the
number of financial products; and how producing firms with access to bank loan financing
evolve, respectively. The structure of the dissertation is as follows: The three papers are
found in Part II and the respective appendices are provided in Part III. Part IV contains
the bibliography and Part V presents my curriculum vitae.
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1 Explaining structural change towards and
within the financial sector1
Joint with Josef Falkinger and Yingnan Zhao
1.1 Introduction
Financialization and inequality are topics that stir up the public debate – among ex-
perts as well as outside the scientific community. Discussions about financialization
(Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013; Philippon and Reshef, 2012, 2013) have gained mo-
mentum by the financial crisis; the inequality debate was brought “in from the cold”
(Atkinson, 1997) towards the end of the last century and has reached the center court re-
cently with the Piketty book (Piketty, 2014). This paper argues that the two phenomena
are genuinely related to each other. Structural change towards and within the financial
sector, as observed over the last three decades, enhances inequality. And rising inequality
fosters financialization.
We present our argument in a model that comprises the most basic tools provided
by economics for analyzing sectoral structure and distribution. Financialization means
two things: The weight of financial business relative to non-financial business increases
and the type of financial business changes. From a macroeconomic perspective the first
aspect can be summarized as structural change towards the financial sector: The financial
sector expands relative to the production sector. We do not approach this question from a
monetary or financial aspect like the nominal transaction volume of the financial relative
to the real sector. Our perspective is a real economics one: The financial sector employs
resources and generates income for the resources employed. That is, there must be some
kind of output (service) that is produced, sold and purchased. The relevant measures
are therefore employment and income or output shares; the essential components to be
modeled are the production function of the financial sector and the demand function for
financial services. For capturing the second aspect of financialization – the shift from
conventional banking type activities to sophisticated modern finance – an appropriate
1This chapter is a revised version of the Working Paper No. 206 from the Working paper series /
Department of Economics at the University of Zurich.
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model structure requires two separate subsectors within the financial sector which differ
in their demand and production characteristics. In sum, we have therefore a three-sector
model – one production sector and two financial subsectors.
Inequality requires incorporating heterogeneous agents which differ in their endow-
ments. In our model we have low-skilled and high-skilled workers. They are mobile
between sectors and cost-minimal skill-intensities differ across sectors. As a consequence,
the interaction between sectoral structure and inequality comes through the skill pre-
mium. The focus on inequality between low-skilled and high-skilled workers is on the
one side motivated by the empirical fact that the rise in inequality over the last decades
has been driven to a large extent by skill premia and skill composition, as the ample evi-
dence from the skill-bias literature shows (for instance, Machin and Van Reenen (1998);
Piketty and Saez (2003)). On the other side, we see it as a first important step, which later
might be complemented by elements which focus on the functional distribution of income
between workers and capitalists or on rents. There is capital in our model; it must be.
After all, financial markets have the purpose to transform, under risk, current resources
into future production possibilities. This requires, on the one side, saving decisions and,
on the other side, capital investment into revenue-bearing inputs to future production. In
our model, returns on capital are generated by two different types of technologies (robust
and risky) which transform savings into future consumption possibilities.
Structural change can be caused by the supply side: Changing endowments or technical
change. The huge literature on directed technical change, for instance, has emphasized
this channel (Acemoglu, 2002). There is, however, also an important role for the demand
side. Although often neglected, income effects are essential for aggregate developments
(Boppart, 2014, 2015; Föllmi and Zweimüller, 2008). We account for demand side effects
by assuming that agents have quasi-homothetic preferences of the Stone-Geary form. The
specific finance aspect enters the demand side of our model through the following channel:
Demand for financial services comes from the need to manage portfolios and to finance
investments into profitable projects in a way that reflects the preferences of the agents
who own the endowments of the economy. Stone-Geary preferences account for the fact
that a part of the savings is motivated by future subsistence expenditures.
In our model the finance industry correctly assesses risks and productivity of invest-
ment projects and earns no rents. This is against popular views; neither does it reflect
the view of the authors of this paper. Actually, there are many sources for imperfections
in the financial sector. For instance, financial products may be distorted by neglected
correlation (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation), or insider knowledge and barriers to entry
generate rents for financial intermediation. A salient example is the so-called finance pre-
mium. There is convincing evidence that a finance premium exists (Célérier and Vallée,
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2015; Philippon and Reshef, 2007, 2012), that is, the same type of labor earns more in a
finance job than in other occupations. Nonetheless, from a methodological point of view,
we consider it as important to start with a benchmark model in which distortions are
kept at a minimum. Given the firm basis of such a benchmark, one can then be bold in
looking at the consequences of imperfections which certainly exists in reality in general
and in the financial business in particular. Arguably, rents can be more easily extracted
when they go along with the tide rather than against it. So it is important to know if
outcome changes are supported by changes in economic fundamentals. Section 1.7 gives
extensions which provide some ideas how distortions affect the comparative-static results
of the benchmark model. Moreover, in the quantitative implementation of our model in
Section 1.9, we try to separate the rent component of the expansion of the financial sector,
in particular new finance, from the part that is driven by economic fundamentals.
There is a long literature on the impact of financial development on economic growth
(Levine, 2005).2 The causes of financial sector growth and the changing structure of
financial activities, which are the topic of this paper, have been less scrutinized. The
literature related to our paper in a more narrow sense is rich as far as the empirical
side is concerned. In particular, Philippon and his co-authors did pioneering empirical
work on financialization. On the theoretical side the situation is quite different. To our
knowledge there are only two attempts to explain structural change towards finance in a
general equilibrium framework. Philippon (2012) sketches in his notes a 2x2 model with
a real and a financial sector both producing with capital and labor. The financial sector
produces intermediation services for households and firms. The focus is on the equilibrium
effects of changes in intermediation costs. Improvements in financial intermediation tend
to raise real wages but have in general an ambiguous effect on the GDP-share of the
financial sector. The GDP-share of finance rises if more firms need intermediation services.
Structural change between services for safe assets and services for risky investments or
wage inequality are not addressed nor do income effects play a role for the relative size of
the financial compared to the real sector. There is only one type of labor, one interest-
bearing asset and preferences are homothetic. Moreover, there are two types of households
- infinitely living saver households and households which live two periods and borrow when
young. By contrast, in our paper all households live for two periods and save when young;
2While the dominant view in this literature was that financial development is positive for growth,
a more skeptical view has emerged in the recent past. Gründler and Weitzel (2012) or Law and Singh
(2014) provide evidence that more finance is good for growth at low levels of financial development
but harmful beyond a certain threshold. Financial sector growth seems to harm in particular skill-
intensive (Kneer, 2013) and R&D intensive (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015) industries. Moreover, neg-
ative growth effects are robust if different measures of financialization are used, for instance market
capitalization rather than credits (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) or the employment share of the financial
sector (Capelle-Blancard and Labonne, 2011). Beck et al. (2012) find that in particular the shift from
enterprise credits to household credits is detrimental for growth and inequality enhancing.
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savings can be invested in a portfolio of safe and risky assets. The second theoretical
explanation of structural change towards finance is provided by Gennaioli et al. (2014).
Like in Philippon (2012) a 2x2-framework is considered and structural change within the
financial is not in the focus of the paper. The real sector produces with capital and labor,
the financial sector consists of financial intermediation experts in whom investors trust.
Therefore they are willing to pay them fees. Like in our set-up households live two periods
and save when young. Moreover, they also account for risky assets. Inequality among
households, however, plays no role. Their saving decision is exogenous - young households
save the entire wage - and the portfolio choice is determined by mean-variance preferences.
The main driver for structural change towards finance in their model is the idea that
financial intermediation services are not only required for the financing of new capital but
also for the preservation of the entire stock of capital accumulated over time. Since in a
Solow type growth model the capital coefficient increases, the share of financial services
in GDP increases, too. In our model, which focuses on comparative-static equilibrium
effects of skills and endowments, technologies and preferences, no long-run accumulation
effect is considered.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the formal structure
of our 3x3-model and its building blocks. Section 1.3 analyzes the production equilibrium.
Section 1.4 derives the demand for goods and financial services. Section 1.5 summarizes
the effects of inequality on the sectoral structure of the economy. In Section 1.6 the
general equilibrium is characterized and comparative-static effects are derived analyti-
cally. Section 1.7 gives extensions which provide some ideas how distortions affect the
comparative-static results of the benchmark model. In Section 1.8 an alternative to the
benchmark specification of the model is considered and the robustness of the results is
discussed. Section 1.9 confronts the theoretical results with empirical evidence from the
U.S.. Moreover, a numerical exercise is provided. Main conclusions are summarized in
Section 1.10.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Model set-up
We model a 3-sector, 3-factor economy. There is a production sector X and a finance
sector Z with two subsectors Z1 and Z2. All sectors employ low-skilled and high-skilled
workers. Produced goods are used for consumption and investment. For transforming
savings into future consumption possibilities, more or less risky technologies are available
which use capital as input and deliver consumption goods as output in the next period.
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(As an extension we present a variant of the model, in which capital is used in the X
sector to set up producing firms.) Financial services have the function to support the
transformation of savings into future consumption possibilities. Services Z1 are used for
safe savings. Services Z2 provide state-dependent instruments and are used for savings in
securities with risky returns.
We consider a (static) two-period OLG economy. The future t = 1 is uncertain. It
consists of a set Θ of distinguishable events and a set Θ¯ of events which are indistin-
guishable in t = 0. The future state space is
{
{θ|θ ∈ Θ} , Θ¯
}
. We have prob(Θ)=µ and
prob(θ|Θ)=piθ with ∑θ∈Θ piθ = 1.3 For θ ∈ Θ, state-contingent investment possibilities are
available which pay off if and only if state θ is realized. No state-contingent investment
possibilities exist for Θ¯ which reflects “true uncertainty”.
1.2.2 Saving decision and portfolio choice
There are N agents who live for two periods. They are endowed with a skill level and work
as either high-skilled or low-skilled worker when young. The number of low-skilled workers
is L¯ and the number of high-skilled workers is H¯. The efficiency units of labor provided
by a high-skilled and a low-skilled agent are given by bH and bL, respectively. They are
paid a wage per efficiency unit at rate, wl, l ∈ {L,H}. Income yl = wlbl can be consumed
in t = 0 or be saved and transformed to tomorrow’s consumption possibilities. Agents
are assumed to have quasi-homothetic preferences of the Stone-Geary form: Beyond a
subsistence level to be expended they spend income on the good produced in the X-
sector.4 They have an instantaneous indirect utility function of the form log(et− e¯t) where
et is the expenditure for good X consumption and e¯t ≥ 0 is the subsistence expenditure
level in time t. Intertemporal preferences are assumed to be additive logarithmic with a
discount factor δ.
The intertemporal problem of agents consists of two parts: A saving decision and
a portfolio choice. On the one hand, agents have to decide how much to expend on
consumption, e0, and how much to save, s. On the other hand, they have to put the saving
in an appropriate portfolio of financial products. For this purpose they demand financial
services. With the support of these services they decide how much of the saving is put
into deposits, d, with a safe payoff r, and how much into risky state-contingent financial
products (Arrow securities), fθ, which pay off Rθ if state θ is realized and zero otherwise.
We assume that all Arrow securities have the same expected payoff. Specifically, there
3This structure is taken from Falkinger (2014).
4Achury et al. (2012) show that a Stone-Geary type utility function is appropriate for explaining
stylized facts of household finance like higher saving rates of households with higher lifetime income or a
larger fraction of risky assets in the portfolios of wealthy agents.
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exists R > 0 so that
Rθ =
R
piθ
, θ ∈ Θ. (1.1)
For transforming one unit of deposit, one unit of financial services from subsector
1 is needed; and for transforming one unit of Arrow securities, one unit of financial
services from subsector 2 is required. Therefore, given the portfolio choice, {d, f} , with
f =
∑
θ∈Θ fθ, agents have to pay a fee T = pz1d + pz2f to the financial sector, where pz1
and pz2 are the prices for financial services Z1 and Z2, respectively.
5 Suppose the fee is
charged in the first period and agents internalize the fee in their portfolio choice. The
expected utility maximization problem of an agent l with income yl is then given by:
max
sl,{f l
θ
}θ∈Θ,dl
EU = log(el0 − e¯0) + δ
µ∑
θ∈Θ
piθ log(e
l
θ − e¯1) + (1− µ) log(elΘ¯ − e¯1)

subject to
el0 + (1 + pz1)d
l + (1 + pz2)
∑
θ∈Θ
f lθ = y
l (1.2)
elθ =

Rθf
l
θ + rd
l, if θ ∈ Θ
rdl, otherwise
(1.3)
sl =
∑
θ∈Θ
f lθ + d
l. (1.4)
In Section 1.4 aggregate demand functions for goods and financial services are derived
from this program.
1.2.3 Production of goods (X-sector)
Firms in the X-sector employ low-skilled and high-skilled labor as input factors in a linear
homogeneous production function
X = Gx(HX , LX),
where HX , LX denote respective labor employment in the X-sector. There is perfect
competition with zero-profit prices. This means:
px = cx(wH, wL), (1.5)
5Without loss of generality, it was assumed that financial services are measured in units of savings.
Without this normalization the cost of financial services per unit of saving would be p˜zi = pzini rather
than pzi , where ni denotes the units of financial services needed for one unit of saving in deposits (i = 1)
and securities (i = 2), respectively.
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where cx(wH, wL) are the unit costs and wH , wL are the wage rates of high- and low-skilled
labor, respectively, per efficiency units.
The goods price is taken as numéraire, px = 1. Revenue X is distributed to labor as
follows:
Wx = wLLx + wHHx = G
x(Lx, Hx),
where Wx is total wage earned in the X-sector.
Capital is used in technologies which transform savings into future consumption pos-
sibilities. Two types of technologies are available: A robust technology, which transforms
under any condition (i.e., in Θ and Θ¯) one unit of capital invested today into r units
of output tomorrow; furthermore, for θ ∈ Θ, a set of risky technologies specialized to
θ-contingent environments. One unit of capital invested in technology θ delivers Rθ units
of output if state θ ∈ Θ occurs tomorrow and zero otherwise. Deposits are invested in
the robust technology; savings in securities are invested in the respective risky technolo-
gies. The smaller the measure piθ of the state to which a risky technology is targeted, the
more productive the capital invested in the technology. (1.1) expresses this relationship
between specialization advantage and risk.
The separation of the production of old age consumption goods by capital from the
labor-based production of the goods consumed and invested in the active period of life is
convenient from an analytical point of view. Under a more realistic perspective, however,
capital is typically a prerequisite for producing with labor. In the extension in Section
1.7.5, we show that essentially the same payoff structure arises if X is produced under
monopolistic competition and capital is needed to set up firms – by robust and risky set-
up technologies, respectively. Asset returns are then generated by the operating profits
of the firms the set-up of which has been financed by the asset.
In almost all of the further analysis only the relative payoff between robust and spe-
cialized risky technologies matters. It is given by:
ρ ≡ r
R
.
The only exception is the discounting of future subsistence expenditure, e¯1
r
, for which the
level of the return on the robust technology will matter.
1.2.4 Production of financial services (Z-sectors)
The financial sector Z consists of two subsectors, Z1 and Z2. They provide financial
services for transforming savings through safe and risky assets into future consumption
possibilities. (The assets are invested in the robust and risky technologies and households
get the generated revenue as return on their investment.)
18 Structural change
Zi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is produced with a linear homogeneous production function Gzi(.):
Zi = G
zi(Hzi , Lzi), i ∈ {1, 2} (1.6)
where Hzi , Lzi denote employment levels in the Zi-sector.
In reality, fixed costs may play an important role in the provision of financial services.
We consider such costs as an extension in Section 1.7.1 and show how changes in fixed
costs affect the equilibrium outcomes of our model.
We assume perfect competition in the Z-sectors and have therefore zero-profit prices
pzi = czi(wH , wL), i ∈ {1, 2} (1.7)
where czi(wH , wL) are the unit costs.
Revenue pziZi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is distributed to labor
Wzi = wLLzi + wHHzi = pziG
zi(Hzi, Lzi), i ∈ {1, 2}
where Wzi is total labor income earned in the Zi-sector.
As emphasized in the introduction of this paper, perfect competition in the Z-sector
is an ideal benchmark rather than a description of reality. The role of rents is considered
in the extension presented in Section 1.7.2.
1.3 Production equilibrium and supply of goods and
financial services
At the production side, the essential feature we want to address is variation in skill
intensities. For an explicit comparative-static analysis we take production functions of
the Cobb-Douglas form.
Let, for j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, Gj have Cobb-Douglas form
Gj (Lj , Hj) = AjL
1−αj
j H
αj
j ,
where Aj is total factor productivity and αj is the factor share of high-skilled workers in
sector j.6 Then
aLj =
1
Ajκ
αj
j
, aHj =
κ
1−αj
j
Aj
(1.8)
6The magnitudes of the total factor productivities depend on the unit in which financial services are
measured. Since financial services are measured in units of savings, Ax < Az1 ≤ Az2 is a plausible
restriction on total factor productivities. Analytically no such restriction is required for the results.
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are the input coefficients, and the cost-minimizing skill-intensities κj ≡ aHj /aLj are given
by
κj(ω) =
γj
ω
, γj ≡ αj
1− αj , (1.9)
where ω ≡ wH/wL is the relative wage per efficiency unit of skilled labor compared to
unskilled labor. It reflects the skill premium (per efficiency unit).7
1.3.1 Wages and prices
We have for variable unit costs in sector j:
cj (wH , wL) =
w
1−αj
L w
αj
H
AjΓj
, Γj ≡ ααjj (1− αj)1−αj . (1.10)
Using (1.10) and px = 1 in the zero-profit price equation (1.5), we obtain
wL = AxΓxω
−αx , (1.11)
and from (1.7), for i ∈ {1, 2},
pzi =
Ax
Azi
Γx
Γzi
ωαzi−αx . (1.12)
In sum, prices for financial services are related to the skill premium in the following way:
Fact 1.1. The price of financial services Zi, pzi, is an increasing function of ω if αzi > αx.
If αzi = αx, then pzi is invariant with respect to ω. Moreover, αzi > αx (αzi = αx) is
equivalent to κzi > κx ( κzi = κx).
Proof. Follows from (1.12) and (1.9), respectively.
As known from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, this fact holds quite generally and is
not an artifact of the Cobb-Douglas specification.
In the further analysis we make the following assumption about the factor intensity
ranking of the three sectors:
Assumption 1.1. αz2 ≥ αz1 and αz1 ≥ αx with at least one inequality holding strictly.
In Section 1.9 we provide evidence on the sectoral skill intensities. Assumption 1.1 is
consistent with the evidence.
7Note that κj =
bHH¯j
bLL¯j
. According to (1.9), the inverse labor demand function is ω =
(
γj
bL
bH
)
L¯j
H¯j
.
Thus, we have skill-biased technical change (in the sense of an outward shift of skilled-labor demand
relative to unskilled-labor demand) if the output elasticity αj of high-skilled labor rises or if there is
low-skilled labor augmenting progress (that is bL/bH rises). It is worth noting that αj is a sector-specific
component whereas bL/bH is uniform across sectors.
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1.3.2 Resource constraints
Total labor endowment in efficiency units is given by
L = bLL¯, H = bHH¯,
so that the “skill richness” of the total labor force is
k ≡ bHH¯
bLL¯
.
The aggregate resource constraints are:
aLxX + a
L
z1
Z1 + a
L
z2
Z2 = bLL¯
aHx X + a
H
z1
Z1 + a
H
z2
Z2 = bHH¯
(1.13)
with alj , j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, l ∈ {H,L} being functions of the skill premium ω defined in (1.9).
For illuminating the drivers of structural change on the production side it is worth
looking, as an intermediary step, separately at the allocation of resources within the finan-
cial sector and the resource allocation between financial services and goods production.
We focus first on the allocation within the financial sector. Let total employment (in
efficiency units) in the financial sector be given by Lz and Hz, respectively. If αz2 = αz1 ,
the allocation of Lz and Hz on Z1 and Z2 is determined by the demand side only. If
αz2 > αz1 , then the resource constraints a
L
z1Z1+a
L
z2Z2 = Lz and a
H
z1Z1+a
H
z2Z2 = Hz solve
to:
Z1 =
Lz(κz2 − kz)
aLz1(κz2 − κz1)
, Z2 =
Lz(kz − κz1)
aLz2(κz2 − κz1)
, (1.14)
where kz ≡ HzLz is the “skill richness” of the labor force in the financial sector. This implies
for the supply structure within the financial sector:
Z2
Z1
=
aLz1
aLz2
kz − κz1
κz2 − kz
≡ χ(ω, kz) (1.15)
The following result on within sector structural change follows immediately.
Proposition 1.1. If αz2 > αz1, for a given level of employment in the financial sector,
an increase in the skill premium or a rise in the skill richness of labor employed in the
financial sector shift the supply structure from traditional financial services Z1 to new
financial services Z2.
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Proof. According to (1.9), κz2 > κz1 if αz2 > αz1 . For κz2 > κz1 ,
∂χ
∂ω
> 0 and ∂χ
∂kz
> 0 as
known from the Rybczynski analysis.
Moreover, for a given level of the skill richness, kz, of labor employed in the financial
sector, system (1.13) can be written in the form
aLxX + Lz = bLL¯
aHx X + kzLz = bHH¯
(1.16)
which leads to the following result.
Fact 1.2. For a given level of skill richness in the financial sector, we have
Lz
Lx
=
k − κx
kz − k . (1.17)
Proof. System (1.16) solves to Lx = bLL¯
kz−k
kz−κx
, Lz = bLL¯
k−κx
kz−κx
. Assumption 1.1 implies
kz > k > kx.
Thus, for a given skill premium ω (so that κx is fixed) and a given skill richness kz
in the financial sector, employment in the financial sector is ceteris paribus higher in an
economy with a large share of skilled labor k.
In a general equilibrium, however, employment in the financial sector is determined
simultaneously with the allocation of resources to the goods sector.
1.4 Income distribution and aggregate demand
The demand for financial services comes from the need of agents to transform current
savings into future income. For this purpose the asset-holding agents require financial
products and expert services from the financial sector which support them by choosing
and managing a portfolio of deposits and securities appropriate for their preferences.
The program max EU subject to (1.2)-(1.4) is only well-defined if e0 > e¯0 and e1 > e¯1.
This requires that
yl = blwl > y¯ ≡ e¯0 + (1 + pz1)
e¯1
r
, l ∈ {L,H} . (1.18)
y¯ denotes the present value of future subsistence expenditure in units of today’s final
output.
Assuming yH ≥ yL, which is equivalent to ω ≥ bL/bH , yL > y¯ is sufficient for (1.18).
The following fact gives a necessary and sufficient condition for yL > y¯. The signs below
the parameters show the sign of the respective partial derivatives.
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Fact 1.3. There exists a threshold ω+L so that y
L>y¯ if and only if ω<ω+L (Ax
+
, Az1
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
, e¯1
r
−
).
Proof. Appendix A.3.
Savings in securities are positive if and only if the following condition holds:
µR (1 + pz1) > (1 + pz2) r. The condition can be rewritten in the form
µ > pρ, p ≡ 1 + pz2
1 + pz1
, ρ ≡ r
R
. (1.19)
pρ is the relative net payoff (i.e., after correction for costs of financial services) of savings in
safe assets compared to savings in risky assets. If condition (1.19) is violated, the expected
net payoff of risky investment is lower than the net payoff of risk-free investments and all
savings is in deposits.
In the next subsection we analyze individual saving and expenditure behavior. Sub-
section 1.4.2 deals with aggregate demand.
1.4.1 Individual saving and expenditure behavior
As is derived in Appendix A.1, under the assumption that inequalities (1.18) and (1.19)
are satisfied, individual savings in deposits and securities are given by
dl = sd
δ
1 + δ
yl − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
, l = {L,H} , (1.20)
and
f l = sf
δ
1 + δ
yl − y¯
1 + pz2
, f lθ = piθf
l, θ ∈ Θ, l = {L,H} , (1.21)
respectively, with
sd =
1− µ
1− pρ, sf =
µ− pρ
1− pρ . (1.22)
Apart from the savings for future subsistence expenditure, e¯1
r
, in form of deposits, the
saving level is proportional to the supernumerary budget yl − y¯. In real terms, the value
of the supernumerary budget, which is relevant as a basis for saving, depends on the price
of the financial service charged on the particular form of savings – pz1 for deposits and
pz2 for securities. The split of the saving on safe and risky assets is given by the marginal
propensities to save in deposits, sd, and in securities, sf , respectively. The propensity of
safe investment increases in the relative net payoff of the safe asset, pρ, and declines with
the measure µ of states covered by securities. The propensity of risky investment reacts in
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the opposite direction.8 In sum, the two propensities add up to one so that total saving,
sl = dl + f l, is given by:
sl =
δ
1 + δ
yl − y¯
1 + pz1
(sd +
sf
p
) +
e¯1
r
(1.23)
If saving in securities is more costly than saving in deposits, sf is discounted by the fee
differential p.9
In contrast to net savings, gross savings include the fee to be paid for the financial
services consumed in support for the transformation of savings into future income. Adding
up (1 + pz1)d
l + (1 + pz2)f
l, we have
sl + tl =
δ
1 + δ
(yl − y¯) + (1 + pz1)e¯1
r
, (1.24)
where tl = pz1d
l + pz2f
l denotes the total fee paid by agent l.
Current expenditures el0 = y
l − (sl + tl) are thus:
el0 =
1
1 + δ
(yl − y¯) + e¯0. (1.25)
For the discussion of structural change on the demand side, the effect of income on the
portfolio structure is of particular importance.10 According to (1.20) and (1.21), richer
agents invest a larger share of their saving in risky assets than the relatively poorer ones.
The reason is that the provision for future subsistence expenditure by safe investments has
diminishing weight if people become richer. This means that saving in deposits has the
character of a “necessity” and saving in risky securities is a “luxury”. Moreover, if present
subsistence expenditure is more pressing than future subsistence expenditure, people save
a smaller part of their income when they are poor and the saving rate s/y rises when they
get richer.11 The following fact summarizes this important implication of our model.
8For e¯0 = e¯1 = 0 and pz1 = pz2 = 0, we have sd =
1−µ
1−ρ and sf =
µ−ρ
1−ρ . Defining R¯ =
R
µ and
ρ¯ = r
R¯
, we can rewrite the two terms in the form sd =
R¯(1−µ)
R¯−r/µ
and sf =
µR¯−r/µ
R¯−r/µ
. Thus, with Cobb-
Douglas preferences and zero financial intermediation cost, the portfolio choice coincides with the one
in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), where the conditional expectation R¯ of the productivity of risky tech-
nologies is used rather than the unconditional expectation R.
9If inequality (1.19) is violated, then saving in securities is unattractive in the first place and we have
a corner solution with sf = 0 and sd = s =
δ
1+δ
y−y¯
1+pz1
+ e¯1r .
10Boppart (2015) analyzes the skill-content of the consumption basket of different income groups. With
rising income, a household’s demand shifts towards skill-intensive sectors (including financial services; also
shown by Suellow (2015) in detail).
11The role of subsistence requirements for the saving behavior may call into mind the effects of fixed
costs in the model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), where saving rate and portfolio structure depend
on an agent’s wealth due to constrained participation in the use of financial intermediation service. While
we consider the effect of a participation constraint as an extension in Section 1.7, no such constraint exists
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Fact 1.4. Let e¯0 > 0 or e¯1 > 0.
a) If e¯1 > 0 , then
∂(f/d)
∂y
> 0.
b) For e¯0 > 0,
∂(s/y)
∂y
> 0 if and only if δe¯0
1+pz1
> e¯1
r
[
1+δ
sd+sf/p
− δ
]
. (Note that for p = 1 the
square-bracketed term reduces to one.)
Proof. Part a) follows immediately from (1.20) and (1.21). For b) the definition of y¯ in
(1.18) is used.
1.4.2 Aggregate demand for goods and financial services
Saving and expenditure behavior follow affine-linear functions. Therefore, aggregate be-
havior depends on two things: The level of aggregate income and the number of people
over which the income is distributed. The latter comes in through the fact that sub-
sistence requirements are bound to the existence of an agent, independent of her or his
income.
Aggregating the two pools of agents, we have
N = L¯+ H¯
for the size of the population and
W = wLbLL¯+ wHbHH¯
for the level of aggregate income. In view of (1.11), the latter amounts to
W = AxΓxbLL¯ω
−αx(1 + ωk). (1.26)
The following fact shows that aggregate income, measured in units of X, is an increas-
ing function of the skill premium (ω = wH/wL).
Fact 1.5. Under Assumption 1.1, W is increasing in ω. We have
∂W
∂ω
= Awω
−αx(1− αx) (k − κx) > 0 (1.27)
with Aw ≡ AxΓxbLL¯.
in the baseline considered here. But everybody has to expend a certain sum to survive. This biases saving
rate and portfolio structure. If people get richer the pressure of the subsistence requirements diminishes.
There are of course other important differences to Greenwood and Jovanovic. In particular, all forms of
saving require costly financial intermediation in our framework. Moreover, our focus is on inequality in
labor income rather than wealth inequality and on structural change rather than growth.
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Proof. According to (1.26),
∂W
∂ω
= Awω
−αx
[
−αx
ω
(1 + ωk) + k
]
= Awω
−αx
[
−αx
ω
+ (1− αx)k
]
= Awω
−αx(1− αx)
[
k − αx
1− αx
wL
wH
]
.
According to (1.9),
αx
1− αx =
wHa
H
x
wLaLx
.
Thus, the square-bracketed term reduces to k − κx, which is positive if Assumption 1.1
holds.
Financial services provision is more skill intensive than goods production, at least on
average. Therefore, in terms of goods, aggregate wage income rises with the skill premium.
A different matter is the impact of the skill premium on the purchasing power for financial
services, the price of which rises too with the skill premium.
Aggregating individual investments in deposits, given by (1.20), we obtain
D =
(
sd
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
)
N, (1.28)
where w¯ ≡ W
N
denotes average income. In an analogous way, we have from (1.21):
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz2
N, Fθ = piθF (1.29)
for aggregate investments in securities. Aggregate savings are
S =
[
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz1
(
sd +
sf
p
)
+
e¯1
r
]
N (1.30)
and aggregate current expenditures are
E0 =
[
1
1 + δ
(w¯ − y¯) + e¯0
]
N. (1.31)
1.5 The effect of the skill premium on the sectoral
structure
In a general equilibrium, sectoral structure and skill premium are determined simulta-
neously. As an intermediate step we characterize the sectoral structure as a function of
the skill premium and exogenous parameters, keeping in mind that in the end the skill
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premium depends on exogenous parameters, too. Not all possible values of skill premia
and parameters are of interest, but only those which are reasonable candidates for a gen-
eral equilibrium, in which both financial sectors are viable, the subsistence of all agents is
feasible and a positive skill premium results. The following paragraphs characterize the
set of parameter configurations which guarantee these equilibrium properties.
Assumption 1.1 that financial service provision is more skill intensive than goods
production (κx < k < κz) is equivalent to
γx
k
< ω < γz
k
as we know from (1.9). At
ωmin ≡ γxk the Z-sector vanishes and beyond ωmax ≡ γzk there would be no longer an
X-sector. Hence, we consider the range ω ∈ (ωmin, ωmax) in our search for the equilibrium
skill premium.
Moreover, according to Fact 1.3, ω < ω+L (Ax
+
, Az
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
, e¯1
r
−
) is required for guaranteeing
subsistence for low-skilled agents. ω+L ≥ ωmax holds if Ax, Az and bL are large enough (for
given e¯0,
e¯1
r
), or e¯0 and
e¯1
r
are not too high (for given Ax, Az, bL). If ω
+
L < ωmax, only range
ω ∈ (ωmin, ω+L ) is feasible.
Finally, ω ≥ bL/bH is required for yH ≥ yL. This is guaranteed if ωmin ≥ bL/bH , which
is equivalent to
γx ≥ H¯
L¯
.
In terms of exogenous fundamentals, the requirements mean that we restrict the pos-
sible combinations of exogenous model parameters
ξ =
{
Ax, Az1, Az2 , αx, αz1, αz2 , bL, bH , H¯, L¯, e¯0,
e¯1
r
, ρ, µ, δ
}
to the following set:
Ξ0 ≡
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣∣H¯L¯ ≤ γx, γxk < ω˜max
}
, (1.32)
where k = bHH¯
bLL¯
and ω˜max ≡ min
{
ωmax, ω
+
L (Ax, Az1, bL, e¯0,
e¯1
r
)
}
.
In general, the interaction of the allocation of resources between the X-sector and
the Z-sector, on the one hand, and the allocation within the Z-sector on Z1 and Z2,
on the other hand, are hard to disentangle in an economically transparent way. For
qualitatively robust insights into important channels we have to reduce complexity on
either the demand or the supply side. In the benchmark analysis presented in Section
1.5.1, 1.5.2 and 1.6, we shut down relative price effects within the financial sector by
assuming identical technologies for Z1 and Z2.
Assumption 1.2. αz1 = αz2 = αz > αx and Az1 = Az2 = Az.
12
12Without normalization n1 = n2 = 1, the assumption would read
Az1
n1
=
Az2
n2
. That is the provision
of financial services per unit of saving must be equal in the two subsectors. For instance, new financial
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Assumption 1.2 allows us to put focus on the income effects. In Section 1.8 we consider
the case αz2 > αz1 = αx as a robustness check. Moreover, in the quantitative implemen-
tation of the model we solve the model numerically for αj-values that match U.S. data
where αz2 > αz1 > αx .
We analyze first the impact of an increase in the skill premium on structural change
within the financial sector.
1.5.1 Within change
The value added in subsector Zi, i = {1, 2} , is equal to aggregate expenditure on the
produced services. According to (1.28) and (1.29), aggregate expenditures for financial
services have the following structure:
pz2F
pz1D
=
sfζη¯
sdη¯ +
1+δ
δ
e¯1
r
≡ Φ(sd
−
, sf
+
,
e¯1
r
−
, ζ
+
(ω), η¯
+
(ω)) (1.33)
where ζ(ω) ≡ pz2
pz1
1+pz1
1+pz2
, η¯(ω) ≡ w¯−y¯
1+pz1
and sd, sf are defined in (1.22). While the
impacts of saving propensities sd and sf on the within structure are straightforward, the
role of the skill premium is in general ambiguous. ζ(ω) expresses relative price effects.
Since pz1 = pz2 = pz under Assumption 1.2, ζ(ω) reduces to one (see discussion in Section
1.8 for the case of changing relative prices within the Z-sector). η¯(ω) is the average
supernumerary income weighted by the cost of future subsistence. It captures the income
effect on within structural change. If e¯1 = 0, there is no income effect on the demand
structure for financial services. For e¯1 > 0, the impact of the skill premium on the value
added ratio Φ of sector Z2 compared to Z1 depends in the benchmark only on the shape
of η¯(ω). The following lemma characterizes the properties of η¯(ω).
Lemma 1.1. Let exogenous model parameters belong to Ξ0 defined in (1.32).
a) If ξ ∈ Ξ1 ≡ Ξ0 ∩ {ξ|αx + αz > 1}, then there exists a threshold ω(Ax
?
, Az
?
, k
−
, bLL¯
N
?
, e¯0
−
)
with ∂η¯
∂ω
∣∣∣ω=ω = 0 so that:
∂η¯
∂ω
< 0 for ω < ω,
∂η¯
∂ω
> 0 for ω > ω.
services may be provided more productively than traditional services, but, at the same time, more units
of services are needed to transform a unit of saving into future payoff by complex rather than simple
financial products.
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Especially, define Ξ1D ≡ {ξ|ω > ωmin} and Ξ2D ≡ {ξ|ω < ω˜max}. If ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ1D, then
∂η¯
∂ω
> 0 for all ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max). If ξ ∈ Ξ1 −Ξ2D, then ∂η¯∂ω < 0 for all ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max).
b) For the comparative-static analysis we have:
η¯
ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+, bLL¯N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−

Proof. Appendix A.3.
On the one hand, a higher ω raises the average wage. On the other hand, the prices
of financial services are increasing, which has a negative effect on the purchasing power.
According to Lemma 1.1, the first effect dominates if the skill premium is sufficiently high.
In sum, we have the following partial results about within structural change in the
finance sector.
Proposition 1.2. Let e¯1 > 0.
a) A rise in the skill premium leads to structural change from subsector Z1 to subsector Z2
(in terms of value added) at high levels of the skill premium (ω > ω) and to structural
change from Z2 to Z1 at low levels of skill premium.
b) For a given skill premium, a rise of Ax, Az, k,
bLL¯
N
or a decline of e¯0,
e¯1
r
lead to structural
change from Z1 to Z2. A rise of µ or a decline of ρ also leads to change from Z1 to
Z2, even if e¯1 = 0.
Proof. (1.33), Lemma 1.1 and the fact that a rise in µ or a decline in ρ raises sf (at cost
of sd).
The proposition describes only a partial effect. For a full comparative-static equilib-
rium analysis, we have to combine the direct effects of exogenous fundamentals with their
indirect effects through the equilibrium skill premium. We come back on the total effects
in Section 1.6.4.
1.5.2 Between change
For αz1 = αz2 = αz and Az1 = Az2 = Az, aggregate supply of financial services reduces
to:
Z(= Z1 + Z2) = AzLzκ
α
z .
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The allocation between the X-and the Z-sector is then determined by the resource
constraints:
aLxX + a
L
zZ = bLL¯,
aHx X + a
H
z Z = bHH¯.
In an analogous way to (1.14), we get from this as solution:
X =
bLL¯
aLx
κz − k
κz − κx , Z =
bLL¯
aLz
k − κx
κz − κx . (1.34)
Substituting aLj =
1
Ajκ
αj
j
, we have:
Z
X
=
Az
Ax
ψ(ω
+
, k
+
), ψ(ω, k) ≡ κ
αz
z
καxx
k − κx
κz − k . (1.35)
This gives us the following result for the comparative-static effects on the supply structure.
13
Proposition 1.3. An increase in the skill premium shifts the supply structure from goods
production to financial services provision. An increase in the high skilled labor share (k)
or biased technical change in favor of financial services (so that total factor productivity
Az rises relative to Ax) have the same effect.
Proof. The signs of the respective partial derivatives in (1.35) follow from κz > κx and
the Rybczynski analysis.
The proposition characterizes the supply structure as a function of exogenous fun-
damentals and the skill premium. The supply structure interacts with demand, which
depends on aggregate income and prices and thus also reacts to the skill premium. To
close the analysis, we have to determine the equilibrium skill premium. Section 1.6.3 will
summarize the general equilibrium effect of the skill premium on the between sectoral
structure.
13 Note that (1.35) characterizes the supply structure of labor produced output. If capital is used as
set-up capital as in the extended model in Section 1.7.5, then X is indeed the total size of final output
in the goods sector. In the baseline model considered here there is in addition the output generated for
old age consumption by past capital investments. Thus, the total size of goods transactions becomes
X¯ ≡ X + rD + µRF with X = E0 + S = E0 + D + F and the between structural change ratio is
Ψ¯ ≡ pzD+pzF
X¯
= pzD+pzFX+rD+µRF with D, F , E0 and S from (1.28)-(1.31). It is, ceteris paribus, increasing in
ω if S′E0−SE′0− (µR− r)(DF ′ −FD′) > 0 where D′, F ′, S′ and E′0 are the respective derivatives with
respect to ω. This means, if the between change (S′E0−SE′0) is larger than within change (DF ′−FD′)
multiplied with the return difference (µR− r).
30 Structural change
1.6 General equilibrium
Aggregate demand in the X-sector is composed of consumer goods demand, E0, and
investment goods demand, S = D + F . On top of it, old agents consume the output
generated by the capital they invested in the period before.
Aggregating the individual budget constraints (1.2), we obtain:
E0 +D + F + pz1D + pz2F = W, (1.36)
where W = Wx +Wz, Wx = X and Wz = pz1G
z1(Hz1, Lz1) + pz2G
z2(Hz2 , Lz2). If the Z1
and Z2-markets are cleared, we have G
z1(Hz1, Lz1) = D and G
z2(Hz2 , Lz2) = F so that
(1.36) reduces to
E0 +D + F = X.
Thus, the goods market is automatically cleared if the markets for financial services are
cleared.
Aggregate demand for financial services comes from savings in deposits D and savings
in securities F . Adding up (1.28) and (1.29), we have for aggregate demand in the Z-sector
ZD =
(
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
)
N. (1.37)
From (1.34) we know that aggregate Z-supply in production equilibrium is
ZS = AzbLL¯κ
αz
z
k − κx
κz − κx (1.38)
where aLz =
1
Azκ
αz
z
was used.
1.6.1 Existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibrium
Both market sides are functions of ω (which works through w¯ and pz on the demand
side and through skill intensities κx, κz on the supply side). For a stable equilibrium, the
condition
dZD
dω
<
dZS
dω
(1.39)
is required at the market clearing ω-value. Since pz is increasing in ω, inequality (1.39)
guarantees that a rise in price pz goes hand in hand with a reduction of excess demand
and a fall in the price reduces excess supply.
The supply function is characterized by the following fact.
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Fact 1.6. ZS is an increasing strictly concave function of ω starting at lim
ω→ωmin
ZS = 0
and approaching AzbLL¯k
αz at ωmax. More specifically,
ZS = AzbLL¯
γαzz
γz − γxg(ω+, k+), g(ω, k) = ω
−αz(kω − γx). (1.40)
Proof. Appendix A.3.
For the demand side the following fact applies.
Fact 1.7. Aggregate demand for financial services is given by:
ZD =
 δ
1 + δ
η¯
ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+, bLL¯N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−
+ e¯1
r
N,
where η¯ was discussed in Lemma 1.1. For all ξ ∈ Ξ1, ZD is defined and positive on the
ω-domain (ωmin, ω˜max). Moreover, it is either U-shaped in ω (for ξ ∈ ΞD ≡ Ξ1∩Ξ1D∩Ξ2D),
increasing over the entire domain (for ξ ∈ Ξ1−Ξ1D) or declining for all ω (if ξ ∈ Ξ1−Ξ2D).
Proof. Equation (1.37) and Lemma 1.1.
Figure 1.1 shows in the (ω, Z)-space the supply and demand curves under the assump-
tion that
ZD(ω˜max) < Z
S(ω˜max), (1.41)
where ω˜max was defined in (1.32).
14
If inequality (1.41) holds, then the market clearing condition ZD(ω) = ZS(ω) has a
unique solution ω∗ within (ωmin, ω˜max). Moreover, stability condition (1.39) is fulfilled at
ω∗. This establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 1.4. Define ΞE = Ξ1 ∩
{
ξ|ZD(ω˜max) < ZS(ω˜max)
}
. For all ξ ∈ ΞE, there
exists a unique and stable equilibrium.
Proof. Continuity of ZD on ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max) and properties of the shape of ZD established
in Fact 1.7.
1.6.2 Equilibrium skill premium
For the comparative-static equilibrium analysis, we have to look at the excess demand
function ZD − ZS. Because of stability condition ∂(ZD−ZS)
∂ω
< 0, we know that for any
14If ω˜max = ω
+
L , then Z
D(ω˜) is to be read as ZD(ω) < ZS(ω) for all ω < ω+L − , with  arbitrarily
small. Figure 1.1 assumes ξ ∈ ΞD; yet, from Fact 1.7 it is obvious that for ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ1D the ZD-curve
would cross the ZS-curve at ω∗ as in Case I, whereas for ξ ∈ Ξ1 −Ξ2D we would have at ω∗ the situation
illustrated in Case II.
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium in the financial service sector
exogenous change of a component i of ξ ∈ ΞE
sign
∂ω∗
∂i
= sign
∂(ZD − ZS)
∂i
|ZD=ZS .
For signing the impact of exogenous fundamentals on the equilibrium, we express
excessive demand explicitly as a function of model parameters. Using (1.26) and (1.12),
we have
w¯N
1 + pz
= AxbLL¯D1(ω|Az
Ax
+
, k
+
), (1.42)
where D1 ≡ Γx(1+ωk)ωαx+AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz
and the signs below parameters in (1.42) express the signs of
their impact on D1. Term D1 captures the purchasing power effect.
Moreover, substituting (1.12) for pz1 in (1.18) we can write the term
δ
1+δ
y¯
1+pz
− e¯1
r
in
the form:
D0(ω|Az
Ax
+
, e¯0
+
,
e¯1
r
−
) =
1
1 + δ
 δe¯0
1 + AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
− e¯1
r
 . (1.43)
Term D0 captures the effect of the subsistence requirements on the aggregate demand
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for financial services. The sign of the square-bracketed term is positive if the present
subsistence expenditure e¯0 dominates the future subsistence expenditure e¯1. It is negative
if e¯1 dominates e¯0. For the economic interpretation of the relevant notion of dominance
it is useful to recall AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx = pz. Thus, D0(ω|AzAx , e¯0, e¯1r ) > 0 (=, < 0) if and only if
δe¯0
1 + pz
>
e¯1
r
(=, <
e¯1
r
, resp.). (1.44)
This is exactly the condition for a rising (constant, declining, resp.) saving rate derived in
Fact 1.4.b). (Note that p = 1 in the benchmark case.) If present subsistence expenditures
are more pressing than future ones, people save more and demand more financial services
if they become richer and get farther away from subsistence problems.
Using D0 and (1.42) in (1.37) and combining the result with (1.40), we conclude that
ZD − ZS is equal to the term
AxbLL¯
 δ
1 + δ
D1(ω|Az
Ax
+
, k
+
)− N
AxbLL¯
D0(ω|Az
Ax
+
, e¯0
+
,
e¯1
r
−
)− Az
Ax
γαzz
γz − γx g(ω, k+)
 . (1.45)
Hence, e¯1 has a positive impact on Z
D−ZS and thus on ω∗; e¯0 has a negative impact.
Az
Ax
and k have opposing effects so that their impacts cannot be signed unambiguously by
inspection of (1.45).
The most interesting question is how technical change affects the equilibrium skill
premium. For this we have to look at the impact of AxbLL¯
N
on ZD −ZS. (Since Az
Ax
has an
ambiguous effect, we only consider uniform progress across sectors, that is, total factor
productivity Az rises pari passu with Ax.) The answer depends on condition (1.44). If
δe¯0
1+pz
> e¯1
r
, D0 is positive and ω
∗ increases if AxbLL¯
N
rises. If δe¯0
1+pz
< e¯1
r
, then D0 is negative
and ω∗ declines if AxbLL¯
N
increases. For e¯0 = e¯1 = 0,
AxbLL¯
N
has no effect.
In sum, we have the following partial effects of the parameters on the equilibrium skill
premium:15
ω∗(
Az
Ax
?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+/−
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
+
), (1.46)
where the impact of AxbLL¯
N
depends on the cases discussed above.
All addressed effects refer to the partial derivatives, that is, they hold under the
condition that other parameters do not change simultaneously. Economically this means,
the effects come from a single source. In particular, for the effect of bLL¯
N
on ω∗, skill richness
15The signs below the parameters represent the partial derivatives. The combination +/− is used for
pointing to case-dependent impacts. A question mark means that the impact of the respective parameter
cannot be signed without further investigation.
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k = bHH¯
bLL¯
is held constant in the comparison. This requires a careful interpretation of the
described effect of bLL¯
N
. The following fact provides an economically meaningful description
of the variations which are consistent with a constant k and a rise in bLL¯
N
.
Fact 1.8. A rise in bLL¯
N
is consistent with a constant k if there is:
a) Uniform factor-augmenting technical progress, raising bL pari passu with bH .
b) A shift in labor supply from unskilled to skilled labor accompanied by factor augment-
ing progress that is biased towards the low-skilled. (Note that such low-skilled labor
augmentation depresses the relative wage of the unskilled – like skill-biased technical
change.)
Proof. Use N = L¯+H¯ for N
bLL¯
=
1+ H¯
L¯
bL
. Hence, k = bHH¯
bLL¯
remains constant under a decrease
in N
bLL¯
if either bL and bH rise proportionally and H¯/L¯ does not change or
H¯
L¯
rises and bL
rises such that bL
bH
grows proportionally to H¯
L¯
.
With these clarification the following proposition summarizes the comparative-static
equilibrium results.
Proposition 1.5. Let e¯0 > or e¯1 > 0.
a) Uniform productivity growth across sectors (raising Ax and Az proportionally) or uni-
form factor-augmenting technical progress (raising bL and bH proportionally) have a
positive effect on the equilibrium skill premium if the present subsistence expenditure
dominates the future subsistence expenditure; if the future subsistence expenditure dom-
inates, then the skill premium declines.
b) A shift of labor supply from unskilled to skilled work accompanied by factor augmen-
tation which is biased towards low-skilled labor has the same effect on the equilibrium
skill premium as factor augmenting progress that is uniform.
c) The equilibrium skill premium rises, if future subsistence expenditure (e¯1) increases or
present subsistence expenditure (e¯0) declines.
Proof. Fact 1.8 and main text.
For the economic intuition behind a) and b) it is useful to remember Fact 1.4.b). If
present subsistence expenditure weighs more than future subsistence requirements then
the saving rate and therefore demand for financial services are rising with income. Since
the financial services are more skill intensive than goods, this rise of demand induces a
rise in the skill premium. The rising income in turn comes from technical progress or a
better educated workforce. The intuition for c) is: If future subsistence expenditure is
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high, agents have to save more and need more financial services; and if present subsistence
expenditure is low, they can afford to save more and to spend more for financial services.
It is worth noting that positive subsistence expenditure (e¯0 > 0 or e¯1 > 0) is essential
for the comparative-static results stated in Proposition 1.5. For e¯0 = e¯1 = 0, expression
(1.45) boils down to
AxbLL¯
 δ
1 + δ
D1
ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Az
Ax
+
, k
+
− Az
Ax
γαzz
γz − γxg
(
ω, k
+
) .
Thus, uniform productivity growth has no effect in this case nor has bLL¯
N
.
1.6.3 Structural change between production and financial ser-
vice sectors
Combining the results of subsections 1.6.2 and 1.5.2, we obtain the following results for
the structural change between production and financial services in equilibrium:
Proposition 1.6. For all ξ ∈ ΞE, at given AzAx , k, any change in other exogenous fun-
damental which raises (lowers) the skill premium leads to structural change from X to Z
(Z to X, respectively).
Proof. Equation (1.35). Since pz rises with ω, the rise of ψ immediately implies that
pzZ
X
rises too.
1.6.4 Structural change within the financial sector
Finally, for structural change within the financial sector, we have the following results in
equilibrium:
Proposition 1.7. Let ω be the threshold defined in Lemma 1.1 and parameters fulfill
ξ ∈ ΞE. Then, under the assumption that prices do not differ across financial services,
the following comparative-static results hold for structural change within the financial
sector as long as e¯1 > 0:
a) At high levels of the skill premium (ω∗ > ω), a fall of e¯0 leads to a shift from Z1
to Z2. In addition, if present subsistence expenditure dominates future subsistence
expenditure, uniform productivity growth across sectors (i.e., a proportional rise of Ax
and Az) as well as an increase in
bLL¯
N
change the structure within the financial sector
from Z1 towards Z2. According to Proposition 1.5 and 1.6, these changes induce an
increase in the inequality level ω∗, accompanied by a simultaneous structural change
from the goods to the financial service sector.
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b) At low levels of the skill premium (ω∗ < ω), a fall of e¯1 leads to a shift from Z1 to Z2. In
addition, if future subsistence expenditure dominates present subsistence expenditure,
uniform productivity growth across sectors as well as and an increase in bLL¯
N
change
the structure within the financial sector from Z1 towards Z2. However, according to
Proposition 1.5 and 1.6, these changes correspond to a decrease in the inequality level
ω∗, accompanied by a simultaneous a structural change from the financial service to
the goods sector.
c) Financial product innovation (a rise of µ) or rising attractiveness of risky investments
(a decline of ρ) lead to structural change from Z1 to Z2, even if e¯1 = 0.
Proof. Using (1.33), (1.46), and Lemma 1.1, we have
Φ
sd− , sf+ , e¯1r
−
, η¯
+
 ω∗
+/−
Az
Ax
?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+/−
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
+
 , Ax
+
, Az
+
, k
+
,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−

 ,
where the signs below the parameters show the sign of the respective partial derivative
of the functions Φ{·}, η¯[·] and ω∗(·). The plus below ω∗ applies for ω∗ > ω, the minus
for ω∗ < ω. The plus below AxbLL¯
N
applies for the case that e¯0 dominates e¯1; the minus
applies if e¯1 dominates e¯0. For the impacts of µ and ρ note that sf is rising and sd is
declining in µ and rising in ρ.
It is worth noting that for e¯1 = 0 there is no income effect on the portfolio structure
so that the channel between skill premium and financial structure is shut down. Since in
the benchmark considered here relative price effects within the financial sector were shut
down too, for e¯1 = 0 only financial innovation (a rise in µ) and rising relative returns
on risky investment (a decline of ρ) remain as sources of structural change within the
financial sector. This will change in the model variant with different technologies for Z1
and Z2 considered in Section 1.8.
The punchline of the general equilibrium analysis in the baseline model is: When
the skill premium has reached a certain level, a rise in average income leads to rising
inequality and to two fold structural change towards and within the financial sector si-
multaneously. The rise in income can be triggered by a general rise of productivity or
by an increased selection of the population into higher education (accompanied by labor
augmenting progress that makes low-skilled labor abundant relative to skilled labor). The
income effects generated by technical progress or education are robust drivers of the devel-
opments outlined at the beginning of this paper. They can explain a rising skill premium
and the twofold structural change towards and within finance by a single source, holding
everything else constant. Yet, of course, in reality the effects triggered by this source are
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overlaid by many other things that happen at the same time. The model points to a series
of other exogenous fundamentals that affect skill premium and economic structure. Thus,
the specific combination of determinants that actually determine the observed patterns
of inequality and structural change can only be identified by empirical analysis. The
quantitative analysis in Section 1.9 illustrates possible combinations of exogenous factors
which are consistent with the development observed from 1980 onwards. Before turning
to the quantitative analysis, we want to add realism to the model by considering exten-
sions which account for important aspects that have been neglected in the “perfect-world”
analysis presented so far.
1.7 Extensions
Five extensions are considered: Fixed costs in the financial sector, rents in the financial
sector, distorted portfolio choices of households, participation constraints in finance sub-
sector Z2 and set-up capital for firms. Like the equilibrium analysis in the benchmark,
the extended analysis is based on Assumption 1.2. Moreover, for avoiding too many case
distinctions, dominance of e¯0 over e¯1 is assumed in this section.
1.7.1 Fixed costs in the financial sector
Suppose that financial services are provided by banks. A bank b, serving Nb clients, needs
Kb = fBNb units of goods to set up the capacity to serve them. We assume that the fixed
cost Kb is financed by a lump-sum fee
τ = fB
imposed on the clients. That is, bank size and number of banks affect neither aggregate
fixed costs
KB = fBN
nor the households’ budget constraint. In the latter, yl reduces to yl − τ so that the
supernumerary budget becomes yl − y¯+, with y¯+ = y¯ + τ = e¯0 + fB + (1 + pz1)e¯1/r.
Hence, fixed cost fB has the same comparative-static effect on household choices as an
increase in subsistence expenditure e¯0. For the X-market this means, on the one hand, the
absorption of X by households’ consumption and investment is reduced by KB = fBN .
On the other hand, KB is spent by banks to set up the capacity to serve their clients. In
sum, we have
E0 − fBN +D + F +KB = X
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for the goods market clearing, which reduces to the condition in the benchmark model:
E0 +D + F = X
since fBN = KB. Hence, goods markets are cleared whenever the Z-markets are cleared.
In the markets for financial services, demand is reduced by the fact that w¯− y¯+ rather
than w¯−y¯ is now the relevant supernumerary income. The supply side remains unaffected.
In equilibrium, the implications of fixed costs can be derived by looking in the benchmark
model at the effect of a rise of e¯0 to e¯0 + fB.
Proposition 1.8. A decline in fixed costs fB has the following effects:
a) The skill premium rises.
b) The between sectoral structure shifts from X to Z.
c) The within sectoral structure shifts from Z1 to Z2 at high levels of the skill premium
(ω∗ > ω). At low levels of the skill premium (ω∗ < ω) the effect is ambiguous.
Proof. Comparative-static results for e¯0 in Proposition 1.5-1.7.
1.7.2 Rents in the financial sector
Suppose that a club of agents in the finance sector has the power to extract rents from
financial service provision.16 One may think of rentiers who have unearned property rights
or an elite subgroup of employees in the financial sector. We make two crucial assumptions:
First, whoever are the rent extracting agents, they spend the rent like other agents. Thus,
the redistribution of rents has no income effect on aggregate demand. (Total subsistence
requirements and aggregate supernumerary income remain unchanged). Second, nobody
can enter the club from outside so that the rent does not affect labor allocation.
In the presented model, two instruments can be used to extract rents. First, a fixed
fee τ˜ as in extension 1.7.1, but with:
τ˜ > fB.
Aggregate rents (τ˜ − fB)N are lump-sum redistributed. Everybody pays τ˜ and an elite
N0 receives the rent. Thus, average supernumerary income becomes
w¯ − y¯ − τ˜ + N0
N
(τ˜ − fB)N
N0
= w¯ − y¯ − fB.
16As pointed out in the introduction, there is robust evidence that indeed a substantial finance premium
exists. This paper deals with the consequences of rents, not with possible explanations why they exist.
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In this case, the rent has no effects on aggregate income, expenditure structure, labor
allocation, relative prices or the skill premium. Nevertheless, there is lump-sum redistri-
bution of income from the real to the financial sector and within the financial sector. This
redistribution implies for the sectoral income shares:
pzZ + (τ˜ − fB)N
X
and
pzF + ν(τ˜ − fB)N
pzD + (1− ν)(τ˜ − fB)N ,
respectively, where ν is the share of the elite rent going to new finance. It is obvious that
a rising finance rent increases the total finance share in the economy. For a given rent
distribution ν, a rise in τ˜ raises the income share of new finance relative to traditional
finance as long as νD > (1−ν)F , that is as long as the new finance share is not too large.
A rise in ν trivially leads to a rise in the new finance share.
A second instrument of rent extraction would be to charge a markup on unit cost
prices in the financial sector so that households have to pay
p˜zi = pzi(1 + oi)
for financial services.
Using (1.12), we have
p˜zi = (1 + oi)
Ax
Azi
Γx
Γzi
ωαzi−αx .
In the benchmark case with pz1 = pz2 a rent o1 = o2 = o decreases D1 in (1.42) to
AxΓx(1+ωk)
ωαx+
(1+o)AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz
and decreases D0 in (1.43) to
1
1+δ
[
δe¯0
1+(1+o)AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
− e¯1
r
]
. Hence, o has
an ambiguous impact on ZD − ZS and thus on ω∗.
Proposition 1.9. Rents in the financial sector have the following effects:
a) If rents are extracted by lump sum fees, they have no allocative equilibrium effects.
Yet, there is a redistributive effect that raises the finance share in total income. The
structure of the subsector shares within finance depends on how the earned rents are
distributed on traditional and new finance, respectively.
b) If rents are extracted by a markup on financial service prices, there is a redistributive
effect towards (and within) the financial sector. Yet, the markups affect all equilibrium
values in a generally ambiguous way.
Proof. Main text.
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1.7.3 Distorted portfolio choice
Several empirical studies have pointed out that people get confused in dealing with com-
plex financial markets (see Célérier and Vallée (2014) and the literature discussed there).
In our model, the complex part that households have to solve is the choice of the portfolio
of the securities. The choice may be based on a wrong assessment of relative risks and
returns of different securities. In this case, we have distortion within Z2 and consumption
levels planned for the future may be deceived by actual payoffs.17 As our study focuses
on structural change between X and Z as well as between Z1 and Z2, we do not consider
such distortions here. Rather we focus on distortions coming from misperception of the
opportunities to save by securities investment rather than in deposits.
In particular, people may have wrong beliefs µ˜ about the measure of future environ-
ments covered by state-contingent securities, relative to the non-covered part of possible
future events. They may also misjudge the relative payoff of deposits compared to the
payoffs of securities and base their decisions on a distorted ρ˜. Such distortions affect the
propensities to save in deposits and in securities. For instance, if agents are euphoric
about investments in securities and believe that µ˜ > µ or ρ˜ < ρ, then sf rises while sd
declines. The total propensity to save, however, does not change in the benchmark model
with pz1 = pz2 .
18 Therefore, the only consequence of µ˜ > µ or ρ˜ < ρ is sectoral change
within the financial sector. According to (1.33), Φ rises.
Proposition 1.10. Euphoric beliefs about measure or performance of state-contingent
financial instruments lead to within sectoral change from Z1 to Z2. Equilibrium skill
premium and (X,Z)-structure are not affected in the benchmark model (with identical
technologies in Z1 and Z2).
Proof. Equation (1.33).
1.7.4 Participation constraints
Suppose that a fixed fee τ is charged only to agents who invest in securities. Moreover,
assume that there is a participation constraint:
yL > y¯ > yL − τ,
yH > yH − τ > y¯.
17Falkinger (2014) focuses on such distortions in an one sector economy.
18For pz1 6= pz2 , however, we would have sd + sfp for the marginal propensity to save, as shown by
(1.23). Thus, µ and ρ impact also on ZD and therefore on ω and all other equilibrium outcomes. See
Section 1.8 for a more detailed discussion.
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Then, low-skilled agents do not participate in the securities market, while high-skilled
agents do. According to (A.18) in Appendix A.2, we have for l = L:
sL = dL =
δ
1 + δ
yL − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
.
For l = H , saving behavior is given by (1.20) and (1.21) with y¯+ = y¯ + τ .
This gives us the following aggregate saving levels:
D =
δ
1 + δ
1
1 + pz
[
(yL − y¯)L¯+ sd(yH − y¯+)H¯
]
+
e¯1
r
N
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
H¯
1 + pz
(yH − y¯+)
S =
 δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯ − τ H¯
N
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
N.
Comparing S with ZD in (1.37), we see that fee τ , combined with the participation
constraint, impacts on ZD and thus on the skill premium and the (X,Z)-structure like
an increase of e¯0 to
e˜0 = e¯0 + τ
H¯
N
.
Moreover, F
D
=
sf H¯
(yL−y¯)L¯
yH−y¯+
+sdH¯+
1+δ
δ
(1+pz)e¯1
r
N
yH−y¯+
is declining in τ . Thus, the participation
constraint does not change the comparative-static effects of fixed cost τ described in
Proposition 1.8.
The above conclusion is only valid if τF is absorbed by real fixed cost requirements
as discussed in Section 1.7.1. If τF is a rent which is redistributed back to high-skilled
agents, as in Section 1.7.2, we have (yH − y¯ − τ)H¯ + τH¯ = yH − y¯ instead of yH − y¯+ so
that
D =
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
N (1− sfβH) + e¯1
r
N
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
H¯
1 + pz
(yH − y¯)
S =
(
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
)
N
with βH ≡ yH−y¯w¯−y¯ H¯N denoting the income share of high-skilled agents. For the high-skilled
nothing changes, but the low-skilled are only saving through D. This means that, com-
pared to the benchmark, we have an increase in D and a decrease in F . ZD = S coincides
with the expression in (1.30) so that equilibrium skill premium and (X,Z)-structure are
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not changed compared to the baseline.19
For the within sectoral structure in the Z-sector, we have in the benchmark case with
pz1 = pz2 = pz:
F
D
=
sfβH
1− sfβH + 1+δδ 1+pzw¯−y¯ e¯1r
=
sfβH η¯
sdη¯ + sf(1− βH)η¯ + 1+δδ e¯1r
≡ Φ˜
Comparing this with (1.33), we conclude that Φ˜ < Φ because sf(1 − βH) > 0. Yet,
the proportion of total expenditure on new finance relative to expenditure on traditional
finance pzF+τH¯
pzD
= F
D
+ τH¯
pzD
is ambiguous. Rent τ increases the new finance share, but the
participation constraint induces a shift of the portfolio towards safe assets.
1.7.5 Set-up capital for firms
In the baseline model invested capital is transformed by linear technologies, using capital
as the only input, into future output. The extension in this section shows that the baseline
can be seen as kind of reduced form of a richer model, in which capital is needed to set
up firms. We assume now that firms in the X-sector use capital to set up the technology
Gx which then produces output by employing low-skilled and high-skilled labor. Each
established firm ν ∈ {1, ...,M} produces a variety xν = Gx(Lxν , Hxν) under monopolistic
competition with free entry. Consumers spend the supernumerary income et − e¯t accord-
ing to a CES-utility function with substitution elasticity σ > 1 symmetrically over the
variants xν in the X-sector, which implies an instantaneous indirect utility function of the
form log(et − e¯t) (see Section 1.7.5.1) like before. So saving decision and portfolio choice
remain the same as in the baseline model. Firms have positive operating profits which
are distributed as payoff to the investors (see Section 1.7.5.2).
1.7.5.1 Consumer problem
Let the instantaneous utility of households be given by u =
[∑M
ν=1 x
σ−1
σ
ν
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1. Then,
prices are determined by a constant markup on unit cost of production
pν =
σ
σ − 1c(wH , wL), (1.47)
19For pz1 6= pz2 , however, the change in ZD2 would also affect ω and all other equilibrium outcomes.
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where c(wH , wL) are the unit costs (as in Section 1.2) and wH , wL are the factor prices.
Moreover, demand for variety xν of a household that spends “supernumerary budget”
e− e¯ is
xν = (e− e¯) p
−σ
ν
P 1−σ
, P ≡
[
M∑
ν=1
p1−σν
] 1
1−σ
.
Since product variants use identical production technologies, their unit cost and prices
are identical, too. Thus, xν reduces to x =
e−e¯
pνM
. Using this in u, we obtain for the
instantaneous indirect utility u = e−e¯
P
. We set the price as numéraire (i.e., pν = 1) so
that the variety effect is P = M
1
1−σ . Due to the log-specification, this variety effect,
though affecting the level of utility, does not matter for the intertemporal decision.20
Thus, maxElog(u) = maxElog(et − e¯t), which is identical to the intertemporal problem
in Section 1.2.2.
1.7.5.2 Firm entry and production in the X-sector
There are two types of set-up technologies, which induce capital demand of firms: A robust
set-up technology which requires c0 units of capital. Firms set up by the robust technology
will be producing tomorrow under any condition (i.e., in Θ and Θ¯). Furthermore, there
are risky set-up technologies with set-up input cθ, which are only effective if state θ ∈ Θ
occurs. Otherwise, their set-up fails. In an analogous way to (1.1), we assume
cθ = piθc1, where c1 < c0. (1.48)
The assumption states that set-up capital required for a robust technology is larger than
the capital required for risky technologies. Moreover, the smaller the measure piθ of the
state under which a set-up technology works, the lower the required set-up capital.21
Robust set-up technologies are financed by loans, whereas the risky set-up techniques are
financed by state-contingent securities.
LetK0 be the aggregate set-up capital for robust technologies and denote byKθ, θ ∈ Θ,
the aggregate set-up capital for specialized risky technologies. Then, the number of firms
which can be set up is M0 =
K0
c0
and Mθ =
Kθ
cθ
, respectively. In a closed economy, capital
markets are cleared if
K0 = D, Kθ = Fθ = piθF.
20Note that log e−e¯P = log(e− e¯)− logP so that the P -levels add to EU a constant.
21See Falkinger (2014) for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between specialization and risk.
There, technologies are more productive the more narrowly they are targeted to a specific environment.
At the same time, they are more risky because the realization of the specific environment is less likely.
Here this idea is applied to set-up costs rather than productivity.
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Hence, we have for to total number of firms
M =

D
c0
+ F
c1
≡MΘ, if θ ∈ Θ,
D
c0
≡MΘ¯ otherwise.
After firms being set up, their operating profits earned under mark-up prices (1.47)
are
Π = (px − c)X = X
σ
,
where px = 1, which implies c =
σ−1
σ
, has been used. Since firms are symmetric, aggre-
gated operating profits are distributed uniformly across firms so that operating profit per
firm is:
Πm
Mm
=
X
σMm
, m ∈ {Θ, Θ¯}.
The returns on one unit of set up capital are therefore
rm =
X
c0σMm
, m ∈ {Θ, Θ¯}
Rθ =
X
cθσMΘ
, R =
X
c1σMΘ
for safe and risky investments, respectively. (piθRθ reduces to R because of assumption
cθ = piθc1.) Since the number of firms is different in Θ and Θ¯, aggregate operating profits
have to be shared among more or less firms so that the return on robust investments
is m-dependent. The relative rate of return, rΘ
Rθ
, however, is uniquely determined by
the relative set-up requirements of specialized risky technologies compared to the robust
technology. We have
ρ =
c1
c0
.
For the portfolio choice derived in Section 1.4 almost only the relative rate ρ matters.
The exception is e¯1
rm
, since future subsistence can only be financed by deposits.22 This
means, we have to restrict the analysis of the paper to e¯1 = 0, or we reconcile the
fluctuation of the earnings of robust firms with a safe return on deposits by assuming
that firms hold buffers and distribute the expected profit per firm p¯i ≡ [ µ
MΘ
+ 1−µ
MΘ¯
]X
σ
to
22Formally the derivation of the portfolio choice presented in the appendix has to be adapted to account
for m-dependent pay-offs in the budget constraints. For e¯1 = 0, return rΘ¯ becomes irrelevant under the
log-specification and the analysis remains valid – with ρ = rΘRΘ .
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the investors.
For the general equilibrium analysis, a further caveat is in order. Under the presented
extension, return r (even if smoothed by the buffer) is endogenous. It depends on M
and X, which are determined by saving behavior and resource allocation, respectively.
Thus, in the general equilibrium, a further feedback loop is to be considered. We did not
account for such feedbacks in Section 1.6, since in the baseline return r is exogenously
given by the constant productivity of capital. For e¯1 = 0, however, the presented analysis
remains fully valid also with set-up capital of firms, since r matters only through the term
e¯1
r
. However, what one loses by setting e¯1 = 0 is the income effect on structural change
within the financial sector. For the income effect on the skill premium and the structural
change between goods and financial sector subsistence level e¯0 > 0 is relevant, which poses
no problem in the extension considered here.
1.8 Robustness
To account for relative price effects within the financial sector, we skip now Assumption
1.2 and impose the following assumption instead.
Assumption 1.2’. αx = αz1 < αz2.
Then, according to (1.12),
pz1 =
Ax
Az1
and thus: y¯ = e¯0 +
(1+ Ax
Az1
)e¯1
r
.
Moreover, the terms alxX + a
l
z1Z1, l ∈ {H,L}, in system (1.13) reduce to
X+
1
Axκαxx
and X+
κ(1−αx)x
Ax
, X+ ≡ X + Ax
Az1
Z1,
respectively. Using this when solving (1.13), we obtain
X+ =
bLL¯
aLx
κz2 − k
κz2 − κx
, Z2 =
bLL¯
aLz2
k − κx
κz2 − κx
(1.49)
and
Z2
X+
=
Az2
Ax
γ˜(ω
+
, k
+
), γ˜(ω, k) ≡ κ
αz2
z2
καxx
k − κx
κz2 − k
, (1.50)
where the signs for the partial derivatives of γ˜ follow from the Rybczynski analysis.
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Substituting Az2κ
αz2
z2 for
1
aLz2
in the second equation of (1.49) and using (1.9), we have
for the Z2-supply:
ZS2 = Az2bLL¯
γ
αz2
z2
γz2 − γx
g(ω
+
, k
+
), g(ω, k) ≡ ω−αz2 (kω − γx). (1.51)
This coincides with (1.40) – with Z2 instead of Z – so that Fact 1.6 remains valid under
the alternative specification and applies to Z2-supply.
Z2-demand is given by
ZD2 = F = sf
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz2
N =
µ− ρp
1− ρp
δ
1 + δ
η˜N (1.52)
with η˜ ≡ w¯−y¯
1+pz2
and p =
1+pz2
1+pz1
. In an analogous way to Lemma 1.1 and Fact 1.7, one
establishes that the income effect (i.e., η˜-part in ZD2 ) has a U-shaped form.
23 Further,
sf is decreasing in ω since
∂p
∂ω
> 0 (according to (1.12)). Because of the relative price
effect p, which now is at work within the finance sector, the demand for risky assets is
substituted by demand for safe assets if the relative price of services for securities rises.
For low values of the skill premium, we are on the downward sloping branch of the η˜-curve
so that income and substitution effect go in the same direction. In the upward sloping
part of η˜, the negative substitution effect is opposed by a positive income effect so that the
total effect of ω on ZD2 depends on the relative importance of the two effects. Numerical
simulation shows that the substitution effect is large if the price pz2 is high and the income
effect is stronger if subsistence expenditures are larger. For a high level of price pz2 (based
on (1.12) this means, for example, a low Az2) and low subsistence levels (such that y¯ is
close to zero) the substitution effect dominates. In this case
∂ZD2
∂ω
< 0. However, for low
levels of price pz2 and large subsistence levels the income effect dominates. For this case,
(1.51) and (1.52) give us the same picture as in Figure 1.1. Proposition 1.4 remains valid
in both cases.
For results corresponding to Proposition 1.5, we have to write the excess demand
function ZD2 − ZS2 explicitly in terms of parameters. Using W = bLL¯AxΓxω−αx(1 + ωk)
and pz2 =
AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx in (1.52), we can rewrite the equilibrium condition ZD2 −ZS2 = 0
23The only thing that changes is that now we have y¯1+pz2
with y¯ constant instead of y¯1+pz1
= e¯01+pz1
− e¯1r .
Thus, apart from subscript z2 instead of z(= z1 = z2) in the modified proof we have y¯ instead of e¯0 and
no negative term − e¯1r .
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in the form:
µ− ρ1+
AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
1+pz1
1− ρ1+
AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
1+pz1
δ
1 + δ
Γxω
−αx(1 + ωk)− N
bLL¯Ax
y¯
1 + AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
− Az2
Ax
γ
αz2
z2
γz2 − γx
ω−αz2 (kω − γx)
≡ D
ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Az2Ax
?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+
, y¯
−
, µ
+
, ρ
−
, δ
+
 = 0.
Hence, an increase of AxbLL¯
N
always leads to a rise in the equilibrium skill premium.
Under Assumption 1.2, this was only the case if present subsistence expenditure dominates
futures subsistence requirements (Proposition 1.5). Moreover, a decline in subsistence
requirements y¯ has unambiguously a positive impact on the equilibrium skill premium -
regardless of whether the decline in y¯ is caused by a decline in e¯0 or e¯1.
In contrast to the benchmark analysis, the equilibrium skill premium is now also
affected by changes in µ and ρ. Finally, a rise in δ has now an unambiguously positive
effect on ω∗. (In the benchmark analysis the role of δ was ambiguous.) The following
proposition summarizes the comparative-static effects on the equilibrium skill premium
under Assumption 1.2’.
Proposition 1.5’. If Assumption 1.2 is replaced by Assumption 1.2’, then:
a) For y¯ > 0, a rise in AxbLL¯
N
(caused by uniform technical progress or education and
biased progress) raises the equilibrium skill premium. A decline of total subsistence
requirements y¯ (wherever they come from) have the same effect.
b) Financial innovation (a rise in µ) or increased attractiveness of risky investments (a
decline of ρ) raise the equilibrium skill premium. A lower discount on the future (a
rise of δ) has the same effect. These effects also hold if y¯ = 0.
Proof. Main text.
As a consequence of (1.50), Proposition 1.6 remains valid if applied to the structure
between new finance on the one side and production cum traditional finance on the other
side. We have
Proposition 1.6’. At given Az
Ax
, k, any change in other exogenous fundamentals which
raises the skill premium leads to structural change from production and traditional finance
(X+) towards new finance (Z2).
Proof. Equation (1.50) and
∂pz2
∂ω
> 0.
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Finally, the ratio of value added in financial subsector Z2 to value added in subsector
Z1 is as in (1.33)
pz2F
pz1D
=
sf η¯
sdη¯ +
1+δ
δ
e¯1
r
pz2
1 + pz2
1 + pz1
pz1
. (1.53)
Since pz1 and y¯ are constant,
∂w¯
∂ω
> 0 immediately implies ∂η¯
∂ω
> 0. Hence, for e¯1 > 0,
the income effect unambiguously leads to structural change from Z1 to Z2 if the skill
premium rises. If e¯1 = 0, no such income effect is at work; yet the relative price effect
remains. For the relative price effect, we only have to consider pz2 because pz1 is constant.
Price pz2 affects the value added structure within finance through two channels: On the
one side, there is the direct effect shown explicitly in (1.53). Since
∂pz2
∂ω
> 0, this channel
tends to increase the share of new finance. On the other side, however, there is the negative
substitution effect in the demand for financial services (
∂sf
∂p
< 0 and ∂sd
∂p
> 0) which drives
the sectoral structure within finance from Z2 towards Z1. Due to this ambiguous role
of the relative price effect under the alternative specification, within structural change
from Z1 to Z2 is more difficult to model than it was in the benchmark. For high levels
of price pz2 and low subsistence expenditures the substitution effect dominates. Then,
the presented model cannot predict a co-movement of ω and the within structural change
from Z1 to Z2. In the other case, however, Proposition (1.7) applies.
1.9 Empirical evidence and numerical exercises
In this section we first provide empirical evidence for the two-fold structural change and
wage inequality and then we carry out numerical exercises to illustrate how the presented
model can replicate the observed changes.
1.9.1 Empirics
1.9.1.1 Data description
We use data from the Current Population Survey (March CPS) for the survey years
1980-2013 from IPUMS-CPS by King et al. (2010).24 This data set allows us to split
the sampled population (weighted with the sampling weight) into our three sectors and
two skill levels: The X-sector consists of all sectors of the U.S. economy except finance.
The finance sector is finance and insurance without real estate.25 “Traditional finance”
Z1 includes banking, credit agencies and insurance. “New finance” Z2 is security and
24Survey years 1980-2013 represent years 1979-2012 because households are surveyed about last year’s
job. This means whenever we talk about a year the data considered represent the situation a year before.
25This corresponds to the standard classification as in Philippon and Reshef (2007, 2012).
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commodity brokerage and investment companies. We define a worker (if worked positive
weeks last year) to be high-skilled if she/he holds a college degree (four-year college) or
more. H¯j is the number of high-skilled workers in sector j ∈ {x, z1, z2} and L¯j is the
number of low-skilled workers in sector j ∈ {x, z1, z2}. For each skill level, we calculate
for the three sectors the average yearly hours worked last year (i.e., hlj , j ∈ {x, z1, z2},
l ∈ {H,L}) and the respective average hourly real wages (i.e., wlj, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, l ∈
{H,L}).26
In our data analysis we use “actual” and “normalized” numbers for employment and
wage levels. The “actual” numbers use the observed sector- and skill-specific average
yearly hours worked and the respective average hourly wage. The “normalized” numbers
are calculated all with the same basis of hours worked and hourly wage (i.e., the ones
from the X-sector).27 This normalization allows us to separate the effects we can identify
in the theoretical, frictionless model from two frictions which are observed in reality: (i)
Low- and high-skilled Z-workers work more hours per year than low- and high-skilled
X-workers. More precisely, for the U.S. over the last decades on average a Z-worker has
worked about 9% more than a X-worker. (ii) There is the finance premium on hourly
wages for low- and high-skilled Z-workers.28 CPS data show that the finance premium
increased over time and differs for the two subsectors: In Z1 workers earn about 15%
more than in the X-sector, in Z2 it is even 50%.
The two sectoral structure-figures below show black and gray lines: Gray lines corre-
spond to the “actual” numbers. Black lines correspond to the “normalized” ones.
26We use worker’s total pre-tax wage and salary income to calculate average hourly real wages (nominal
values are adjusted by using the CPI-U adjustment factor to 1999 dollars (i.e., for the base survey year
2000)). There are two issues related to this: First, the CPS top-codes high wage incomes for reasons
of confidentiality. This leads to an underestimation of wages in general and especially in the finance
sector: Over all our survey years around 0.8% of workers in the X-sector are top-coded whereas in the
Z1-sector it affects around 1.6% of the workers and in the Z2-sector even 7.6%. To dampen the bias
in high wages we multiply top-coded incomes for survey years 1980-1995 by 1.5; a standard factor used
in literature (as it is described in Philippon and Reshef (2007, 2012)). From year 1996 on, top-coded
wages are categorized into groups with different mean incomes by the CPS and thus the aggregate and
the average wage income are uninfluenced by the top-coding. Note that our results are not very sensitive
with respect to the multiplication factor (e.g., as compared to ω = 1.62, Ψ = 5.08% and Φ = 13.99%
in Table 1.2 resulting from multiplication factor 1.5, using a factor of 1.75 as in Philippon and Reshef
(2007, 2012) would results in ω = 1.63, Ψ = 5.09% and Φ = 14.02). Second, total wage income consists
of both wage income from longest job last year and wage income from other work. We cannot allocate
these two incomes to different industries nor to the respective hours worked. Thus, we allocate the total
wage income to one industry and account for it all hours worked. If one assumes that the switch of job
occurs equally likely between the three sectors, this does not bias the results. Furthermore, only about
one fifth of all workers (in all three sectors) is affected by this and of those who are affected not even a
fourth of total income is coming from other work.
27Since the skill premium is approximately identical in all three sectors in the U.S. the skill intensities
in the sectors need not be “normalized”. They already correspond to the frictionless numbers.
28See Célérier and Vallée (2015) or Philippon and Reshef (2007, 2012) for a detailed empirical discus-
sion of the finance premium.
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1.9.1.2 Empirical trends
As is described in the introduction and picked up in the model, financialization has several
aspects: On the one hand, the weight of the financial sector relative to non-financial
business has increased; this is structural change towards finance. On the other hand,
the type of financial products and services has changed; this is structural change within
finance. The next two figures show the two-fold structural change.
Figure 1.2 shows the ratio of the total finance sector (Z-sectors) compared to the
non-finance economy (X-sector) for the U.S. based on the CPS data.
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Figure 1.2: Employment ratio and wage sum ratio of the financial sector
Notes: ΨE measures the employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of finance (including insur-
ance) compared to the rest of the U.S. economy. Ψ measures the ratio of the total wage sum in finance
vs. the rest of the U.S. economy. “Actual” uses the observed sector-specific hours worked and hourly
wages (for low-and high-skilled), whereas “normalized” uses the X-sector hours worked and hourly wages
(for low-and high-skilled). Survey years from 1980-2013. Source: Own calculations based on CPS.
On the one hand, the figure shows that finance has attracted new employment. The
employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of the financial sector, defined by
ΨEactual ≡
hHz1H¯z1+h
H
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, increased from 4.5% in 1980 to 5.6% in 2013. The
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rose from 4.2% in
1980 to 5.2% in 2013. On the other hand, the figure illustrates the structural change
towards the financial sector in terms of a growing wage sum ratio of finance. The wage sum
ratio of the financial sector, defined as Ψactual ≡ w
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increased by 50% from about 5.2% in 1980 to 7.8% in 2013. The respective “normalized”
ratio Ψnormalized ≡ w
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rose by 34% from 4.4% in 1980
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to 5.9% in 2013. The difference between the employment (E) ratio and the wage sum
ratio is the result of different skill-intensities in the different sectors. By comparing the
“normalized” black with the “actual” gray lines one sees a large difference between the
two ratios of the wage sum: More than half of the increase in the ratio of the wage sum
is the result of the frictions (i) (more hours) and (ii) (finance premium). Yet, as the
black line shows, there is still structural change towards finance if one controls for the
two frictions. Comparison of the two black lines shows that the difference between the
employment ratio and the wage sum ratio increased over time.
We observe a similar pattern for the within finance sectoral structure by splitting total
finance up into the two subsectors Z1 and Z2. Figure 1.3 shows the employment ratio
and the wage sum ratio of finance subsector Z2 compared to the subsector Z1 for the U.S.
since the 1980s based on the CPS data set.
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Figure 1.3: Employment ratio and wage sum ratio within the financial sector
Notes: ΦE measures the employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of “new finance” compared
to “traditional finance”. Φ measures the ratio of the total wage sum in “new finance” vs. “traditional
finance”. “Actual” uses the sector-specific hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled),
whereas “normalized” uses theX-sector hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled). Survey
years from 1980-2013. Source: Own calculations based on CPS.
“New finance” (subsector Z2) grew strongly independent of the measure we use:
The within employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of finance subsector Z2,
ΦEactual ≡
hHz2H¯z2+h
L
z2
L¯z2
hHz1H¯z1+h
L
z1
L¯z1
, more than doubled from about 8.6% in 1980 to 20.8% in 2013. The
respective “normalized” ratio ΦEnormalized ≡ h
H
x H¯z2+h
L
x L¯z2
hHx H¯z1+h
L
x L¯z1
is very similar with a rise from
8.3% in 1980 to 19.8% in 2013. The within finance wage sum ratio, defined by Φactual ≡
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, increased dramatically from 11.8% in 1980 to 29% in 2013 peaking in
survey 2009 at 40.2%. The respective “normalized” ratio Φnormalized ≡ w
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rose from 9.2% in 1980 to 22.8% in 2013 with a peak in survey year 2009 of 29.9%. Hence,
about two-thirds of the actual rise in the wage ratio of “new finance” cannot be assigned
to frictions: Structural change is also observed in the “normalized” data. The rest of the
rise comes from friction (ii) (finance premium), which is particularly strong in the finance
subsector Z2.
As argued in the introduction financialization (with the two-fold structural change)
and inequality are two closely related topics. Figure 1.4 shows the development of the
“normalized” skill premium calculated by ω = w
H
x
wLx
for the U.S. since 1980 based on the
CPS data.29
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Figure 1.4: Skill premium
Notes: ω measures the “normalized” skill premium (i.e., hourly wage of high-skilled labor in X-sector
divided by hourly-wage of low-skilled labor in X-sector). Survey years from 1980-2013. Source: Own
calculations based on CPS.
It increased from 1.55 in 1980 to 1.91 in 2013. This time trend in ω illustrates that
wage inequality increased over time. Nowadays high-skilled workers earn nearly double
as much as low-skilled workers per hour. If one accounts additionally for the fact that
high-skilled workers work more hours, the income inequality is even larger (e.g., 2.19 in
2013).
29Interestingly, the skill premium in the U.S. is about the same in the three sectors because both low-
and high-skilled workers in the financial industry earn a similar relative finance premium.
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1.9.2 Numerics
In this section we implement our theoretical model quantitatively and use it for several
numerical exercises. These illustrate possible drivers of the empirical developments pre-
sented in the Figure 1.2-1.4. First, we calibrate our model for the average value of the
early survey years 1980-1994. Second, this calibrated model is used for comparative-static
analysis. We introduce (i) ceteris paribus shocks and (ii) simultaneous shocks to illustrate
how the channels analyzed in our model can predict the situation observed in later years
(average values of later survey years 1995-2009).
1.9.2.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model such that it fits the data for the average of the survey years
1980-1994 (i.e., years 1979-1993). Table 1.1 gives the exogenous parameters used.
Table 1.1: Parameters survey years 1980-1994
Parameter Data Source Description
L¯ 99.2m CPS # Low-skilled employees
H¯ 26.5m CPS # High-skilled employees
hL 1639.4 CPS Yearly hours of low-skilled
hH 1982.6 CPS Yearly hours of high-skilled
αx 0.34 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in X
αz1 0.42 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z1
αz2 0.68 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z2
Ax 26.53 CPS Technology level in X
PT65 $ 11,204 U.S. Bureau of the Census Real poverty threshold <65
PT 65 $ 10,076 U.S. Bureau of the Census Real poverty threshold >65
LEratio 4.66 LE from World Bank Old-age ratio
rf 0.0368 Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis Real effective federal funds rate
Az1 116 Model calibration Technology level in Z1
Az2 165 Model calibration Technology level in Z2
δ 0.385 Model calibration Discount rate
µ 0.740 Model calibration Certainty measure
Notes: The table shows the averaged values for the time range of survey years t ∈ {1980, . . . , 1994}.
Averages of αj,t =
κj,tωj,t
1+κj,tωj,t
with κj,t =
hHj,tH¯j,t
hL
j,t
L¯j,t
and ωj,t =
wHj,t
wL
j,t
, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, hHt = hHx,t and
hLt = h
L
x,t. Ax,t =
wLx,t
Γx,tω
−αx,t
x,t
with Γx,t = αx,t
αx,t(1 − αx,t)1−αx,t . PT is the average, real poverty
threshold of a two-people household (nominal values are adjusted by using the CPI-U adjustment
factor to 1999 dollars (i.e., for the base survey year 2000) from CPS with PT65 denoting the relevant
value for households younger than 65 and PT 65 denoting the value relevant for older ones. LEratio
is the average ratio of working-time to retirement: (65 − 20)/(LEt − 65), where LEt denotes life
expectancy in year t; 65 is the retirement age and 20 is the assumed start of the working-life. rf
is the average, real effective federal funds rate (effective federal funds rate adjusted with the CPI-U
adjustment factor from CPS). See bibliography for details on data sources.
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Exogenous values from data are used for labor endowments L¯, H¯, hL, hH , output elas-
ticities αj , technology in the X-sector Ax, poverty thresholds (PT65 for young and PT
65
for old households) and interest rate rf as summarized in Table 1.1. For the subsistence
levels we assume that each worker must cover over the life cycle half of a two-people
household’s poverty threshold. Further, we account for the fact that during 1980-1994
the ratio of working-time to retirement was LEratio = 4.66 (i.e., we divide the poverty
threshold of old households by 4.66). Hence, e¯0 = PT65/2 and e¯1 = PT
65/2/4.66. The
real safe return is r = 1+rf with rf being the real effective federal funds rate and the risky
return is such that the risk premium is four percentage points (i.e., R = (r + 0.04)/µ).
We measure the efficiency units from the model by bl = h
l, l ∈ {H,L}, where hl are hours
worked.
The other parameters (productivities in the finance sectors Az1 and Az2, discount factor
δ and completeness measure µ) are calibrated internally by targeting wage inequality ω,
“normalized” ratios for the sectoral structure Ψ and Φ of the U.S. economy and the gross
saving rate in the U.S. for the average of the survey years 1980-1994. The targeted values
are shown in Table 1.2. More specifically, we solve the model numerically for possible
parameter combinations of Az1 , Az2 , δ and µ and grid-search for the combination (see
Table 1.1 for calibrated values) which minimizes the sum of the squared relative distances
of the four model values from the corresponding data targets.30 The comparison of the
four model values generated by our calibrated model with the data outcomes is given in
Table 1.2: The calibrated model fits the targets fairly well.
Table 1.2: Targets
Variables Model Data Source Description
ω∗ 1.63 1.62 CPS Skill premium
Ψ 5.08% 5.08% CPS Between sectoral structure
Φ 13.99% 13.99% CPS Within sectoral structure
saving rate 20.32% 20.30% World Bank Aggregate savings
Notes: ω∗ is the equilibrium skill premium (per hour worked). Ψ corresponds to
pz1D+pz2F
X in the
model and to Ψnormalized in the data. Φ corresponds to
pz1D
pz2F
in the model and to Φnormalized in
the data. The saving rate is (D + F )/W in the model and the share of aggregate savings in gross
national income in the data, where aggregate savings (gross savings) is gross national income less
total consumption, plus net transfers. See bibliography for details on data sources.
30For solving the model numerically, we use the demand functions in the goods and financial services
markets to obtain the equilibrium values of X-, Z1- and Z2 as functions of ω (and exogenous parameters).
Substituting these functions for X-, Z1- and Z2 in one of the labor market clearing conditions, we can
solve for the equilibrium skill premium ω∗. (Then, at ω∗, the other labor market is also cleared.) From
ω∗ follow factor prices and prices of financial services, output levels and employment in the three sectors
and the sectoral structure of the economy in a straightforward way.
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Further, the other equilibrium values following from the model are also very similar
to the values observed in the CPS data (given in brackets). Hourly wages in our model
are wH = $ 19.3 ($ 19.3), wL = $ 11.8 ($ 11.9) and the resulting prices are pz1 = 0.25,
pz2 = 0.19.
31 Labor employments in total hours are Hx = 49215m (49215m), Lx =
156043m (156287m), Hz1 = 2710m (2794m), Lz1 = 6113m (6022m), Hz2 = 614m (635m),
Lz2 = 472m (468m). For the skill intensities we get κx = 0.32 < κz1 = 0.44 < κz2 = 1.30
(κx = 0.31 < κz1 = 0.43 < κz2 = 1.30), which shows that the two finance subsectors
are more skill intensive than the rest of the economy. These numbers suggest that the
calibrated model matches the U.S. economy in the survey period 1980-1994 fairly well.
1.9.2.2 Numerical exercises
We show now how our calibrated model can predict the twofold structural change and
the rising wage inequality between survey period 1980-1994 and survey period 1995-2009
as seen in the Figure 1.2-1.4. To do so, we look at the predictions of our calibrated
model if shocked by exogenous changes. Thereby, we apply the changes in the exogenous
parameters of our model as observed in data. In other words, we use as shocks the average
values of L¯, H¯, hL, hH , αx, αz1 , αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf for the time span
of the survey years 1995-2009 instead of the ones for the time span of the survey years
1980-1994.32 In addition, we also consider shocks on the internally calibrated parameter
Az1, Az2 , δ and µ.
As a first exercise, we introduce ceteris paribus shocks. This means that we separately
apply each of the changes listed in Table 1.3. We apply observed changes for the exogenous
parameters and potential changes for the internally calibrated parameters. The qualitative
effects of such ceteris paribus changes on the skill premium ω, on the between sectoral
structure Ψ and the within structure Φ are summarized in Table 1.3. These comparative-
static effects can be interpreted as follows: Uniform productivity progress Aj means
that the productivities in all three sectors j ∈ {X,Z1, Z2} grow at the same rate (i.e.,
A1zi = gxA
0
zi
, i ∈ {1, 2}, where gx = A1x/A0x is given by the observed average values of A0x
from survey years 1880-1994 and of A1x from survey years 1995-2009). Consistent with
Proposition 1.5-1.7 such a uniform productivity progress leads to an increase in the skill
premium as well as to the twofold structural change. This is due to the income effect
arising through the subsistence requirements e¯0 > 0 and e¯1 > 0. Sector-biased technical
31The magnitude of the financial services prices could be interpreted in the following way: A household
has to pay the unit costs of financial intermediation, estimated by Philippon (2015) to be 0.015-0.02,
during all his/hers “capital-accumulation” years (i.e., 15-times from 1980-1994 to 1995-2009).
32See Table A.1 in Appendix A.4 for data of the average values for survey years 1995-2009 of L¯, H¯ ,
hL, hH , αx, αz1 , αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf . For R we use again a constant risk premium of
four percentage points.
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Table 1.3: Comparative statics
ω Ψ Φ
Uniform productivity progress Aj (income effect) + + +
X-biased technical change Ax + + +
Z1-biased technical change Az1 – – –
Z2-biased technical change Az2 – – +
Skill-biased technical change αx, αz1 , αz2 + – –
Higher subsistence requirement young e¯0 – – –
Higher subsistence requirement old e¯1 + + –
Increased skill supply k – – +
Lower safe return r ( e¯1r -channel) + + –
Lower relative return ρ + – +
More completeness µ + – +
Fall in δ – – –
Notes: + is a positive comparative-static effect. – is a negative comparative-static effect.
change means that only the respective sector grows, while the other two productivity levels
are kept constant (as growth rate we use always the observable rate gx). The comparative-
static effects of such a ceteris paribus shock are a combination of income and substitution
effects. (Sector-specific) skill-biased technical change αj , as observed in the data for
j ∈ {X,Z1, Z2}, induces clearly an increase of the skill premium. Higher subsistence
requirements (mainly a higher e¯1 because of aging households) lead to similar effects as
predicted in Proposition 1.5-1.7. An increase in skill supply k = H¯h
H
L¯hL
leads to within
structural change because there are more high-skilled people who demand more finance
subsector Z2 services. A lower r has the same effect like a higher e¯1. Furthermore, a lower
relative return ρ (induced by an increase of the risk premium by one percentage point)
or more market completeness µ (by ten percentage points) raise the skill premium and
make new financial services relatively more attractive compared to services for deposits.
Finally, a fall in δ to 0.335, which leads to a lower saving rate close to 18.83% as observed
on average for the time span of survey years 1995-2009, induces a decline in the skill
premium and leads to smaller financial sectors.
As a second exercise, we shock our calibrated model with simultaneous shocks. This
means, we shock our economy by using all the shocks in the exogenous parameters together
(i.e., new average values of H¯ , L¯, hH , hL, αx, αz1 , αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf for
time span of survey years 1995-2009). Further, we assume uniform technological progress.
This means, the productivities in the Z-sectors develop identical to the productivity in
the X-sector. Discount parameter δ and completeness measure µ are held fixed at the
calibrated values. With this procedure, we get a quantitative model prediction which can
then be compared with the empirical development (see Table 1.4): Under simultaneous
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shocks our model predicts a rise in the skill premium ω from 1.63 to 1.86 and two-fold
structural change towards and within finance with a rise of Ψ from 5.08% to 5.21% and
a rise of Φ from 13.99% to 15.02%.
Table 1.4: Predictions
Variables Model Data Source Description
ω∗ 1.86 1.85 CPS Skill premium
Ψ 5.21% 5.54% CPS Between sectoral structure
Φ 15.02% 23.41% CPS Within sectoral structure
Notes: ω∗ is the equilibrium skill premium (per hour worked). Ψ corresponds to
pz1D+pz2F
X in the
model and to Ψnormalized in the data. Φ corresponds to
pz1D
pz2F
in the model and to Φnormalized in the
data.
Comparing the model values with data, we see that the simulated equilibrium values
underestimate the between structural change (only a little) and mainly the within struc-
tural change. This means, additional shocks are needed to come closer to data values.
According to our analysis, possible candidates for such additional shocks (unobserved
in our data) are: More market completeness (µ-shock) and biased technical change in
the Z2-sector (shown in Table 1.3) or diminished fixed costs in the financial sector and
distorted portfolio choices as discussed in Section 1.7.
Overall, the simulated development in our calibrated model illustrates the channels
that lead to the observed rise in the skill premium and the two-fold structural change
towards and within the financial sector fairly well; at least as far as these changes are
caused by economic fundamentals. As pointed out in the beginning of this section, the
normalized financial sector ratios considered here are amplified in reality by rents.
1.10 Conclusion
The presented 3x3-model of goods production and financial services helps to explain
the two-fold structural change towards and within the financial sector. The analysis
emphasized demand side effects by using quasi-homothetic preferences of the Stone-Geary
form and accounted for supply side effects by considering for different skill-intensities
in production of goods and financial services. The theoretical analysis was based on
established building blocks for modeling a multi-sector economy with production and was
at the same time sufficiently tractable to allow analytical results. The comparative-static
equilibrium analysis showed the effects of productivity progress and technical change,
skill supply, present and future subsistence requirements as well as financial product
innovation on the skill premium and on the sectoral structure of an economy. Both the
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size of the financial sector relative to the non-financial sector as well as the size of the
new finance sector relative to the traditional finance sector were considered. Moreover,
in several extensions the robustness of the results was discussed and the effects of rents
or distortions in the financial sector were addressed. The main insight of the results from
the theoretical analysis can be summarized as follows: If one looks for a single economic
source (apart from assuming rents or distortions) that could explain the twofold structural
change towards and within finance and the rising skill premium simultaneously, the income
effect is a robust candidate. Other channels, like relative price effects within the financial
sector lead to more ambiguous results.
The quantitative results derived in the theoretical analysis were illustrated quantita-
tively by calibrating the model to U.S. data from the CPS of 1980-1994. The numerical
implementation of the model shows that the subsequent development observed in the CPS
for 1995-2009 can be explained fairly well. While uniform productivity growth, working
through the income effect, is confirmed as a main source of structural change towards and
within finance, skill biased technical change is important too for matching the rise in the
skill premium.
The paper leaves open two main questions which are important in the current debate
about real economic development and financialization. The first open problem is the
finance premium. While it is obvious that the rents revealed by the premium contribute
to inequality and blow up the structural change towards and within finance considered
in this paper, the question where the premium comes from is less clear. In recent years,
several attempts have been made to explain the premium by asymmetric information
between shareholders and employees in the banking sector. Yet, this can only explain
the redistribution of earnings within the financial sector. Our hypothesis is that it is
the asymmetry between financial agents and their clients which allows extracting rents.
After all, the financial sector is an expert system to start with. It would be worthwhile
to integrate this aspect into the presented framework; possible channels for modeling
the rent-generating information asymmetry would be intransparent cost structures or
confusion by financial innovation (distorted µ-beliefs).
The second open question left to future research is how structural change towards
and within the financial sector affects economic productivity. The literature on financial
development and growth has identified market completion by financial innovation as an
important source of growth. Does the recent evidence on a negative effect of financial
development on economic growth indicate that the huge flood of new financial products
since the 1990s has not really completed markets but rather generated obfuscation? In the
framework presented in this paper such confusion would induce euphoric beliefs about the
degree of market completeness µ which is one of the drivers of structural change within
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finance and at the same time a possible lever for rent extraction. Another possible channel
for a growth dampening effect could be the absorption of high-skilled labor in the finance
sector, which leads to scarcity of talent outside the financial sector and may slowdown
productivity growth.
To take stocks of this paper: The empirical evidence shows that the expansion of the
financial sector and the changing structure within the financial sector towards new finance
are partly caused by the finance premium. This is a rent which remains unexplained in
the presented paper. But there are also economic fundamentals which drive the twofold
structural change. These drivers are the focus of the paper. The main explanation for the
observed two fold structural change is a rise in average income generated by uniform pro-
ductivity growth across sectors and factors, which changes demand for financial services,
combined with skill-biased technical change that drives up the skill premium.
Could the structural change towards and within finance, accompanied by a rise in
the skill premium, come to a halt? According to our model, apart from a slowdown of
growth, the following factors exert downward pressure on finance shares and skill premium:
Finance-biased productivity progress, less attractive risky investments, a decline in the
saving rate or a stop in the proliferation of new financial products.
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2 An equilibrium model with diversification-
seeking households, competing banks and
(non-)correlated financial innovations
2.1 Introduction
The financial sector has experienced innovation dynamics with an immense increase in
the number of financial products over the last decades (see Figure 2.1). This proliferation
in the number of financial products raises two main questions: First, what are potential
determinants of the number of financial products? Second, what are the consequences of
the increase in the number of financial products for the aggregate output and the size of
the banking sector? This paper contributes to an explanation of the number of financial
products in an equilibrium model with diversification-seeking households and competing
banks and it looks at possible consequences of new financial products.
To demonstrate the empirical relevance of the analysis of the paper, Figure 2.1 provides
some motivating evidence. It shows the expansion of the number of financial products
traded on different exchanges over the last decades.The graphs give a general impression
of the rise in the number of products in the financial sector. A closer look shows that the
number of financial products listed at the Swiss Exchange SIX increased tenfold in the last
two decades (from 3,190 financial products in 1995 to 34,888 in 2014). For the Deutsche
Börse we observed a rise from 25,133 different financial products in 2002 to 1,416,712 in
2014. The number of financial products traded at the London Stock Exchange increased
by 26% in eight years (from 16,292 in 2006 to 20,571 in 2014). At the Shanghai Stock
Exchange SSE the number of listed securities rose from 30 in 1990 to 2,786 in 2013.
Although, the increase in the number of financial products varies among the exchanges in
time and absolute numbers, the trend seen at these exchanges is observed globally. It can
be taken as a strong indicator for the financial innovation dynamics, even though data on
exchange traded financial products only partly mirror the whole development (e.g., over-
the-counter traded financial products are neglected). In this paper the number of financial
products (not the specific characteristics of financial innovations nor the dynamics of the
development or cross country differences) is the key variable considered.
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Figure 2.1: Number of financial products traded on exchanges
Notes: The graphs shows the number of financial products (i.e., shares, bonds and securitized derivatives)
listed at (a) the Swiss Exchange SIX, (b) the Deutsche Börse, (c) the London Stock Exchange and (d)
the Shanghai Stock Exchange SSE, respectively, over the last decades. Sources: SIX, FESE, ECB and
SSE (see bibliography for details).
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical general equilibrium
framework, which identifies fundamentals and wrong beliefs as potential drivers of new
financial products. The proposed model has the following key modeling elements: First,
there is demand for and supply of the number of financial products and a fee at which they
are provided. The demand comes from households (“financial investors”) whose main mo-
tive is diversification. The supply is provided by financial sector firms (“banks”) which are
characterized by a cost structure and acting in a competitive market. Like in any market,
the equilibrium is determined by preferences, cost parameters and competition. Second,
financial products are tied to the production sector, where the returns of the financial
products are generated. Third, risky financial products are divided into two categories of
assets: On one hand, there is a set of independent financial products with real projects as
underlyings (“financial innovation” in the proper sense of market completion) and on the
other hand, there are correlated derivatives derived from the first set. Thereby, possible
drivers for the growth of the second category are neglected correlation on the demand
side or cheaper costs of provision on the supply side. Within this framework the modeling
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strategy focuses on the most essential mechanisms: (i) a diversification motive on the de-
mand side captured by a mean-variance approach; (ii) a convex cost function of financial
product supply with fixed and variable cost components which capture the two aspects of
financial services (i.e., the provision of financial products and the management of financial
portfolios); and (iii) free entry competition (zero-profit condition) in the banking sector.
This model structure allows determining the equilibrium number of financial prod-
ucts and the equilibrium fee charged by banks explicitly. The model’s key findings of
the comparative-static effects of fundamentals on the number of financial products are
intuitive and in line with empirical observations in a qualitative sense: From the demand
side, new financial products are stimulated if more households act as financial investors,
if they are less risk averse or if a larger volume of wealth is invested. From the supply
side, financial products are fostered if the quality of risky investment projects serving as
real underlyings rises (higher return or lower risk), banks costs decline or their efficient
size increases.
In addition to the effects of the fundamentals on the number of financial products,
this paper analyzes the consequences of correlation between financial products in connec-
tion with erroneous household beliefs about this correlation. It is found that neglected
correlation can boost new financial products so that correlated derivatives lead to a waste
of resources if they imply costs without adding diversification possibilities. Additionally,
correlated derivatives bias saving decisions if households neglect part of the correlation
between them, which decreases households’ welfare. Furthermore, it is elaborated how
banks endogenously adapt their supply behavior of financial products if households neglect
correlation. The model shows that if households have wrong beliefs about the correlation
of financial products, banks are “cheating” by providing correlated derivatives instead of
financial products based on real projects. New financial products are thus not always the
result of changes in the fundamentals. They can also be induced by correlation neglecting
investors and a cost-minimizing “cheating” behavior of banks. These results allow illus-
trating an immense increase in the total number of financial products. At the normative
level, these results support policy recommendations (e.g., patenting or rating of financial
innovations) which aim to protect households, the real economy and the banking sector
from the negative effects of correlated financial products.
Finally, the model is used to evaluate consequences of more financial products on
aggregate output and the financial sector at the macro-level. Specifically, the theoret-
ical analysis can explain a positive relationship between the aggregate output level, its
volatility, the size of the banking sector and the number of financial products.
This research project is related to several fields of economic research. It connects
insights from macroeconomics, portfolio choice, security design and microeconomics of
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banking with financial innovation.
The object of the presented paper is to endogenize the number of financial products.1
This is related to the literature on financial innovation and security design, which empha-
sizes that new financial products foster diversification possibilities and risk sharing (see, for
example, Allen and Gale (1988, 1991, 1994), Duffie and Jackson (1989), Duffie and Rahi
(1995), Kero (2013), Miller (1986), Pesendorfer (1995), Ross (1989), Simsek (2013b) or
Tufano (2003)). To my knowledge, none of these previous studies explicitly considers
simultaneously fundamentals from the real economy and the financial sector as well as
wrong households’ beliefs as determinants of the number of financial products.
I analyze the topic from a static macroeconomic perspective by basing financial prod-
ucts on real investment projects. The returns of financial products are generated by
real investment projects with technological uncertainty in the sense of Diamond (1967).
Similar to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) a financial innovation occurs whenever a new
risky financial product based on a novel, independent real investment project is offered.
In addition, the model will be expanded by introducing correlated derivatives which are
derived from other financial products rather than being based on real investment projects
as underlyings. The results of Célérier and Vallée (2014), who find that complexity of
structured products and their interlinkage increased over the last decade, motivate the
introduction of such correlated financial products.
I take a mean-variance approach for both the return structure of financial products and
household preferences (as initiated by Markowitz (1952)). This is a reasonable alternative
to expected utility maximization in state-space, as used in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)
and others, because it allows focusing on the first two moments of the return distribution.2
This paper adds to standard macroeconomic literature by embedding an explicit finan-
cial intermediation sector into a model with real investment projects and households who
save. Thereby, I assume the Cone (1983) / Jacklin (1986)-result which states that produc-
ers and households cannot act in the financial sector directly but they need a bank which is
intermediating and matching their borrowing wants and investments needs.3 The general
approach to connect households and real investment projects with financial intermediation
(under potentially distorted beliefs) is affine to Falkinger (2014). However, he works with
a state-space uncertainty structure with focus on imperfect knowledge and he does not
1For an empirical discussion of financial innovations see Frame and White (2004), Miller (1986) and
Tufano (2003), who give an overview over the development of types of financial innovations.
2Mean-variance optimization coincides with expected utility maximization for special cases (shown
among others by Levy and Markowitz (1979); Merton (1969); Samuelson (1969) or Tobin (1985)): If util-
ity is quadratic and returns are normally distributed or under CRRA utility and log-normally distributed
returns.
3A historical overview on financial intermediation is provided by Allen and Santomero (1998). The
literature is surveyed by Gorton and Winton (2003).
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endogenize the number of financial products. Additionally, compared to Falkinger (2014),
this paper models the technology structure and competition in the banking sector explic-
itly. Thereby, compared to other authors who impose costs for financial intermediation
and innovation, I assume a more detailed cost function of banks:4 The presented model
incorporates variable portfolio management costs proportional to the complexity of the fi-
nancial portfolio and two types of fixed “innovation” costs; namely convex handling costs
and linear issuing costs which allow differing between financial products based on real
underlyings and correlated derivatives. Using this cost structure, the equilibrium number
of financial products and the fee is determined by perfect bank competition which leads to
zero-profits. Although banks are characterized by a cost structure and are assumed to act
in a competitive market – rather than seen as a black box – many issues from the finance
literature (e.g., oligopoly structure or rents in the banking sector, liquidity provision or
bubbles) are neglected.
This paper assesses wrong beliefs as driver of new financial products. More precisely, I
explore the effects of neglected correlation (whereas, for example, Simsek (2013a,b) looks
at belief disagreement between financial investors or Gennaioli et al. (2012, 2013) analyze
neglected tail risk). The relevance for considering erroneous assessment of correlations
by investors is supported by experimental studies by Eyster and Weizsäcker (2011) and
Kallir and Sonsino (2009). They find that subjects in the role of financial investors neglect
correlation between assets. The results of this paper arising from neglected correlation
as driver of the emergence of correlated derivatives, question the finding of Pesendorfer
(1995) who shows potential welfare enhancing effects of redundant financial products.
Finally, this paper deals with the aggregate consequences of financial innovations.5
The findings of a co-movement of more financial products and aggregate output are in
line with the financial development argumentation in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). For
them the fact that new financial assets can be used as a tool for diversifying the risk of
high-productive technologies (“safety in variety” (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997, p.718))
is an important source of growth. In contrast to Acemoglu and Zilibotti, who find that
aggregate variability can be decreasing with more securities being available, in the model
presented here portfolio and aggregate output volatility increase with the number of finan-
cial products because the effect of more capital being invested riskily dominates the di-
versification effect. This is similar to the “hedge-more/bet-more-effect” in Simsek (2013b,
4For example, Freixas and Rochet (2008, p. 70) assume managing costs per volumes of deposits or
loans; Allen and Gale (1988, 1991) assume a (linear) fixed cost for issuing new financial claims; Bisin
(1998) works with variable and fixed cost depending on the payoff vector of securities; or Pesendorfer
(1995) uses marketing costs proportional to traded volumes of financial products and per costumer.
5For a more normative perspective on financial innovations see Haliassos (2013). He collects views
from academia and practice on the question whether financial innovations can be blamed for the recent
economic crisis and concludes that there was not too much but too little financial innovation.
66 Financial innovations
p.1367) and the “volatility paradox”-result of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014, p.379)
saying that securities that foster risk sharing can lead to more volatility. Further, the
model can predict a co-movement of the number of financial products and the growing
size of the financial sector (i.e., financializiation) as observed in data.6
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, the theoretical model is
described. The general equilibrium and comparative-static effects of changes in fundamen-
tals are analyzed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 expands the baseline model by incorporating
correlated financial products and erroneous household beliefs. In particular, the effects
arising from such distortions on the equilibrium number of financial products and house-
hold utility are discussed. Section 2.5 provides insights into banks’ supply behavior of
both correlated derivatives and financial products based on real underlyings. Section 2.6
provides model intuition how the empirical observed exponential increase in the total
number of financial products can arise. Section 2.7 discusses consequences of financial
innovations for households, aggregate output and the size of the banking sector. Section
2.8 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model consists of three parts: First, real investment projects with return generating
technologies which are the basis for financial products; second, households as financial
investors who can choose to invest in a safe asset and in risky financial products; third,
banks which offer the financial products and manage financial portfolios.
2.2.1 Financial products
2.2.1.1 Projects with mean-variance return generating technology
Financial products are based on real investment projects which generate returns. There
are two types of investment projects with linear technologies in capital: (i) a safe and
(ii) a potential set {j|j ∈ [1,∞)} of risky return generating technologies. The safe in-
vestment project s has output Ys = rKs and yields on capital input Ks a deterministic
return ∂Ys/∂Ks = r with var(r) = σ
2
r = 0. The output of the risky investment project
j is Yj = RjKj . Its return ∂Yj/∂Kj = Rj is stochastic and describes the idiosyncratic
productivity of capital input Kj . This means that the riskiness comes from uncertainty in
the return generating technology (i.e., technological uncertainty in the sense of Diamond
(1967)). Risky investment projects are assumed to be independent. Risky return gen-
6See Epstein (2005), Falkinger et al. (2015), Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) or
Philippon and Reshef (2012) for a discussion of financializiation.
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erating technologies are i.i.d. and described by their mean and variance: The expected
return of a risky investment project, E(Rj) = E(R), and the corresponding variance,
var(Rj) = σ
2, is the same for all j. Define R˜ ≡ E(R)− r as the excess return of the risky
projects. In line with the conventional return-risk trade-off the following assumption
holds:
Assumption 2.1. R˜ > 0 and σ2 > 0.
Aggregate output Y in this economy corresponds to the sum of output of the safe and
the N open risky investment projects. (It is explained in Section 2.2.3.3 how the number
N is determined in equilibrium.) Expected aggregate output is given by
E(Y ) = rKs + E(R)
N∑
j=1
Kj (2.1)
and its volatility captured by the variance is
σ2Y = var(Y ) = var
rKs + N∑
j=1
RjKj
 = σ2 N∑
j=1
Kj
2. (2.2)
2.2.1.2 Design of financial products and diversification effect
Real investment projects receive capital by serving as underlying of financial products.
Hence, financial products reflect the property rights on the distribution of returns gen-
erated by the investment projects. Project returns are given back as payoffs of financial
products to households, who act as financial investors. A safe asset is based on the safe
return generating technology and promises the deterministic return r. Risky financial
products are based on risky real investment projects.7 That means, a financial innovation
is designed in a stylized way and defined as follows: A financial innovation occurs when-
ever a bank decides to offer a new risky financial product by accessing and opening up
for their clients another independent investment project.8 It promises a stochastic return
with expectation E(R) and variance σ2.
By construction, N risky financial products correspond to N open independent, risky
projects in which investments are made. The N financial products generate independent
streams of returns. Therefore, each financial innovation raises the level of diversification.
The N risky financial products can be combined into a bundle B. The expected return
7Sections 2.4 and 2.5 models the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
8This process is similar to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). However, in their case it is not the banks
who offer financial products for a fee which covers the costs of providing financial products and managing
financial portfolios. They have agents who run production projects with a minimum size requirement
and compete for funds by issuing (cost-free) financial products.
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of a bundle is the weighted sum of each individual asset’s expected return and its vari-
ance depends on the weights, the variances of the individual assets and their respective
covariances. With uncorrelated assets, there is the following diversification effect:
Lemma 2.1. In a bundle B of N financial products maximal possible diversification
is achieved if equal amounts are invested in each of the N independent, risky financial
products. The resulting bundle B promises an expected return E(RB) = E(R) and variance
σ2B =
σ2
N
< σ2.
Proof. Equal amounts means a share 1
N
per risky asset. It follows E(RB) =
∑
N
1
N
E(R) =
N 1
N
E(R) = E(R). And σ2B =
∑
N
1
N2
σ2 = N 1
N2
σ2 = σ
2
N
. Since the variance is scaled by
the square of the weights, the variance of a weighted sum is minimized if the weights are
1
N
.
Lemma 2.1 means, the more N there are, the lower becomes the variance σ2B of the
return of the bundle B with still the same expected return E(RB). Hence, N represents
the “level of diversification” in the risky bundle B. If the number of financial innovations
N →∞ all idiosyncratic risk would diversified away and markets became complete.
2.2.2 Households’ mean-variance portfolio choice
The economy consists of I households, who act as financial investors. Households have
endowments w > 0 and save it for later consumption by investing into a financial portfolio
(PF) and paying a fee τ to banks. They decide how to invest w to maximize utility
from later consumption of the returns on their investments. In line with the portfolio
choice problem in the finance literature, households do this by mean-variance optimization
(originated by Markowitz (1952)). They are assumed to maximize
E(RPF )− γσ
2
PF
2
− τ, (2.3)
where E(RPF ) is the expectation and σ
2
PF is the variance of households’ financial portfolio
unit return. γ > 0 reflects their risk aversion. τ > 0 denotes the unit fee charged by
the bank. This fee is deducted from the return on households’ portfolio (similar to the
“intermediation margin” in Freixas and Rochet (2008, p.73)). Households have to pay
the fee per unit of endowment to the banks for the provision of financial products and
the managing of their portfolios.9 τ is endogenously determined by the banking sector
in equilibrium and will depend on the complexity of the financial portfolio (see Section
2.2.3). It is assumed that households cannot observe banks’ pricing function.
9Assume that the parameters are such that even in the worst case realization of the financial portfolio
unit return, households have enough endowment to cover the fee.
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The mean-variance approach captures the key characteristics of a concave utility func-
tion. It makes evident that risk averse agents wish to gain a high expected return, to have a
low-risk portfolio and to pay a small fee. By counterbalancing return and risk, households
invest in the safe asset and in the bundle B of the N risky financial products. More specif-
ically, given a level of diversification N , households choose the share α of their endowment
w to be invested in the risky bundle B. The rest, (1−α) of w, is invested in the safe asset.
The expected unit return on their financial portfolio is thus E(RPF ) = αE(R) + (1−α)r.
The corresponding variance is σ2PF = α
2σ2B +(1−α)20 = α2σ2B. Substituting these values
in (2.3), we have the following decision problem of households:
max
α∈[0,1]
αE(R) + (1− α)r − γα
2σ2B
2
− τ, (2.4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] excludes short-selling and reflects the budget constraint. The maximiza-
tion problem in (2.4) gives the optimal share α∗ invested in the risky bundle B:10
α∗(N) =
E(R)− r
γσ2B
= N
R˜
γσ2
. (2.5)
The second equality uses σ2B =
σ2
N
as derived in Lemma 2.1. Equation (2.5) shows that the
optimal share α∗(N) depends linearly on the level of diversification N . The unit return
of the optimal financial portfolio generated by this portfolio choice has mean E(R∗PF ) =
N R˜
γσ2
E(R) + (1 − N R˜
γσ2
)r = N R˜
2
γσ2
+ r and variance σ2PF
∗
= (N R˜
γσ2
)2 σ
2
N
= N R˜
2
γ2σ2
. Both
the expectation and the volatility of the portfolio unit return depend positively on N . A
more pronounced diversification effect in B (i.e., more N) leads to more risky high-return
investments and thus to higher expected return and variance of the portfolio unit return.
Substituting the optimal share α∗(N) from (2.5) into (2.4), I get the indirect utility
function
v∗(N, τ) =E(R∗PF )−
γσ2PF
∗
2
− τ = N R˜
2
2γσ2
+ r − τ. (2.6)
The households’ utility v∗(N, τ) depends on N , the fundamentals and the fee τ . It is
linearly increasing in N . Since more of financial products N promises higher utility,
households are denoted to be diversification-seeking. This mean that, other things equal,
households are attracted by financial innovation.
10In the following I focus on interior solutions. For γσ2 <∞, α∗ = 0 will never be optimal because of
E(R) > r. The upper bound α∗ = 1 does not change, but only dampen the model predictions because
with a fix α∗ = 1 more N do lower the variance (due to the diversification effect from Lemma 2.1), but
do not increase the expectation of the portfolio unit return. Furthermore, household finance data (see
e.g., Carroll (2002)) show that α∗ < 1 is far more realistic than α∗ = 1.
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Lemma 2.2 summarizes the two intermediary results.
Lemma 2.2. Given a level of diversification N , household’s portfolio choice is α∗(N)
with α∗ increasing in N . Households are diversification-seeking because the indirect utility
v∗(N, τ) is increasing in N .
Proof. Follows directly from equations (2.5) and (2.6).
2.2.3 Banking sector
Banks act as financial intermediaries and financial innovators. Their task is to transform
savings into productive investment capital by offering N financial products and managing
financial portfolios. Banks financially innovate when issuing more financial products by
accessing and opening up for their clients more real investment projects. As described
above, banks offer such financial innovations to households who seek diversification.
2.2.3.1 Technology structure
Banks are symmetric and operate with the same technology structure, which is charac-
terized by the efficient bank size and the cost parameters.
An exogenous efficient bank size I∗ > 0 is assumed, which means that I∗ households
can be served per bank. Under the assumption that each household is only served by
one bank, it follows that the number of households I divided by the efficient bank size I∗
determines the number of banks n = I
I∗
in the economy.11
Banks face costs for providing financial products and intermediation services. The key
assumption on banks is:
Assumption 2.2. Banks are symmetric and a bank’s total costs Ctot(N) are increasing
and convex in N.
This is in line with the intuition that providing more financial products and manag-
ing more diverse portfolios costs more. Consider the following specification as a concrete
cost structure fulfilling Assumption 2.2:12 Total costs Ctot(N) consist of variable costs
11Symmetry means that banks are not differentiated and all offer the same variety of financial products
[1, N ] by assumption. It could also be understood as a representative bank. The symmetry assumption is
justified by the empiric: It is actually observed that all banks are offering more or less the same financial
products (e.g., made accessible by an initial public offering) and that households are likely to be served by
only one “house bank”. One could determine I∗ endogenously by assuming an oligopoly with free entry
in the banking sector. In this case, I∗ would be fixed by the minimum value of the natural oligopoly
properties of a customer relationship cost function F (I/n).
12Note that by Assumption 2.2, Ctot(N) fulfills the usual assumption of convexity and regularity of
banks’ costs function (see, for example, Freixas and Rochet (2008, p.70) for general motivation of convex
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of managing the volume of savings and of fixed innovation costs of handling and adver-
tising financial products. Variable portfolio management costs are proportional to the
complexity of the financial portfolio: Variable costs of managing risky invested savings
are cr > 0, whereas safe invested savings impose variable costs cs > 0 with cs < cr.
cr and cs arise to the bank per volume of households’ total saving in the risky bundle,
α∗(N)wI∗, and the safe asset, (1 − α∗(N))wI∗, respectively. Thus, total variable costs
are crα∗(N)wI∗ + cs(1 − α∗(N))wI∗. Define c˜ ≡ cr − cs > 0 as the excess costs of risky
investments. For positive asset demand the cost of managing an asset must be smaller
than the returns it yields (i.e., cr < E(R), cs < r and c˜ < R˜). In addition to the variable
costs, there are two types of fixed costs for offering risky financial products (innovation
costs). The first can be interpreted as handling costs of a variety N of independent fi-
nancial products. They occur to a bank when accessing and opening up for their clients
N risky real investment project. These handling costs are convex increasing in N . This
reflects the fact that with more N , it costs banks disproportionately more to be careful in
providing new, independent financial products. Without loss of generality these costs are
assumed to be dN2, where d > 0 is a constant. Second, for each risky financial product
there are fixed costs f > 0. These can be interpreted as advertising costs or as the issuing
fee of a financial product. Total advertising costs are fN . Bank’s total costs are therefore
Ctot(N) = c
rα∗(N)wI∗ + cs(1− α∗(N))wI∗ + dN2 + fN. (2.7)
Ctot(N) is in line with Assumption 2.2 because α
∗(N) in (2.5) and thus the total variable
costs are linear increasing in N and the fixed costs, dN2 + fN , are convex increasing in
N .
2.2.3.2 Profit function
Banks charge to each client a fee τ per unit of managed wealth w to compensate for the
portfolio management and the supply of financial products. The total fee a household
has to pay is thus proportional to the volume of savings w that the bank has to manage.
Total fee income per bank is then I∗wτ . By deducting total costs from the total revenue
raised by the fee, the banks’ profit function becomes
Π(N, τ, α∗(N)) = I∗wτ − Ctot(N), (2.8)
costs; however, not in relation to financial products N). Ctot(N) shall be understood in broad sense;
it includes entry costs, managers’ compensation, reserves and so on. This cost structure allows the
discussion of comparative-static effects of cost parameters on the equilibrium (see Section 2.3.2) and the
introduction of correlated derivatives (see Sections 2.4 and 2.5).
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where Ctot(N) defined by (2.7) uses α
∗(N). It shows that a bank’s profit depends on the
fee τ it charges, the number of financial products N it offers, households’ behavior α∗(N)
and technology parameters.
2.2.3.3 Banking sector equilibrium: Competition and optimal offer
Banks compete by offering the safe asset and N risky financial products for a fee τ . It is
assumed that there is perfect competition by free entry (i.e., competition for the market).
Free entry prevents any bank from gaining positive profits in a banking sector equilibrium.
If this did not hold, banks would be substituted away by new market entrants. In line with
the contestable market concept banks will enter and overtrump others (by offering more
N or ask a lower fee τ) as long as they can gain positive profits. More specifically, banks
are offering to households a financial service package characterized by (N, τ), which must
fulfill two conditions in equilibrium: First, for not being overtrumped the package must
not yield positive profit to the bank. Second, as a participation constraint for households
the package offered by a bank must generate for households at least the utility level they
would get from any other zero-profit package.13 Lemma 2.3 presents formally the two
conditions which the equilibrium-package (N∗, τ ∗) must fulfill.
Lemma 2.3. Let Π(N, τ, α∗(N)) be the bank’s profit function from equation (2.8) and
let v∗(N, τ) be the household’s indirect utility from equation (2.6). In equilibrium, banks
offer a (N, τ)-package such that
Π(N, τ, α∗(N)) = 0
v∗(N, τ) > v∗(N ′, τ ′) ∀ N ′, τ ′.
(2.9)
Proof. If banks offer (N, τ)-packages not fulfilling Π(N, τ, α∗(N)) = 0, there is market
entry by another bank which offers N ′ > N or τ ′ < τ taking over the clients and still
gaining Π(N ′, τ ′, α∗(N ′)) > 0. This continues until Π(N, τ, α∗(N)) = 0. If banks do not
offer utility optimizing (N, τ)-packages to households, they are outplayed by a market
entrant who offers a (N ′, τ ′)-package with v∗(N ′, τ ′) > v∗(N, τ) and takes over the clients
(if Π(N ′, τ ′, α∗(N ′)) > 0 finally being displaced by another bank with Π(N ′′, τ ′′, α∗(N ′′)) =
0). Thus, at the end Π(N, τ, α∗(N)) = 0 and v∗(N, τ) > v∗(N ′, τ ′).
To determine the number of financial products N∗ and the corresponding τ ∗ simulta-
neously as a package in equilibrium, banks’ supply decision is combined with households’
13Note that this competition structure yields the same equilibrium outcome as a situation in which an
auctioneer would do a profit maximization for the n banks by exploiting households’ utility surplus fully.
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demand decision (portfolio choice): From the profit function (2.8) follows that in a zero-
profit banking sector equilibrium the fee τ charged for providing a specific number of
financial products N is given by
τˆ(N) ≡ Ctot(N)
I∗w
, (2.10)
where Ctot(N) uses α
∗(N). For each potential level of diversification N , banks determine
with τˆ (N) the necessary fee to be charged to have zero profits. Since Ctot(N) is increasing
and convex in N by Assumption 2.2, it holds that τˆ ′(N) > 0 and τˆ ′′(N) > 0. Thus, a
more complex bundle B consisting of more financial products N makes banks charge a
higher fee to households.
In addition, the equilibrium condition (2.9) states that the equilibrium N∗ and τ ∗
must fulfill v∗(N∗, τ ∗) > v∗(N ′, τ ′) for any N ′ and τ ′ fulfilling (2.10). The equilibrium
number of financial products N∗ is implicitly determined by the following equation
∂v∗(N, τˆ(N))
∂N
= 0, (2.11)
where v∗(N, τˆ(N)) is the indirect utility function evaluated at the equilibrium fee τˆ (N)
for N . It states that, in equilibrium, for households the diversification utility of more N
must correspond to marginal fee costs of more N .
Proposition 2.1. Suppose the assumptions on households’ utility and on banks’ tech-
nology structure and free entry competition hold with parameters satisfying the inequality
2fγσ2 < I∗R˜(R˜ − 2c˜)w. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium (N∗, τ ∗)-package. It is
characterized by:14
N∗ =
I∗R˜(R˜− 2c˜)w − 2fγσ2
4dγσ2
(2.12)
τ ∗ =
16csd+ I
∗(R˜2−4c˜2)R˜2w
γ2σ4
− 8c˜fR˜
γσ2
− 4f2
I∗w
16d
(2.13)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1 for derivation.
Figure 2.2 gives an illustration of the equilibrium conditions (2.10) and (2.11) and
the determination of the equilibrium in the (N, τ)-space. It shows the zero-profit locus
which is given by the τˆ (N)-function defined in equation (2.10). τˆ (N) is increasing and
14For N∗ > 0 the assumption that fγσ2 < I
∗R˜(R˜−2c˜)w
2 is necessary. Furthermore, N
∗ ≥ 1 is guaranteed
if I
∗wR˜2
2γσ2 ≥ 2d+ f + R˜I
∗wc˜
γσ2 .
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convex in N . The household’s utility from different (N, τ)-packages is represented by the
indifferences curve in the (N, τ)-space. From equation (2.6) follows that it is a straight
line with slope R˜
2
2γσ2
> 0. According to condition (2.11), the equilibrium (N∗, τ ∗)-package
is determined by the unique point where the household’s indifference curve is tangent to
the τˆ(N)-function. This point is consistent with both banks’ zero-profit condition and
households’ optimal portfolio choice. In contrast any other (N, τ)-package does not jointly
fulfill the two equilibrium conditions given in (2.9).
v∗(N, τ)
τˆ (N)
N∗
τ∗
v∗(·) ↑
Π(·) ↑
τ
N
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium package with N∗ and τ ∗
Notes: The figure plots a bank’s zero-profit fee function and a household’s indifference curve both for
α∗(N). The tangency point fulfills the equilibrium conditions and determines the equilibrium number
N∗ of financial products and the corresponding fee τ∗.
2.3 Equilibrium analysis
2.3.1 Equilibrium characterization
The equilibrium in this economy is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is a number of financial products and a fee for financial
services {N, τ}; a household’s portfolio choice {α} and the resulting capital allocations
{Ks, Kj}, j = 1, ..., N , which is consistent with household optimization and a zero-profit
equilibrium in the banking sector.
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The equilibrium in this economy is characterized by N∗ and τ ∗ defined in (2.12) and
(2.13), respectively, by
α∗(N∗) = N∗
R˜
γσ2
, (2.14)
Ks
∗(N∗) = (1− α∗(N∗))wI = (1−N∗ R˜
γσ2
)wI (2.15)
and
K∗j (N
∗) =
α∗(N∗)
N∗
wI =
R˜
γσ2
wI, j = 1, ..., N∗. (2.16)
The equilibrium given by equations (2.12)-(2.16) allows now answering the questions
raised in the introduction about the determinants and the consequences of financial inno-
vations. More precisely, it enables the discussion of the equilibrium effects of changes in
the fundamentals on the number of financial products (see comparative statics on N∗ in
Section 2.3.2). Further, it allows analyzing effects of more financial products on aggregate
variables (see Section 2.7).
2.3.2 Effects of fundamentals on financial innovations
The equilibrium solution N∗ presented in (2.12) depends on the fundamentals from the
underlying return generating technologies R˜ and σ2, households’ endowment w and risk
attitude γ and the bank’s cost parameters c˜, d, f as well as the number of households I∗
served per bank. The signs of the comparative-static effects of the fundamentals on the
number of financial products are shown in Table 2.1 and summarized in Proposition 2.2.15
Table 2.1: Comparative statics of fundamentals
Parameter I∗ w γ R˜ σ2 c˜ f d
on N∗ + + – + – – – –
Proposition 2.2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, in equilibrium financial
innovations are stimulated by a larger volume of wealth managed per bank (higher I∗ or
more w), less risk averse households (lower γ), more attractive risky financial products
(higher R˜ or lower σ2) or higher cost-efficiency in the banking sector (lower c˜, f or d).
Proof. Follows from equation (2.12): For N∗ > 0 we have ∂N
∗
∂I∗
> 0, ∂N
∗
∂w
> 0, ∂N
∗
∂γ
< 0,
∂N∗
∂R˜
> 0, ∂N
∗
∂σ2
< 0, ∂N
∗
∂c˜
< 0, ∂N
∗
∂f
< 0 and ∂N
∗
∂d
< 0.
15The comparative-static effects of the fundamentals on the equilibrium fee τ∗, portfolio share α∗ and
capital allocations Ks
∗, K∗j are presented in Table B.1 in Appendix B.2.
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By qualitatively cross-checking the results in Proposition 2.2 with data, I find that
these comparative-static results are intuitive and in line with empirical observations: First,
the data shows that the safe return r, represented by the effective federal funds rate
in the U.S., dropped from around 10% in the 1980s to 0.1% in 2014.16 According to
the model a lower r raises, ceteris paribus, R˜ and lead to a higher number of financial
products. The reasoning behind this is that households are looking for more yield and
therefore ask for risky, high-return financial products. Second, wealth volumes w managed
per bank increased dramatically throughout the recent decades (for example through
leveraging). According to Proposition 2.2 this drives more financial products because
innovation costs are better shared. Additionally, the empiric shows that the financial
sector was characterized by consolidation with a decrease in the number of banks in the
U.S. from above 35,000 in 1980 to around 15,000 in 2009.17 A decreased number of banks
corresponds in the presented model to a higher efficient bank size I∗. This stimulates
more financial products because a higher I∗ allows banks to serve a given N at a lower
τ per household. This induces demand for more N . Finally, as Philippon and Reshef
(2012) argue, bank deregulation (as observed in the last decades) can intensify innovation
activity of banks because it lowers a bank’s innovation costs by loosening the frontier
for financial innovations. Furthermore, numbers of Philippon (2015) on the unit costs
of financial intermediation (i.e., total income of financial intermediaries divided by the
amount of intermediated assets) hint at a decrease of bank cost in the short run: His
calculations show a decrease in the quality adjusted unit costs of financial intermediation
from 1.8% in 1990 to 1.5% in 2012. Such a decrease can be a result of diminished variable
management costs c˜ or of lower handling costs d or advertising costs f (e.g., through
IT-progress). Any such reduction of costs triggers, according to the model, new financial
products.
Hence, the model developed here identifies reasonable channels and provides an ex-
planation for new products in the financial sector by identifying fundamentals as possible
drivers. Qualitatively these drivers are consistent with empirical trends.
2.4 Correlated financial products and neglected cor-
relation
I now address the question whether new financial products can also be induced by (wrong)
beliefs – in contrast to changes in the fundamentals. More precisely, I allow neglected
correlation to be an additional channel which could facilitate new financial products. So
16Data taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis. See bibliography for details.
17Data taken from OECD.Stat. See bibliography for details.
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far, financial innovations were new financial products based on real investment projects
with independent return generating technologies. In fact, however, financial innovations
are partly just combinations of existing financial products and exhibit correlation among
them.18 Henceforth, I call such products correlated derivatives. In the further analysis
the baseline model is extended to account for such products. The question of interest is
how correlated financial products affect the equilibrium number of financial products in
this economy and households’ welfare – the answer depends on whether households are
able to see the respective correlation or not.
2.4.1 Correlated derivatives
Assume that banks do not thoroughly check whether the financial products they offer are
all based on independent real investment projects. In fact, they are offering derivatives
D which are correlated with the “real” financial innovations N . The design of derivatives
is assumed to be done in a simplistic way: For each of the N financial products based on
independent real projects banks offer ν ≥ 0 other products based on the same underlying.
They promise the same return. Hence, in addition to N banks offer D = νN cloned
derivatives with correlation ρ = 1. In sum, banks supply a total M = N +D = (1+ ν)N
of financial products which have, in fact, only N independent real investment projects as
underlyings. For now, the multiplier ν is taken as exogenous parameter. (In Section 2.5,
ν is endogenized through a cost-minimizing behavior of banks.) For the provision of a
correlated derivative the following is assumed:
Assumption 2.3. The provision of a correlated derivative requires no handling cost d,
yet, it has to be issued at cost f .
Under Assumption 2.3 a bank’s innovation costs become dN2 + f(1 + ν)N and total
costs are Ctot(N, ν, ) = c
rα∗(N, ν, )wI∗+cs(1−α∗(N, ν, ))wI∗+dN2+f(1+ν)N , where
α∗(N, ν, ) is determined in the next subsections. Compared to the baseline model the
changes are that issuing fixed costs increase to (1+ ν)f instead of f and that households’
portfolio choice α∗(N, ν, ) might be affected by ν; depending on whether households
neglect correlation  between N and D or not.
18Célérier and Vallée (2014) analyze the development of complexity of structured products and find,
in fact, increased interlinkage between them.
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2.4.2 Neglected correlation
2.4.2.1 No neglect
First, for the sake of comparison, the effects of correlated derivatives on the equilibrium
are analyzed for the case in which households are fully able to differ between the financial
products N based on independent real investment projects and the cloned derivatives D.
They are aware of the correlation ρ = 1 of the clones and understand that the derivatives
D are not contributing to diversification. This means that households base their portfolio
decision still on the true bundle variance. Thus, σ2B(N, ν) = σ
2
B =
σ2
N
is invariant to
ν, where σ2B(N, ν) denotes the variance of a bundle B with M = (1 + ν)N assets with
equal weights.19 Households’ portfolio decision remains unbiased and the same fraction
α∗(N, ν, ) = α∗(N) of wealth is allocated to risky assets as in the baseline. The only thing
that changes compared to the baseline is the increase of issuing cost f to (1 + ν)f and
thus the fee which is consistent with zero profits rises from τˆ(N) to τˆ (N, ν) ≡ τˆ(N)+ νNf
I∗w
.
By applying the same procedure as in Section 2.2 to determine the equilibrium, we
obtain for the total number of financial products
M∗D = (1 + ν)N
∗
D = (1 + ν)
I∗R˜(R˜− 2c˜)w − 2(1 + ν)fγσ2
4dγσ2
, (2.17)
which is a multiple of the number of financial innovations N∗D based on real projects.
20
Compared to N∗ in (2.12), the equilibrium number of real financial innovations N∗D is
now lower. The reason is that the issuing costs per financial product based on a real
investment project rise from f to (1 + ν)f because also its clones have to be issued and
advertised (“cost effect”). Thus, the multiplier ν has the same comparative-static effect
as an increase in f . The correlated derivatives waste resources in the sense that they incur
extra costs without adding value in the sense of diversification possibilities. Derivatives
substitute real financial innovations. Due to the ν-multiplier, derivatives increase the total
number of financial products compared to the frictionless model whenever M∗D > N
∗.21
In sum, if I∗w is large compared to f , then derivatives stimulate the total number of
financial products through this “multiplication effect”.
19Actually, households are in their portfolio choice indifferent (if they have to cover all costs anyhow)
between investing a certain fraction of their wealth symmetrically in the N basic financial products or in
all M = (1 + ν)N products which are offered. It is assumed without loss of generality that they do the
latter.
20See Appendix B.1.1 for the derivation and Table B.2 in Appendix B.3.1 for a full characterization of
the other equilibrium variables.
21M∗D > N
∗ ⇔ (1 + ν)N∗D > N∗ reduces to the following condition: I∗R˜(R˜ − 2c˜)w > 2fγσ2(2 + ν).
Thereby, I∗R˜(R˜ − 2c˜)w > 2fγσ2(1 + ν) is already needed for N∗D > 0.
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2.4.2.2 (Partial) correlation neglect
Second, I consider the more interesting case with erroneous beliefs; namely, neglected
correlation. I analyze what happens if households are not (fully) able to differentiate
between the N financial products with independent projects as underlyings and the D
correlated derivatives. Assume that households neglect a part  ∈ [0, 1] of the correlation
ρ = 1 and base their portfolio decision on ρ˜ ≡ 1 − . This inaccurate belief can either
arise if households have limited ability to differ between financial products or if banks
are not providing them with all relevant information. The erroneous assessment of ρ
makes households overestimate the diversification effect provided by a bundle B of equally
weighted M = N + D assets. With belief ρ˜, the perceived variance of such a bundle B
is:22
σ2B(N, ν, ) =
1 + ν(1− )
(1 + ν)N
σ2 ≤ 1
N
σ2 = σ2B (2.18)
For  = 0, we are back in the case σ2B(N, ν, ) = σ
2
B in which households account
correctly for the fact that D are perfectly correlated clones of N . In contrast, if  > 0
households overestimate the diversification effect and hence underestimate the variance
of the risky portfolio. Then neglected correlation leads to a biased portfolio choice
α∗(N, ν, ) = R˜
γσ2
B
(N,ν,)
= (1+ν)N
1+ν(1−)
R˜
γσ2
. This says, with increased neglect the households
excessively invest in the risky bundle B. Thus, in addition to the increased fixed costs
from f to (1 + ν)f , we have biased portfolio choices with more risky invested savings
increasing also variable costs. This rises the zero profit fee τˆ (N, ν, ) ≥ τˆ(N, ν) > τˆ (N)
further.
With the same procedure as in Section 2.2, the equilibrium total number of financial
products M∗D,NC for the case with derivatives and neglected correlation is determined:
23
M∗D,NC = (1 + ν)N
∗
D,NC = (1 + ν)
I∗R˜(R˜− 2c˜)w(1 + ν)− 2(1 + ν)(1 + ν(1− ))fγσ2
4dγσ2(1 + ν(1− ))
(2.19)
Like in the  = 0 case, the cost of issuing the ν-fold clones of the financial products
based on real projects raises the zero-profit fee. This “cost effect” would result in a lower
N∗D,NC compared to the baseline N
∗ in (2.12). The neglect of correlation distorts the equi-
librium provision of financial products through an additional channel; namely, through
the variance bias 1+ν(1−)
1+ν
. This bias raises the households’ demand for risky financial
22See derivation in Appendix B.1.2.
23See Appendix B.1.1 for the derivation and Table B.2 in Appendix B.3.1 for a full characterization of
the other equilibrium variables.
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products and counteracts the cost effect of ν on N∗D,NC . We have that the higher the
correlation neglect , the higher is the number of real financial innovations N∗D,NC . This
is because households believe to have more diversification and invest a larger share of
their savings in risky financial products (“neglected correlation effect”). N∗D,NC > N
∗
from (2.12) as soon as the neglect  is above a threshold ¯,24 because then the “neglected
correlation effect” outweighs the “cost effect” of ν on N∗D,NC . In addition, derivatives
increase the total number of financial products because of the ν-fold multiple of each
financial product based on a real investment project. For M∗D,NC > N
∗ we have that
the creation of derivatives in connection with neglected correlation increases the total
number of financial products.25 Indeed, the number of financial products M∗D,NC can rise
dramatically by an interaction of the “neglected correlation effect” and the “multiplica-
tion effect”. This shows that the proliferation of the number of financial products (as
illustrated in Figure 2.1) can be driven by correlated financial products in connection
with erroneous diversification assessment and need not always to be the result of changes
in the fundamentals.
2.4.3 Consequences of correlated derivatives and neglected cor-
relation
Correlated derivatives in connection with correlation neglect are not only affecting the
total number of financial products in equilibrium, but have further consequences for
households: In sum, there are two effects of correlated derivatives in connection with
wrong beliefs about correlations, which affect the individuals’ welfare. First, the issuing
costs of cloned financial products must be covered by higher fees. Second, households are
misled in their portfolio choice. This means that the true utility level – generated by the
biased portfolio choice under the true bundle variance σ2B =
1
N∗
D,NC
σ2 which is larger than
the planned one σ2B(N
∗
D,NC , ν, ) – is smaller than the households’ planned utility level.
In other words, the overestimated diversification effect is disillusioned when confronted
with reality – with an adverse effect on households’ welfare. Thus, the cost and the bias
distortion both have negative effects on households’ utility.26
24¯ = 2fγσ
2(1+ν)
2fγσ2ν+I∗R˜(R˜−2c˜)w
.
25 > ¯ is a sufficient condition for M∗D,NC > N
∗, not a necessary one. For a sharp condition follows
from (2.19) and (2.12): M∗D,NC > N
∗ if and only if I∗R˜(R˜−2c˜)w(1+ν+ ) > 2fγσ2(1+ν(1− ))(2+ν).
26In Appendix B.3.2 the equations for the equilibrium utility level from the baseline model,
v∗(N∗, τ∗), and the model with derivatives but no correlation neglect, v∗(N∗D, ν, τ
∗
D), as well as planned
v∗(N∗D,NC , ν, , τ
∗
D,NC)
p and true v∗(N∗D,NC , ν, , τ
∗
D,NC)
t utility levels from the model with derivatives
and neglected correlation are provided.
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The consequences of correlated derivatives and neglected correlation on households’
utility and the equilibrium number of financial products are summarized in Proposition
2.3.27
Proposition 2.3. If there are correlated derivatives D and households neglected part
 of the correlation between the derivatives and the financial products with independent
projects as underlyings, portfolio choices become biased (“excessive” risky investments)
and effective household utility declines. Moreover, the total number of financial products
M = N + D provided in equilibrium can fundamentally exceed the number issued in an
undistorted equilibrium.
Proof. Implied by equations (2.18), (2.19) and the utility levels in Appendix B.3.2.
These results support policy recommendations which aim to prevent the supply of
redundant financial products and protect financial investors: ν should be kept small (e.g.,
through patenting of financial innovations) and  should be minimized (e.g., through trans-
parent information requirements, costumer services or responsible rating agencies which
reveal information about financial products) so that the equilibrium without distortions
can be realized.
2.5 Endogenous supply of correlated derivatives
I propose now a way to endogenize the derivative multiplier ν. This reveals a potential
explanation for why banks might offer redundant financial products. The modeling pro-
cedure to determine the endogenized ν follows the one from the baseline model.28 Banks
are competing for diversification-seeking households by providing the optimal level of di-
versification at the lowest possible fee costs. Households are seeking for diversification
possibilities in order to invest in risky financial products with high returns without in-
creasing their risk exposure. According to (2.5), the optimal share households invest in
the bundle B of risky assets is α∗ = R˜
γσ2
B
. Without diversification (i.e., if there is just
one risky asset) we have σ2B = σ
2. With diversification the bundle variance is lowered to
σ2B =
1
a
σ2, where a ≥ 1 defines the degree of diversification offered by bundle B. The
portfolio allocation is thus α∗(a) = a R˜
γσ2
. In the baseline analysis the level of diversifica-
tion a = σ
2
σ2
B
was given by N . In contrast, under neglected correlation the perceived level of
27In addition to the consequences of correlated derivatives and neglected correlation on households’
utility and the equilibrium number of financial product, aggregate output and the size of the banking
sector are affected. See Section 2.7 for a discussion of the effects of financial innovations on aggregates.
28For notational simplicity, I suppress D,NC as the sub-index of M and N for the remainder of the
paper, but I keep on discussing the model version with correlated derivatives and neglected correlation
(if not stated otherwise).
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diversification is given by a = (1+ν)N
1+ν(1−)
(see (2.18)), which is a function of the correlation
neglect .
Specifically, the procedure for endogenizing ν is as follows: First, banks determine
the minimal fee for each potential level of perceived diversification a by combining in
a cost-minimizing way financial innovations based on real underlyings N and correlated
derivatives D = νN in the bundle B (see Section 2.5.1). This allows them to deliver a at
the lowest possible fee. Any higher fee level would be underbid by a potential competitor.
Second, in general equilibrium, this supply behavior of banks is combined with households’
mean-variance preferences so that the equilibrium level of perceived diversification a∗
which promises households the highest possible utility level can be determined (see Section
2.5.2).
2.5.1 Cost-minimal provision of perceived diversification
For each level of perceived diversification a banks offer the combination of N financial
products based on real underlyings and the derivative multiplier ν leading to D = νN
derivatives which minimizes total costs Ctot(N, ν, ). Thereby, they take into account that
households base their portfolio choice α∗(a) on the perceived level of diversification a
which is influenced by the correlation neglect . For any a with α∗(a) ∈ [0, 1] the bank’s
cost-minimizing combination of N and ν is determined by the following optimization
problem:
min
ν,N
crα∗(a)wI∗ + cs(1− α∗(a))wI∗ + dN2 + f(1 + ν)N (2.20)
subject to a = (1+ν)N
1+ν(1−)
α∗(a) = a R˜
γσ2
N ≥ 1, ν ≥ 0
The first constraint of the optimization problem defines a locus, which describes
all (N, ν)-combinations providing the same perceived level of diversification a (i.e., iso-
diversification curve). It can be rewritten:29
N(ν, a, ) =
1 + ν(1− )
1 + ν
a (2.21)
By substituting this into (2.20), I determine implicitly the cost-minimizing ν∗ for a given
29See Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1.3.1 for the iso-diversification curve. Note that for  > 0 ∂N(ν,a,)∂ν < 0
and ∂
2N(ν,a,)
∂ν2 > 0,
∂N(ν,a,)
∂a > 0 and
∂N(ν,a,)
∂ < 0.
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perceived level of diversification a:30
f
2da
= 
1
1−
+ ν∗
(1 + ν∗)3
(2.22)
The analytical examination of the program in (2.20) and its solution in (2.22) provide
insights into banks’ supply behavior of financial products based on real underlyings and
of correlated derivatives:
Equation (2.22) determines the multiplier ν∗ only for  ∈ (˜, ˜) (i.e., inner solutions if
the constraints ν∗ ≥ 0 and N∗ ≥ 1 ⇔ ν∗ ≤ a−1
1−a(1−)
by (2.21) are non-binding) and has a
unique positive solution for this range of .31 For the whole range of  ∈ [0, 1] banks set
the multiplier ν∗ as follows: First, it is at its minimum ν∗min = 0 for 0 ≤  ≤ ˜; second, it
is given by (2.22) for  ∈ (˜, ˜); and third, it is determined by ν∗ = a−11−a(1−) for 1 ≥  ≥ ˜
(with maximum ν∗max =
a−1
1−a(1−˜)
at ˜ and with ν∗ = a−1 for  = 1). This means in words:
If households are capable to distinguish between the financial products based on real
underlyings and the derivatives and to assess their correlation well enough with 0 ≤  ≤ ˜,
banks do not clone the financial products based on real underlyings – although households
might not consider the correlation fully – because the provision of correlated derivatives
is costly and they do not add much to the perceived diversification. Thus, ˜ ≥ 0 is the
lower bound of neglected correlation beyond which banks start “cheating” on households
by providing correlated derivatives. For high correlation neglect with 1 ≥  ≥ ˜ banks are
providing the full perceived level of diversification a with derivatives based on only one
real financial innovation. Hence, ˜ ≤ 1 is the upper bound of neglected correlation after
which banks are providing the perceived level of diversification a with only one financial
product based on a real investment project, but many clones of it. These boundaries
for ν∗ imply by (2.21) that the number of financial products based on independent real
investment projects, N∗, starts at maximum N∗max = a for 0 ≤  ≤ ˜ and ends in its
minimum N∗min = 1 for 1 ≥  ≥ ˜.
If households neglect part ˜ >  > ˜ of the correlation, banks duplicate the financial
products based on independent real investment projects and create correlated derivatives
because the latter’s “innovation” is cheaper. For these positive inner solutions follow
comparative-static effects of changes in  ∈ (˜, ˜), a, d and f on the derivative multiplier
(given by (2.22)) and on the number of financial products based on real underlyings (given
30See Appendix B.1.3.1 for the derivation.
31For the argumentation on uniqueness of a positive ν∗ for  ∈ (˜, ˜) see Appendix B.1.3.1. ˜ and ˜ are
derived from equation (2.22) by setting ν∗ = 0 and ν∗ = a−11−a(1−) , respectively. ˜ = f2da+f decreases in
a. It starts at f2d+f for a = 1 and is limited at lima→∞
˜= 0. ˜ = 4(a−1)d+af+
√
f
√
8(a−1)d+a2f
2a(2d+f) increases in
a. It starts at f2d+f for a = 1 and is limited at lima→∞
˜ = 1. See Appendix B.1.3.2 for derivations.
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by N∗(ν∗, a, ) in (2.21)). (2.23) summarizes the comparative statics where + is a positive
and - a negative comparative-static effect.32
ν∗(
+
, a
+
, d
+
, f
−
) and N∗(
−
, a
+
, d
−
, f
+
) (2.23)
As indicated by (2.23), for  ∈ (˜, ˜) the multiplier ν∗ rises with the level of correlation
neglect . Hence, the more correlation the households neglect, the more banks can deceive
them by selling redundant financial products. (2.23) indicates further that for  ∈ (˜, ˜)
the number of financial innovations based on real underlyings, N∗, decreases with the
level of correlation neglect . The reason of the decrease of N∗ in  is twofold: In addition
to a direct negative effect of the correlation neglect , there is an indirect effect through
the increased multiplier ν∗ that makes fewer financial products based on independent
real investment projects necessary to achieve a. These comparative-static effects mean, if
households neglect a larger part  of the correlation between financial products banks are
providing the level of perceived diversification a by substituting financial products based
on real underlyings through cloned derivatives (-effect).
Further, (2.23) shows that for  ∈ (˜, ˜) an increase in the perceived level of diversi-
fication a raises both ν∗ and N∗ because it shifts the iso-diversification curve outwards.
This means, for a higher perceived level of diversification more financial products based
on real investment projects are offered along with the rising number of cloned derivatives
(a-effect).
Finally, (2.23) summarizes for  ∈ (˜, ˜) that ν∗ rises with the handling costs d of real
investment products because with a higher d the supply of derivatives becomes relatively
cheaper. N∗ decreases in d due to the inverse argumentation. ν∗ declines (and N∗ rises)
as the issuing cost f increases because this makes derivatives relatively more costly to
offer.
For the comparative statics of the exogenous on the total number of financial products
M∗ = (1 + ν∗)N∗ follows for  ∈ (˜, ˜):33
M∗( 
+/−
, a
+
, d
+
, f
−
) (2.24)
The effect of the neglect  onM∗ depends on the elasticity of the multiplier ν∗ with respect
to : ∂M
∗
∂
≷ 0 ⇔ ∂ν∗
∂

ν∗
≷ 
1−
. The condition for a positive effect of  on M∗ is fulfilled
for low , but not necessarily if the correlation neglect is high. Thus, the total of financial
products M∗ is hump-shaped in : Since ν∗ is increasing and N∗ is decreasing in , their
product (1+ν∗)N∗ is larger for middle values than it is closer to the boundaries. Further,
32See Appendix B.1.3.3 for derivations.
33See Appendix B.1.3.4 for derivations.
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the total number of financial products is clearly increasing in the level of diversification a
because both ν∗ and N∗ are increasing in a. Finally, M∗ increases in d and decreases in
f as ν∗ does.
Banks’ partial equilibrium supply behavior of financial products derived from (2.20)
and summarized in (2.23) and (2.24) provides insights why banks might offer redundant
(or correlated) financial products: If financial investors make an erroneous diversification
assessment the creation of correlated financial products permits banks to stay competitive
because it allows them to satisfy investor’s perceived diversification demand a at lower
costs.
2.5.2 Equilibrium with neglected correlation
To determine the general equilibrium, the supply behavior of banks is combined with
households’ mean-variance preferences. For each potential level of perceived diversification
a, banks have determined the cost-minimizing derivative multiplier ν∗a and the number
of financial products N∗a based on real underlyings. They fixed the corresponding zero-
profit fee τˆa(N
∗
a , ν
∗
a) which just covers their total costs. Then, in equilibrium, for a given
level of neglect  we get the equilibrium level of perceived diversification a∗ =
(1+ν∗
a∗
)N∗
a∗
1+ν∗
a∗
(1−)
,
which promises households the highest utility level given their optimal portfolio choice
α∗ = a∗ R˜
γσ2
and the corresponding equilibrium fee τ ∗a∗(N
∗
a∗ , ν
∗
a∗).
I obtain the general equilibrium by numerical simulation.34 The main results can be
summarized as follows: The higher the correlation neglect , the higher is the equilibrium
level of perceived diversification a∗. A higher  shifts banks’ cost function for a specific level
of perceived diversification a down because the issuing of D is cheaper than the provision
of N .35 Since households willingness to pay for a is not affected by , this leads to a
demand for a higher a∗. Under more neglect households are willing to hold many financial
products because they believe that each of them provides diversification possibilities.
Thus, in general equilibrium the multiplier ν∗ increases in  twofold: First, because banks
can “cheat” more by satisfying demanded perceived diversification with cheap correlated
clones (-effect) and second because more diversification is asked (a∗-effect). In addition,
as long as  is not too high, N∗ is increasing in  because more diversification is demanded
(i.e., the positive a∗-effect outweighs the negative -effect onN∗). In sum, the total number
34The simulation procedure is described in Appendix B.4.1. Figure B.2 in Appendix B.4.2 gives sim-
ulated results of the equilibrium in dependence of the correlation neglect  ∈ [0, 1]. In panels (a)-(f)
a∗, ν∗, N∗ and M∗ and the true σ2B
∗
and planned bundle variance σ2B
∗
(N∗, ν∗, ) as well as the fee τ∗
are plotted. Note that the corner solutions of ν∗ as discussed above are hardly visible in the simulation
because ˜ is close to 0 and ˜ approaches 1 for increased levels of a∗.35See Appendix B.1.3.5 for the derivations of comparative-static effects on the cost function.
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of financial products M∗ rises with the level of correlation neglect .36 The consequence
of these results is that the underestimation of the true bundle variance σ2B
∗
is increasing
in  because there is (i) more neglect  of (ii) more perceived diversification a∗. Hence,
planned and true bundle variance are diverging. Further, the demand for more a∗ implies
a higher fee τ ∗ as long as ν∗ and N∗ are increasing in . If the negative -effect outweighs
the positive a∗-effect on N∗ it is possible that the equilibrium fee τ ∗ decreases with 
because banks do not need to provide many costly financial innovations based on real
underlyings anymore.
These general equilibrium results show that the observed product innovations in the
financial sector can be driven by correlated financial products; namely, if banks compete
for diversification-seeking investors who (partially) neglect correlation. New financial
products can be induced by investors’ neglected correlation and the subsequent caused
cost-minimizing “cheating” behavior of banks and must not always be the result of changes
in the fundamentals.
2.6 Intuition for immense increase in the number of
financial products
With these results from the general equilibrium analysis it can be illustrated how a series
of the static model (with increasing correlation neglect) is able to intuitively replicate the
immense increase in the number of financial products as seen in Figure 2.1.
2.6.1 Empirical features
When taking a deeper look at, for example, the data from the Swiss Exchange SIX shown
in Figure 2.1 one observes some interesting features which are presented in Figure 2.3.
The figure shows the number of financial products listed at the Swiss Exchange SIX from
1995-2014 subdivided into security types bonds, shares and structured products. In this
time range the number of bonds varied between 2,019 and 1,235 and the number of shares
decreased from 530 in 1995 to 289 in 2014. However, the most remarkable change can be
observed in the number of structured products: It increased from 551 in 1995 to 32,896 in
2014. Thus, while in 1995 two-thirds of the total of 3,190 financial products were bonds,
in 2014 94% of the total of 34,888 were structured products. This indicates that the
36Panel (c) in Figure B.2 shows that beyond some -threshold the -effect dominates and N∗ declines.
Still the total number M∗ of financial products rises (panel (d)) because the multiplier ν∗ is enhanced
by the rising  (panel (b)).
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Figure 2.3: Number of financial products traded at SIX
Notes: Number of financial products listed at the Swiss Exchange SIX from 1995-2014. Shares include
Swiss shares and foreign shares. Bonds include domestic CHF bonds and foreign CHF bonds. Structured
products include investment funds, sponsored funds, ETFs, ETSFs, ETPs and structured products and
warrants. During 2002 to 2004, there were security type reallocations (e.g., structured products bonds
were reallocated from bonds to derivatives) and before 2003, the numbers included equities listed on the
main market only. Source: SIX (see bibliography for details).
strong innovation dynamics in the financial sector arise from a dramatic increase in the
number of structured products and not from basic financial products.37
2.6.2 Model intuition
The presented static model can provide intuition for the empirical features of the immense
increase in the number of financial products as seen in Figure 2.1 and 2.3. For that,
consider several single realizations i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 6} of the presented model with varying
correlation neglect i (i.e., comparative statics with respect to ). The single model
realizations are ordered such that i is incrementally increased (i.e., 0 = 0 < 1 < ... < 6).
Figure 2.4 provides an illustration of this series of single static model predictions. It shows
an immense increase in the total number of financial products.
Note that, this specifically ordered series of single static model predictions can be
interpreted as time series if one assumes that over the last decades households made more
and more erroneous correlation assessments. One could claim that such an increasing
37This conclusion is in line with findings of Célérier and Vallée (2014) who empirically show that
financial products became more complex during the last decade.
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Figure 2.4: Immense increase in the number of financial products
Notes: The figure plots a series of single static model predictions for seven different levels of correlation
neglect  ∈ [0, 1] with 0 = 0 < ... < 6. For all i, i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 6},• indicate the total numbers of financial
products M∗i = N
∗
i +D
∗
i = (1 + ν
∗
i)N
∗
i , ◦ indicate the numbers of correlated derivatives D∗i = ν∗iN∗i
and ∗ indicate the numbers of financial products based on real investment projects N∗i . It shows a strong
incremental increase of the total number of financial products – summing the derivatives D∗i and the real
financial innovations N∗i – implied by households’ increasing correlation neglect and banks’ duplication
behavior.
correlation neglect is caused by increased financial complexity over time if fundamentals
have led to an increase in the number of financial products.
The intuition of the series of model predictions in Figure 2.4 is as follows (for the
intuition, the results from the equilibrium analysis from Section 2.5.2 are used): In the
model realization i = 0 with  = 0 = 0 households do not neglect correlations so that
the derivative multiplier ν∗0 = 0. Thus, the model realization i = 0 predicts the total
number of financial products to be equal to the number of financial innovations based
on independent real investment projects, M∗0 = N
∗
0 . In model realizations i ≥ 1 with
 = i > 0, households make an erroneous diversification assessment and neglect more
and more correlation with increasing i (1 < ... < 6). This increases the derivative
multiplier ν∗i incrementally due to positive - and a
∗-effects on ν∗ (see Section 2.5.2).
Furthermore, the number N∗i of financial products based on real projects increases with
i under the assumption that the positive a
∗-effect outweighs the negative -effect on N∗
(see Section 2.5.2). The elevated ν∗i and N
∗
i
with i result in a convex increase in the
number of correlated derivatives D∗i = ν
∗
i
N∗i. This means that (i) the total number
M∗i = N
∗
i
+ D∗i = (1 + ν
∗
i
)N∗i of financial products increases immensely and that (ii)
correlated derivatives drive this immense increase. These two results are in line with
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empirical observations. Hence, the series of single static model predictions with increasing
correlation neglect provides a model intuition for the empirical features of the exponential
innovation dynamics in the financial sector.
2.7 Consequences of financial innovations
The increase in the number of financial products – inclusive the provision of correlated
clones on top of financial products based on independent real investment projects – have
far reaching consequences for households and macroeconomic aggregates.38
2.7.1 Mean-variance effects: Diversification vs. volatility
With more financial products, M∗ = (1 + ν∗)N∗, a larger share of wealth is invested in
risky, high-return financial products (i.e., α∗ = 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
N∗ R˜
γσ2
increases in M∗). Thus,
the equilibrium unit return on household portfolios E(R∗PF ) =
1+ν∗
1+ν∗(1−)
N∗ R˜
2
γσ2
+ r in-
creases withM∗. Pari passu, its true variance rises to σ2PF
∗
= ( 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
)2N∗ R˜
2
γ2σ2
, whereas
( 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
)N∗ R˜
2
γ2σ2
was planned. Although there is a diversification effect in the bundle B
if more financial products are provided, the volatility of the portfolio rises because a more
risky composition of the portfolio is chosen. This effect arises even in the baseline with
ν∗ = 0 and  = 0. It is similar to the “hedge-more/bet-more-effect” in Simsek (2013b,
p.1367) and Simsek (2013a). With correlated derivatives and neglected correlation  > 0,
the overestimation of the diversification effect by households who face a mix of real fi-
nancial innovations N∗ and correlated derivatives D∗ = ν∗N∗ induces the households to
take even more risk. Compared to  = 0, this raises the mean of portfolio unit return as
expected, but the risk in the return is accompanied by more volatility than expected (note
that ( 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
)2 > 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
if  > 0). Hence, planned and true portfolio variance diverge
more if  rises. This means that with correlated derivatives and neglected correlation
the consequences of new financial products for the households are deceived expectations
about the performance of their financial portfolios.39
2.7.2 Aggregate output effects
The model is able to qualitatively replicate macroeconomic outcomes, which can be ob-
served parallel to the innovation dynamics in the financial sector.
38Note that here the impact of an increase in the number of financial products is discussed ceteris
paribus. This means, without considering the other effects of fundamental or wrong beliefs which led to
the actual increase in the number of financial products.
39Similar effects are also found in Falkinger (2014) who considers erroneous probability and productivity
assessments.
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Furthermore, implications for the real aggregate output level and its volatility can be
deduced. For the macroeconomic implications of the equilibrium with correlated deriva-
tives and erroneous diversification assessment it is useful to look at the share α∗ allocated
to the risky assets. Aggregate output is determined by the factor allocations, which de-
pend through α∗ on the total number of financial products M∗ = (1 + ν∗)N∗. Aggregate
capital allocations in the safe and the risky investment projects are Ks
∗ = (1−α∗)wI and
K∗j = α
∗wI/N∗ for j = 1, ..., N∗ (see (2.15) and (2.16)), respectively, where with deriva-
tives and neglected correlation we have α∗ = 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
N∗ R˜
γσ2
. For the expected aggregate
output given in (2.1) I get then
E(Y ∗) =
(
1 + ν∗
1 + ν∗(1− )N
∗ R˜
2
γσ2
+ r
)
Iw (2.25)
and the true aggregate volatility given in (2.2) is
σ2Y
∗
=
(
1 + ν∗
1 + ν∗(1− )
)2
N∗
I2w2R˜2
γ2σ2
. (2.26)
Since with more financial products a larger share of wealth is invested in high-return,
risky investment projects, E(Y ∗) and σ2Y
∗
increase with the total number of financial
products M∗. This is, more risky financial products lead to a positive aggregate output
effect because the average return E(R) on the α∗-fraction of savings, which is increasing in
M∗, is larger than the safe return r. This argumentation is in line with the literature on
financial development (e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)). At the same time, a “volatil-
ity paradox” (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014, p.379) exists:40 More financial products
that diversify risk increase aggregate volatility because they lead to more investments in
the risky bundle.
Note that the rise in the output level is of linear order in the factor ( 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
), while
the volatility of aggregate output is increased by the quadratic factor ( 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
)2. If the
growth of financial products supplied by the financial system is (partly) driven by banks’
provision of correlated derivatives ν∗ and households’ neglected correlation , then the
co-movements of financial innovations and macroeconomic trends are accelerated; with
the volatility of aggregate output rising more strongly than its expected level. This shows
that the discussed distortions not only impact the number of financial products based on
real underlying and of correlated derivatives, but also the real economy outcome.
In sum, equations (2.25) and (2.26) show, ceteris paribus, co-movements of expected
aggregate output and aggregate volatility, with the total number of financial product.
40Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) describe the “volatility paradox” as a phenomenon in which lower
fundamental risk can lead to more volatility because it implies higher leverage.
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These are stylized facts, which can be observed in the empirics: The aggregate output
effect mirrors macroeconomic growth and the variance effect is in line with the recent rise
of macroeconomic volatility shown by Carvalho and Gabaix (2013).
2.7.3 Banking sector size
The number of financial products impacts also the size of the banking sector. The size
of the banking sector λ denotes the fraction of resources absorbed by banks relative to
the aggregate output. The absorbed resources are measured by total fees. The size of the
banking sector λ is the sum of total fees Iwτ divided by expected aggregate output E(Y ):
λ ≡ Iwτ
E(Y )
(2.27)
With correlated derivatives and neglected correlation τ ∗ = Ctot(N
∗,ν∗,)
I∗w
and thus the
relative size of the banking sector is thus given by
λ∗ =
α∗c˜+ cs + dN
∗2+f(1+ν∗)N∗
wI∗
α∗R˜ + r
, (2.28)
where α∗ = 1+ν
∗
1+ν∗(1−)
N∗ R˜
γσ2
. The size of the banking sector depends on the total number of
financial productsM∗ and also on the mix of products based on independent real projects
N∗ and correlated derivatives D∗ = ν∗N∗. More financial products M∗ increase the share
α∗ of wealth allocated to risky assets. Both the resources absorbed by the variable costs
(i.e., α∗c˜ + cs in (2.28)) and the expected aggregate output (i.e., α∗R˜ + r in (2.28)) are
affine linear increasing in the share α∗. Their relative effect α
∗c˜+cs
α∗R˜+r
is increasing in M∗
if c
r
cs
> E(R)
r
. In addition to this, we have the effect of the fixed costs: The equilibrium
costs in the banking sector rise with M∗ through the two direct fixed costs of financial
innovations d and f . Thus, the mix of the financial products matters for the size of the
banking sector as follows: First, the size of the banking sector increases under the sufficient
condition c
r
cs
> E(R)
r
with the number N∗ of financial products based on real underlyings
because the fixed cost d-component is a convex increasing function of N∗. Second, the
effect of a rise in the derivative multiplier ν∗ on the size of the banking sector depends on
its effect on the fixed costs relative to its effect on aggregate output (i.e., f(1+ν
∗)N∗/(wI∗)
α∗R˜+r
in (2.28)). The sign of the relative effect depends on the level of the correlation neglect
: If  is not too large (i.e., if the bias due to  in the portfolio choice α∗ and thus on
aggregate output is not too pronounced), the effect of an increased ν∗ on the fixed costs
outweighs the one on aggregate output. Then, the size of the banking sector increases
with ν∗. The sufficient condition for this is  = 0 in addition to c
r
cs
> E(R)
r
.
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λ∗ is increasing in M∗ if the extra costs implied by providing new financial prod-
ucts exceed relatively their gains on expected return. Under this, the model can ex-
plain a growing financial sector as a co-movement to the immense increase in the num-
ber of financial products. This is in line with the financialization over the last decades
(see, e.g., Epstein (2005), Falkinger et al. (2015), Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) or
Philippon and Reshef (2012) for a discussion of financialization).
Proposition 2.4 summarizes the consequences of financial innovations on the aggre-
gates:
Proposition 2.4. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1 and Assumption 2.3, and
irrespective of the presence of correlated derivatives and neglected correlation, aggregate
output, its volatility and the size of the banking sector (the latter under the sufficient
conditions c
r
cs
> E(R)
r
and  = 0) depend, ceteris paribus, positively on the number of
financial products.
Proof. Main text.
2.8 Conclusion
Since the recent crisis, the interconnections between the real economy and the financial
sector attracted attention - within and outside academia. One aspect of the recent devel-
opments within the financial sector is the proliferation of the number of financial products.
In a theoretical model in which banks compete for diversification-seeking households, I
identify fundamentals and wrong beliefs as possible drivers of new financial products.
Banks offer financial products to households for a fee. In the benchmark model the fi-
nancial products are based on real investment projects. They generate stochastic returns
and provide diversification possibilities. A financial innovation occurs whenever a bank
offers a new financial product with an independent returns. The banking sector is in
equilibrium if the number of financial products and the charged fees are consistent with
optimal portfolio choice of the households and zero profit for banks (net of all cost, includ-
ing management, issuing and advertising expenses). The model design allows for explicit
solutions.
In the benchmark model, it is derived that in equilibrium more financial products
are stimulated by changes in the fundamentals like increased volume of savings, more
attractive financial assets and cost-reductions in the banking sector. Furthermore, by
considering correlated financial products and wrong beliefs possible distortions are ana-
lyzed: Wrong beliefs about correlations bias households’ portfolio choice. This leads to
excessive risk taking and exaggerates financial innovations by correlated financial prod-
ucts. In particular, erroneous diversification assessment by households, reflected in a
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neglect of correlation, induces banks to provide correlated derivatives. Thus, new finan-
cial products are not always the result of changes in fundamentals. They can also be
induced by investors’ neglected correlation and the subsequent caused cost-minimizing
“cheating” behavior of banks. These results support policy recommendations that aim at
enabling the households to clearly distinguish between financial products based on inde-
pendent real projects and correlated derivatives so that the economy comes closer to an
equilibrium in which the total number of financial products coincides with the number of
financial products based on real underlyings.
The model allows the discussion of consequences of financial innovations: Expected
aggregate output and the corresponding macroeconomic volatility depend positively on
the number of financial products. Furthermore, the size of the banking sector, measured
as the fraction of GDP spent for the provision of financial products and their management,
increases with the number of financial products if the extra costs imposed by the provision
of new financial products exceed relatively their gains on expected output. Such a rise of
the banking sector size replicates qualitatively the co-movement of the financialization of
the economy and the increase in the number of financial products.
94 Financial innovations
3 Bank lending and firm dynamics in general
equilibrium
Joint with Yingnan Zhao
3.1 Introduction
Access to financing is one of the main issues firms are dealing with. In general,
financial constraints determine firms’ development and their size distribution
(Angelini and Generale, 2008). Especially for small and medium-sized firms with con-
strained access to bond or equity markets (The Economist, 2015), bank loans account for
the primary part of external financing (Berger and Udell, 2002). This project analyzes
how entrepreneurs and banks interact by modeling long-term credit relationships between
them. Long-term credit relationships help to overcome information asymmetries through
dynamic contracting. To the best of our knowledge we are the first who deal with such
a long-term lending relationship in a general equilibrium framework which allows us to
determine endogenously both the share of entrepreneurs as well as important aspects of
firm dynamics such as size, growth and variance of growth of firms.
A key point of our model is the assumption of information asymmetry. This is, en-
trepreneurs have private knowledge about realized output levels of firms’ production and
banks cannot observe these. To deal with such repeated informational friction we take the
paper of Smith and Wang (2006) on “dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium”
as a starting point. Like them we have banks and ex-ante identical households with finite
life expectancy who either become entrepreneurs or workers. Workers supply labor, con-
sume and save, whereas entrepreneurs run firms by hiring labor and capital. The realized
output of firms is exposed to stochastic states of productivity. These are only observ-
able to the entrepreneurs who report them to the banks. We extend Smith and Wang
(2006) by adopting a production structure which allows for variable firm size like in
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) (who work in a partial-equilibrium analysis). In partic-
ular, we use a technology with decreasing returns to scale. As in Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006) and Smith and Wang (2006) entrepreneurs finance production costs through loans
from banks. Banks offer entrepreneurs long-term financial contracts, which determine
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the optimal level of bank loans and state-contingent repayments. In recursive formula-
tion these are determined together with future promised values as functions of today’s
promised values. A promised value is the continuation utility of an entrepreneur from con-
sumption of future cash flows (net revenue generated from production by using bank loans
minus repayments). The financial contracts are promise keeping and incentive compatible
and fulfill the limited liabilities and the credibility constraints.
Our model structure allows us to determine the share of entrepreneurs endogenously
and to see the effects of the dynamic lending-contracts on the size, growth, variance of
growth of firms at different ages, and on the size distribution of firms in the economy in
equilibrium. This extends Smith and Wang (2006) by the aspect of firm dynamics and it
completes Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) by the general equilibrium aspect. Further, it
augments Dyrda (2014), Gross and Verani (2013) and Verani (2015) – who are also in a
general equilibrium framework, but assume two types of households with different utility
functions being either workers or entrepreneurs – with the endogenous determination of
the share of entrepreneurs.
We calibrate our model; use it to get numerical results and to solve for the general
equilibrium. Workers’ saving and labor decision, entrepreneurs’ choice of the optimal level
of factor inputs and the optimal financial contract are derived numerically. We find that
the optimal level of bank loans and state-contingent future promised values are increasing
functions of today’s promised values while the state-contingent repayments first increase
and then decrease with the state variable. State-contingencies of future promised values
and repayments are as follows: If entrepreneurs’ report a high productivity state they
are promised a higher future continuation utility, but they have to repay more today
than if they report a low productivity state. This trade-off induces truth-telling about
productivity realizations. By combining the three partial decision problems – of workers,
entrepreneurs and banks, respectively – we close our model and determine the stationary
general equilibrium. In general equilibrium our model predicts an interest rate of around
4%. This is a common number in literature. The share of entrepreneurs in our economy is
found to be 8%, which corresponds approximately to the rate of self-employed in the U.S.
(data from OECD). The firm dynamics resulting in general equilibrium from the optimal
path of the promised values are as follows: There is a positive correlation between firm
size and firm age. Furthermore, the growth of younger firms is on average larger and more
volatile than that of older firms.
In addition to the numerical results and the economic explanation of them, we provide
a discussion of technical issues which can cause problems in dynamic programming. These
are, among others, starting value problems, extrapolation issues, sensitivity to parameter
values and to functional forms as well as issues related to simulations.
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The paper adds to the literature by modeling the long-term credit relationships be-
tween firms and banks in general equilibrium. Through dynamic contracting informa-
tion asymmetries between banks and firms can be overcome. The analysis of repeated
information asymmetries was initiated by Radner (1985) and Rogerson (1985). The dy-
namic programming approach to it with the recursive formulation of incentive compati-
ble, optimal contracts was developed by Green (1987) and Spear and Srivastava (1987).
Thomas and Worrall (1990), who extend the two-period, two-state problem of
Townsend (1982) for any number of periods and finite state space, add to Green (1987)
and Spear and Srivastava (1987) by focusing on the long-run asymptotic properties of
the contracts. Such incentive compatible long-term contracts deliver on the one hand
an insurance component if agents are exposed to idiosyncratic shocks which are unob-
servable (as in Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992)
or Atkeson and Lucas (1995)). On the other hand, they provide financing opportuni-
ties. In particular, contracts between risk-neutral banks and firms can support optimal
lending- policies of banks which maximize the value of the firms (as in Quadrini (2004),
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) or DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)).
The main contribution of this paper is the incorporation of dynamic financial con-
tracts into a general equilibrium framework with an endogenous share of entrepreneurs
and dynamic evolution of firms’ size over age. Smith and Wang (2006), Dyrda (2014),
Gross and Verani (2013) and Verani (2015) work in a similar model set-up. However,
Smith and Wang (2006) do only consider projects with fixed units of capital and labor as
input factors. They do not model an entrepreneur’s optimal labor and capital decision
under a more realistic production function. Hence, they cannot deal with firm dynamics.
Dyrda (2014) does not consider a saving decision of workers by excluding them from the
capital market. And in contrast to Dyrda (2014), Gross and Verani (2013) and Verani
(2015), who do not incorporate firm entry, we determine the share of entrepreneurs in the
economy endogenously. Technically, more complex equilibrium conditions are considered,
which raises computational challenges.
Our model exhibits financial frictions which are the result of the information asymme-
try. More precisely, we have borrowing constraints (i.e., firms do not get the efficient level
of banks loans) as an endogenous result of the incentive-compatible long-term lending
relationship between borrowers and the lender. This is like in the literature discussed
above. Yet, on contrast to other contributions to the literature with long-term contracts
between firms and banks, our model does not connect financial frictions to the issue of
collateral as it is done in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) or Verani (2015). Nor do we
allow for the possibility of auditing like in Verani (2015) or Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004) in an environment with limited enforcement.
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Directly connected to the (endogenous) borrowing constraints are the dynamics of firm
development in our model.1 As a result of the long-term relation between the banks and
firms, we predict that older firms are on average larger and that they grow less but more
stable. These results are in line with the predictions from the dynamic contract models
in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Dyrda (2014), Gross and Verani (2013) and Verani
(2015). Furthermore, they are consistent with the empirical regularities of firm dynamics.2
In our model, the firm size distribution is more dispersed for older than for younger firms
because their history of productivity realizations is more heterogeneous. That (endoge-
nous) borrowing constraints have an impact on the size distribution of firms is consistent
with the findings of Angelini and Generale (2008) and Cabral and Mata (2003) who find
that younger firms, which are financially constrained, have in fact different (more skewed)
firm size distributions.
The structure of the paper is as follow: Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical model.
Therein, the workers’ and entrepreneurs’ problems and the role of financial intermediaries
is described. Further, the recursive formulation of the dynamic lending contracts is pre-
sented and some theoretical properties are discussed. Section 3.3 provides the aggregation
and equilibrium conditions and defines the stationary, general equilibrium. In Section 3.4
the calibration of the model and numerical results are presented. Section 3.5 discusses
issues connected with dynamic programming. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Model set-up
Consider an infinite time horizon model with finite life expectancy. A continuum of
ex-ante identical households are born at the beginning of each period. A household
survives at the end of the period with an exogenous probability. Right after birth a
household decides to become a worker or an entrepreneur. We assume that this choice
of occupation is irreversible over lifetime. A worker supplies labor, consumes and saves
part of its income. An entrepreneur runs a firm which uses labor and capital as inputs
and consumes entrepreneurial income (net revenue from production). In addition to the
households, there are banks which act as financial intermediaries between workers and
entrepreneurs. Namely, they take annuity deposits from workers and offer contracts with
financing in the form of bank loans to the entrepreneurs for their production. We assume
1For an overview of the effects of financial frictions in a dynamic contract set-up on aggregate fluctu-
ations / business cycle fluctuations see the literature discussed in Dyrda (2014) and Verani (2015). For
the effects of access to credit on international trade see Gross and Verani (2013).
2See, for example, Evans (1987) or Hall (1987) for empirical literature on firm dynamics.
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that banks are competitive so that they make zero profit in expectation from any financial
contract they sign with entrepreneurs.
3.2.2 Households
Households are endowed with one unit of labor each period and no wealth at birth.
The instantaneous utility function of the households (both workers and entrepreneurs) is
U(c, l), where c is the consumption level and l is the labor supply. U(c, l) is decreasing
in l and increasing, strictly concave and bounded in c. Households discount future with
rate β.
The exogenous survival probability is ∆. We assume that the mass of newborns
in each period is 1 − ∆, so that the mass of population is constant at 1. The share
of the households in cohort τ who become entrepreneurs is λτ . λτ will be determined
endogenously in equilibrium by the labor market clearing condition (see 3.27). Figure 3.1
summarizes the compositions of different cohorts’ population size and their occupations
at time t. It shows that at each point in time we have a distribution of workers and of
entrepreneurs of different ages in the population.
Cohort 0
Cohort 1
Cohort τ
Mass 1−∆:
λ0 entrepreneurs
(1− λ0) workers
Mass (1−∆)∆:
λ1 entrepreneurs,
(1−λ1) workers
Mass (1−∆)∆τ :
λτ entrepreneurs,
(1−λτ ) workers
Time t
Age 0
Age 1
Age τ
Figure 3.1: Different cohorts with infinite time horizon
3.2.2.1 Workers
In each period, workers supply labor for production and get wage income in return. Wage
income as well as wealth can be used for consumption of final goods or as savings for wealth
(and thus consumption) in future periods in the form of one-period annuity deposits in
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the banks. In each period t, the workers of age τ buy at the end of the period Aτ,t+1 ≥ 0
units of the annuity at price pAt . This entitles the worker to receive wealth level Aτ,t+1
in period t + 1 conditional on survival. The annuity deposits are priced competitively
(actuarially fair)such that banks make zero profit from offering them to the workers. This
means, the aggregate amount of money received by the banks from workers plus the
interest it generates within a period must be equal to what they give out in the next
period. Formally, at time t,
∞∑
τ=0
(1 + rt+1)(1−∆)∆τpAt Aτ,t+1 =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ+1Aτ,t+1,
where (1−∆)∆τpAt Aτ,t+1 is the aggregate payments of the workers of age τ at time t to
buy the annuity. This generates an interest with rate 1 + rt+1 in the next period. The
aggregate amount is redistributed to all workers from last period who are still alive this
period, which is ∆-times the original size (1−∆)∆τ of each cohort. Therefore, zero-profit
for banks implies that
pAt =
∆
1 + rt+1
, (3.1)
whereby the market-clearing interest rate rt+1 is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
The workers’ problem of choosing labor supply l, consumption c and savings in annu-
ities A′ in an optimal way can be formulated in the following recursive way with today’
wealth A ≥ 0 as state variable:
V W (A; r, w) = max
c,l,A′
{
U(c, l) + ∆βV W (A′; r′, w′)
}
, (3.2)
subject to
c+ pAA′ = wl + A, (3.3)
c ≥ 0, l ∈ [0, 1], A′ ≥ 0.
V W (A; r, w) is the worker’s value function (i.e., continuation utility) given today’s wealth
level A, interest rate r and wage rate w (determined endogenously in equilibrium). pA is
given by (3.1). A prime indicates variables of tomorrow. ∆β captures discounting and the
fact that the worker survives with probability ∆. Denote the policy function of optimal
saving A′ and labor choice l, respectively, by
Aτ,t+1 = g(Aτ,t; rt+1, wt), lτ,t = h(Aτ,t; rt+1, wt). (3.4)
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3.2.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs run firms. They supply entrepreneurial labor and derive utility from con-
sumption of net revenue from production. Entrepreneurs and firms are associated for the
whole lifetime. Namely, a newborn household who becomes entrepreneur opens a firm
and runs the firm for the entire lifetime until death; then the firm exits the market. Thus,
the firm’s exit rate is exogenously given by the household’s death rate 1−∆.
Firms produce in each period under uncertainty a single output (numéraire), which can
either be consumed or be used as capital. In each period a fixed amount of entrepreneurial
labor LE is needed for setting up the production. The production requires capital k and
labor from workers l. The production function takes the form:
Y (kt, lt) = θtF (kt, lt),
where F (·) reflects the production technology that transforms capital and labor inputs
into the final product. It exhibits decreasing returns to scale. We assume the function to
be continuous and strictly concave.
The level of θt represents the productivity at time t. In each period t the productivity is
subject to an idiosyncratic shock with state space S = {1, 2, · · · , S} and the corresponding
realization of states θt ∈ Θ = {θ1, θ2, · · · , θS}. The shock is i.i.d. over entrepreneurs and
time. The probability distribution of the states is {pis}s∈S with
∑
s∈S
pis = 1. Without
loss of generality, let θi < θj if i < j. At any time t, each firm has an entire history of
productivity realizations θtτ = (θt−τ , θt−τ+1, · · · , θt), where τ is the age of the firm and
t − τ + i, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ} is the calendar time when the firm was of age i. Note that
the heterogeneity among firms is characterized by the different histories of productivity
realizations.
We assume that the realization of productivity shock is private information to the
entrepreneur. This reflects the information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and banks.
Prior to production (i.e., before the idiosyncratic shock is realized), the entrepreneurs
need to purchase capital and pay the workers. By assumption, the entrepreneurs are
neither endowed with wealth nor do they accumulate wealth from their production rev-
enues over lifetime. This means, self-financing of production is excluded. Hence, they
need external financing. We restrict the source of financing to bank funding. Bank
loans and repayments arise from a lifetime financial contract between the bank and the
entrepreneur. More specifically, the financial contract entitles the entrepreneurs each pe-
riod to some amount of bank loans b, which is used to cover the production costs, and
some repayments m after production.3 For a given level of loans and factor prices, the en-
3A detailed characterization of the financial contract, which includes bank loans b as well as repayments
102 Bank lending
trepreneurs determine the optimal capital and labor employment by maximizing expected
output. The decision problem is
max
kt,lt
E(θt)F (kt, lt) (3.5)
subject to
wtlt + (rt + δ)kt ≤ bt,
where (rt + δ) are the user cost of capital with δ being the depreciation rate of capital.
We define
R(bt; rt, wt) ≡ F (k∗t , l∗t ) (3.6)
with k∗t = k(bt; rt, wt), l
∗
t = l(bt; rt, wt) being the solution to (3.5) at which the marginal
rate of transformation correspond to the relative factor price of capital and labor. Notice
that firms’ labor costs include only wage payments to workers. The implicit assumption
is that the entrepreneurs do not supply the entrepreneurial labor LE in the labor market
of workers. In what follows we denote the labor supply from workers as labor.
The entrepreneur’s consumption ct in each period is given by net revenue from pro-
duction, which is gross production θtR(bt) minus repayments to banks mt:
cEt = θtR(bt; rt, wt)−mt. (3.7)
Therefore, the expected lifetime utility of an entrepreneur is given by
V E0 =
∞∑
t=0
(β∆)tEU(cEt , L
E), (3.8)
where expectation is with respect to current period realization of productivity, θt, as well
as the history of realizations captured in bt andmt (as derived in Section 3.2.4). According
to the properties of the utility function, natural limits of V E0 are given by V
E
min and V
E
max,
where
V Emin ≡ limc→0
1
1− β∆U(c, L
E) and V Emax ≡ limc→∞
1
1− β∆U(c, L
E). (3.9)
Remember that entrepreneurs do not make intertemporal savings decisions by assumption.
Therefore, for given terms of the financial contract, maximization of expected lifetime
utility in (3.8) is equivalent to maximizing the expected production output as given by
(3.5).
The continuation utility of an entrepreneur at time t can in recursive formulation be
m, can be found in Section 3.2.4.
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written as:
V Et = E
[
U(cEt , L
E) + β∆V Et+1
]
(3.10)
Notice that V Emin and V
E
max are also the upper and the lower bound of continuation
utilities of the entrepreneurs, respectively.
3.2.3 Financial intermediaries
The banks in the economy serve the role as financial intermediaries between saving house-
holds and producing firms. Namely, they take annuity deposits from workers and offer
financial contracts to entrepreneurs. Banks act also as holder of capital by acquiring eq-
uity E. Banks’ equity is the accumulated retained earnings from net cash flows of bank
loans and repayments (see Section 3.3.1.3 for more details on equity). Overall, banks
invest the annuity deposits from workers and own banks’ equity as the capital supply of
the economy into the production of entrepreneurs.
Banks are risk neutral profit maximizers and discount future at the current interest
rate. There is free entry into the banking sector. This means in equilibrium banks expect
zero profits from each single lending contract and thus size and ownership of the banks do
not matter. Without loss of generality, we assume the existence of a representative bank
holding a portfolio of all financial contracts with the entrepreneurs of all ages τ and with
all heterogeneous histories of productivity realizations θtτ .
3.2.4 Dynamic lending contract
The credit relation between banks and entrepreneurs is characterized by a lifetime binding
financial contract. More specifically, following the standard dynamic contracting model
(e.g., Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992)), each firm signs a lifetime
contract with a bank. Banks offer each newborn entrepreneur a take-it-or-leave-it lifetime
binding financial contract.
We assume that both banks and entrepreneurs are fully committed to the contract in
all possible future contingencies.
In the dynamic financial contract problem in recursive form, the continuation utility
of an entrepreneur from future consumption, V Et as defined in (3.10), can be used as
state variable (given interest and wage rate). Following the terminology of the literature,
we call V Et the promised value. This means that the banks promise a continuation util-
ity to the entrepreneurs by committing themselves to the terms of contract that imply
a sequence of future consumption flows which generate the promised value. Therefore,
given a promised value V Et = V
E(θt−1; rt, wt) as state variable – which includes the entire
history of productivity realizations of an entrepreneur until time t − 1, θt−1 – the con-
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tract consists of
{
b(V Et ; rt, wt), m(V
E
t , θt; rt, wt), V
E(V Et , θt; rt, wt)
}
.4 The first two terms
are the bank loans to the entrepreneur, b(V Et ; rt, wt), and the repayments from the en-
trepreneur to the bank, m(V Et , θt; rt, wt). Loans are advanced before production, whereas
repayments are made after the realization and after entrepreneurs’ report of the current
period productivity. Hence, loans are only contingent on today’s promised value, whereas
repayments are a function of today’s promised value and the reported productivity level
including time θt. (Note that according to the revelation principle, any equilibrium out-
come can be achieved by a truth-telling mechanism. In particular, by imposing incentive
constraints we can guarantee that entrepreneurs always report the actual realization of
productivity θt. Therefore, we focus only on truth-telling contracts.) The third term,
V E(V Et , θt; rt, wt), is the next period’s promised value given today’s promised value and
the productivity realization θt. In other words, V
E
t+1 = V
E(V Et , θt; rt, wt) is the transi-
tion function of the state variable which incorporates the whole history of productivity
realizations of an entrepreneur.
Since firms with the same promised value of today are assigned the same terms of
contract (independent of time t or age τ), V E is the state variable. V E can be used as
an indicator of firms in the equilibrium analysis (see Section 3.3.1.2 for aggregation of
entrepreneurs).
3.2.4.1 Optimal financial contract
For given interest rate and wage rate, (r, w), the optimal contract can be determined by the
following program written in recursive form with the promised value, V E ∈ [V Emin, V Emax],
as state variable:
P (V E ; r, w) = max
b,{ms,V Es }s∈S
−b+∑
s∈S
pis
[
ms +
∆
1 + r
P (V Es ; r
′, w′)
]
(3.11)
subject to
V E =
∑
s∈S
pis[U
(
θsR(b; r, w)−ms, LE
)
+ β∆V Es ], (PK)
U
(
θiR(b; r, w)−mi, LE
)
+β∆V Ei ≥ U
(
θiR(b; r, w)−mj, LE
)
+β∆V Ej , ∀i, j ∈ S, (IC)
ms ≤ θsR(b; r, w), ∀s ∈ S, (LL)
V Es ∈ [V Emin, V Emax]. (CC)
P (V E ; r, w) is the bank’s expected profit (value function) from a financial contract with
state variable V E given r and w. b denotes the level of bank loans,
{
ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
are state-
4See Appendix C.1 for a detailed structure of the timing in the dynamic financial contract.
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contingent repayments and future promised values, respectively. ∆
1+r
captures discounting
and the fact that the entrepreneur survives with probability ∆. V Emin and V
E
max are given
in (3.9).
(PK) is the promise keeping constraint. It indicates that the terms of the contract
must be such that the expected utility from today’s cash flows plus future promised values
fulfill the promised value V E .
(IC) captures the incentive constraints. In general, there is no guarantee that the
reported productivity realization corresponds to the actual one. Yet, the incentive con-
straints induce that the truth-telling reporting strategy (weakly) dominates all other
possible reporting strategies of entrepreneurs in terms of their expected utility, and thus
eliminates incentives to misreport. Formally, we define:
Definition 3.1. A contract is incentive compatible if the terms of the contract are such
that (IC) is fulfilled ∀i, j ∈ S.
The constraints (LL) stand for limited liability. We impose that the entrepreneurs
are liable for repayments to the bank at most to the extent of the production revenue
(i.e., realized productivity shock times the production level corresponding to the bank
loan level). Hence, a contract is feasible if the terms of the contract are such that the
entrepreneurs consume a non-negative amount of the final products after any productivity
realization. This leads to the following definition of a feasible contract:
Definition 3.2. A contract is feasible if (LL) is fulfilled for ∀s ∈ S.
The credibility constraint (CC) imposes that banks can only promise utility values that
are achievable with non-negative finite cash flows; otherwise, the promised value can only
be granted by violating (LL) sometime in the future or is never satisfiable, respectively.
More precisely, (CC) captures that banks can never promise (i) less utility than achievable
by non-negative consumption for all future periods or (ii) more utility than by infinite
consumption for all future periods.
Formally, we define an optimal financial contract as follows:
Definition 3.3. For a given path {rt, wt}∞t=0, the optimal dynamic contract is a se-
quence of functions
{
b(V Et ; rt, wt), m(V
E
t , θt; rt, wt), V
E(V Et , θt; rt, wt)
}∞
t=0
that solves pro-
gram (3.11).5
5For notational simplicity we suppress from now rt and wt in the sequence of functions of the contract{
b(V Et ),m(V
E
t , θt), V
E(V Et , θt)
}∞
t=0
and in the value function P (V E) whenever it is not misleading.
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3.2.4.2 Theoretical properties
In this part, we show theoretical properties of financial contracts under program (3.11).6
We first discuss general results about incentive compatible contracts and the simplification
of incentive constraints. Then, we come to the properties of the optimal contract. Propo-
sition 3.1 and 3.2 and Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 follow the properties of optimal social insurance
in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) which are based on Thomas and Worrall (1990).
The following proposition defines the necessary condition of an incentive compatible
contract:
Proposition 3.1. Let θs > θs−1, ∀s ∈ S. An incentive compatible contract satisfies
ms ≥ ms−1 and V Es ≥ V Es−1.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.1.1.
This implies that banks induce truth-telling behavior of entrepreneurs by postponing
rewards for reporting high productivity realization. If productivity is high repayments
are high, but the future promised value is high, too.
Define the incentive constraints for all i, j ∈ S as:
Ci,j ≡ U(θiR(b)−mi, LE) + β∆V Ei − U(θiR(b)−mj , LE)− β∆V Ej , (3.12)
where i is the actual state and j is the reported state. Then, the set of incentive constraints
can then be simplified with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. If the local downward constraints, Cs,s−1 ≥ 0, and the local upward con-
straints, Cs,s+1 ≥ 0, hold for each s ∈ S, then the global constraints Ci,j ≥ 0 hold ∀i, j ∈ S.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.1.2.
Suppose for the following lemma and Proposition 3.2 and 3.3 that P (V E) is strictly
concave – a fact which is observed in the numerics.
Using this and Lemma 3.1, we get the following property of the optimal contract.
Lemma 3.2. For strictly concave P (V E), for all states s ∈ S, the optimal contract
implies that the local downward constraints Cs,s−1 ≥ 0 always bind, whereas the local
upward constraints Cs−1,s ≥ 0 never bind for ms > ms−1.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.1.3.
6In the optimal dynamic contract, the path of factor prices rt, wt is taken as given. For notational
simplicity we suppress from now on {rt, wt} in the R(b) function whenever it is not misleading.
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In addition, the optimal contract has the property of risk sharing:
Proposition 3.2. For strictly concave P (V E), both the entrepreneurs’ utility and the
banks’ profits are non-decreasing with a higher productivity realization, that is: Under an
optimal contract, for θi > θj
U(θiR(b)−mi, LE) + β∆V Ei ≥ U(θjR(b)−mj, LE) + β∆V Ej , (3.13)
−b+mi + ∆
1 + r
P (V Ei ) ≥ −b+mj +
∆
1 + r
P (V Ej ). (3.14)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.1.4.
We introduce the efficient level of loan banks b∗, which is implicitly determined by
E(θ)R′(b∗;w, r) = 1. (3.15)
Notice that the efficient level of loan banks corresponds to the optimal firm size if banks
were the firm owners. It reflects that marginal productivity equals marginal costs of one
more unit of bank loans.
Suppose for Proposition 3.3 that there are only two states in the state space, S = {l, h}
with θh > θl.
Proposition 3.3. For strictly concave P (V E) and for ms > ms−1, the optimal level of
bank loans from the contract is not larger than the efficient level.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.1.5.
Note that this implies endogenous borrowing constraints, which are also existent in
the models of Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Dyrda (2014), Gross and Verani (2013)
and Verani (2015).
3.3 Aggregation and general equilibrium
So far we have characterized the optimization problems of the agents in the economy. More
specifically, for a given sequence of factor prices {rt, wt}∞t=0 and the share of entrepreneurs
of each cohort {λτ}∞τ=0, we get: (i) the workers’ optimal path of consumption, wealth
accumulation and labor supply from (3.2); (ii) the entrepreneurs’ optimal path of capital
and labor employment from (3.5); and (iii) the banks’ optimal path of terms of contract
with loans, repayments and future promised values from (3.11). Given the technical
complexities, for combining the three partial parts to get the general equilibrium we
focus on the stationary case with constant factor prices {r, w} and a constant share of
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entrepreneurs λ. Specifically, we consider the age-dependent, time-independent supplies
and demands of labor and capital, consumption of workers and entrepreneurs, bank loans
and repayments. We sum the individual decisions over the cohorts of all ages in the
economy to get the aggregate demand and supply of labor, capital and goods. This
allows us in the end to write down the equilibrium conditions and define the general
equilibrium. More precisely, the equilibrium is then the prices {r, w} and the share of
entrepreneurs λ such that goods, labor and capital markets clear and banks make zero
profit (see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Aggregation
3.3.1.1 Aggregation of workers
By aggregating the optimal consumption, saving and labor decision over individual work-
ers of all ages τ , we get total consumption CW , total deposits D and total labor supply
LS:7
CW (r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ c(Aτ , r, w) (3.16)
D(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τpAAτ+1 =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τpAg(Aτ , r, w) (3.17)
LS(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ lτ =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τh(Aτ , r, w) (3.18)
where c(·) is given by the workers’ budget constraint (3.3) and g(·) and h(·) are the
worker’s policy functions defined in (3.4). (1−∆)∆τ is the mass of households of age τ .
Note that heterogeneity among workers comes only from age differences; within a cohort
all workers are identical in their lifetime decisions.
3.3.1.2 Aggregation of entrepreneurs
Aggregating over all entrepreneurs is more complicated because they are heterogeneous
in two dimensions: Age and history of productivity realizations. In other words, there
are firms of different ages τ and firms of the same age τ differ in productivity history θτ
due to the idiosyncratic shocks.
History of productivity realizations of an entrepreneur aged τ , θτ ∈ Θτ maps into a
promised value V E by applying the transition function V Es = V
E(V E, θs; r, w) recursively
7For now the measure of workers is supposed to be 1. The equilibrium share of workers (1− λ) will
be determined through the equilibrium conditions as given in Section 3.3.2.
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with starting value V E0 .
8 The distribution of θτ among entrepreneurs of age τ corresponds
to a stationary distribution of promised values, denoted by Ψτ (V
E).
Promised values V E are translated by the optimal financial contract into bank loans
and repayments,
{
b
(
V E ; r, w
)
, m
(
V E , θs; r, w
)}
. For given bank loans, follow the optimal
capital and labor employment,
{
k∗(V E; r, w), l∗(V E ; r, w)
}
defined by the solution to (3.5)
where it is used that b(V E ; ·) is a function of V E.
We can aggregate the totals of the bank loans B, capital KD and labor demand LD
over all cohorts as follows:9
B(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∫
b(V E ; r, w)dΨτ(V
E), (3.19)
KD(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∫
k∗(V E ; r, w)dΨτ(V
E) (3.20)
LD(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∫
l∗(V E; r, w)dΨτ(V
E) (3.21)
Furthermore, following the arguments and notations, the aggregate expected repayments
from the entrepreneurs of all ages τ to banks are given by:
M(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ ∑
s∈S
pis
∫
m(V E , θs; r, w)dΨτ(V
E) (3.22)
The expected aggregate output Y and the consumption of the entrepreneurs CE are
similarly given by:
Y (r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ ∑
s∈S
pis
∫
θsR(b(V
E; r, w); r, w)dΨτ(V
E), (3.23)
CE(r, w) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ ∑
s∈S
pis
∫
c(V E , θs; r, w)dΨτ(V
E), (3.24)
where R(·) is defined in (3.6) and c(·) in (3.7).
3.3.1.3 Aggregation of banks’ equity
Finally, banks’ equity is the accumulated retained earnings from the flows of bank loans
and repayments. In a stationary equilibrium, it is determined by
E(r, w) = (1 + r)E(r, w) +M(r, w)−B(r, w),
8The indifferent occupational choice condition, which must hold in equilibrium, requires that V E0 =
VW0 (see (3.26)).
9For now the measure of entrepreneurs is supposed to be 1. The equilibrium share of entrepreneurs λ
will be determined through the equilibrium conditions as given in Section 3.3.2.
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where E(r, w) denotes the bank equity, (1 + r)E(r, w) are the gross returns on previ-
ous equity and M(r, w) − B(r, w) are the net aggregate payments from entrepreneurs.10
Rewriting the above equation, we have
E(r, w) =
B(r, w)−M(r, w)
r
. (3.25)
3.3.2 Equilibrium conditions
In a stationary equilibrium (see Section 3.3.3 for the formal definition), there are simulta-
neously workers and entrepreneurs from all cohorts in the economy. Newborn households
are indifferent with respect to their occupational choice. That is, the expected lifetime
utility of becoming a worker is the same as that of becoming an entrepreneur. Formally,
this means:
V E0 = V
W (0; r, w), (3.26)
where V W (0; r, w) is determined by program (3.2). Note that this equation defines the
starting value of the state variable for the entrepreneurs, which is used in generating the
life path of promised values in the numerical analysis by applying the optimal contracts
(see Section 3.4.2).
In addition – as in standard general equilibrium theory – labor, capital and goods
markets clear.
Labor market clearing requires that aggregate labor supply from workers equals ag-
gregate demand for labor by the entrepreneurs. This is
λLD(r, w) = (1− λ)LS(r, w), (3.27)
with LS(r, w) and LD(r, w) defined in (3.18) and (3.21), respectively, and λ being the
endogenously determined share of the entrepreneurs in the economy.
Capital market clearing requires in equilibrium that capital supply in the economy,
which consists of aggregate deposits from the workers plus banks’ equity, is equal to capital
demand:
KS(r, w) ≡ (1− λ)D(r, w) + λE(r, w) = λKD(r, w), (3.28)
where D(r, w), E(r, w) and KD(r, w) are given in (3.17), (3.25) and (3.20), respectively.
10Notice that this condition indicates that in the stationary equilibrium banks give on aggregate more
loans than repayments they ask for; with the gap between B andM being exactly coverable by the interest
from banks’ equity. Thus, the level of equity is endogenously kept constant in the stationary case. Since
we do not characterize the path of how the economy converges to the stationary equilibrium, we cannot
show numerically how the accumulation of banks’ equity converges to the stationary equilibrium level.
However, we give in Appendix C.6 a non-rigorous intuition of how an economy may evolve from the very
beginning of time to the stationary equilibrium.
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The goods market is cleared if aggregate output equals the sum of households’ con-
sumption plus aggregate investments, where the latter is equal to depreciated capital in
a stationary equilibrium. Formally, the condition is
λY (r, w) = (1− λ)CW (r, w) + λCE(r, w) + δλKD(r, w). (3.29)
It is directly implied by the labor and the capital market clearing conditions, (3.27) and
(3.28) as shown Appendix C.2.2.
Finally, banks’ are assumed to make zero profit in expectation from each newly-signed
contract in equilibrium. Under the indifferent occupational choice condition in (3.26), the
zero-profit condition for banks is given by
P (V W (0; r, w)) = 0. (3.30)
3.3.3 Definition of general equilibrium
With the agents’ optimal behavior derived from the respective optimization problems and
the general equilibrium conditions, we can now define the stationary general equilibrium
in the economy.
Definition 3.4. A stationary general equilibrium is characterized by a stationary dis-
tribution of workers of different ages, and the corresponding capital and labor supply
{Aτ , lτ}∞τ=0, a stationary distribution of entrepreneurs of different ages, for each cohort
a stationary distribution of promised values,
{
Ψτ (V
E)
}∞
τ=0
, and the corresponding cap-
ital and labor demand of the entrepreneurs,
{
k∗(V E), l∗(V E)
}
, bank loans and repay-
ments of the banks,
{
b(V E), m(V E, θs)
}
s∈S
, and interest rate, wage rates and share of
entrepreneurs, {r, w, λ} such that for given (r, w),
(1) workers maximize lifetime utility according to (3.2),
(2) entrepreneurs maximize expected output according to (3.5),
(3) banks offer profit-maximizing contracts subject to (PK), (IC), (LL), (CC) according
to (3.11).
The factor prices (r, w) and share of entrepreneurs λ are such that,
(1) labor, capital and goods market clear according to (3.27), (3.28) and (3.29).
(2) banks make zero profit in expectation according to (3.30).
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We determine the stationary equilibrium numerically, but we do not deliver an ana-
lytical general proof for the existence of a stationary equilibrium.11
3.4 Calibration and numerical results
Given the complexity of the problem, the stationary equilibrium is in the following de-
termined numerically. To calibrate the model, we assume specific functional forms of the
utility and the production function and give exogenous parameter values.
The households’ utility function (workers and entrepreneurs) is given by
U(c, l) = −exp(−γc)− ηl2, γ, η > 0. (3.31)
It includes a CARA-part for consumption with γ being the absolute risk aversion and a
parabola part for the disutility of labor supply. The form of the utility function gives us
computational simplicity.
The production technology of the entrepreneurs exhibits decreasing return to scale:
Y (k, l) = θsa¯k
αk lαl , (3.32)
where θs denotes the state-dependent productivity realization, a¯ scales total factor pro-
ductivity and αk and αl are the share of capital and labor, respectively. We simplify the
state space S to two states: “high” and “low” with productivity θh = θ+σ and θl = θ−σ,
σ > 0, and corresponding probability pih and pil, respectively.
For the exogenous parameters we take the values given in Table 3.1. The survival
rate is chosen such that the death rate 1−∆ corresponds approximately to the empirical
yearly exit rate of firms. The discount rate β is similar to standard values found in
literature. Household preference parameter γ and η are internally calibrated such that
workers’ labor supply is about 30% of their labor endowment. Further, we assume both
states are equally likely. Then, the values of θh and θl imply an expected productivity
realization of θ = 1, with standard deviation of 0.25. LE corresponds to a third of an
entrepreneur’s labor endowment. αk and αl correspond to the usual capital and labor
shares of output. The depreciation rate δ = 0.1 corresponds to a common number in
literature reflecting a quarterly depreciation rate of approximately 2.5%. The assumed
utility function and the parameter values determine the boundaries of the promised value,
V Emin = −9.26 and V Emax = −0.49 given by (3.9).
11See Appendix C.4 for the numerical procedure and Appendix C.5 for a detailed description of the
algorithm to find the stationary equilibrium numerically.
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Table 3.1: Exogenous parameters
Parameters Value
Survival rate ∆ 0.92
Discount rate β 0.963
Household preferences
γ 2
η 0.5
Probability of bad state pil 0.5
High productivity θh 1.25
Low productivity θl 0.75
Fixed entrepreneur labor LE 1/3
Share of capital αk 0.35
Share of labor αl 0.6
Productivity scale a¯ 1/3
Depreciation rate δ 0.1
3.4.1 Three optimization problems
We characterize first the numerical solutions to the three optimization problems. Specif-
ically, for a given wage w and interest rate r, we solve for the workers’ optimal consump-
tion, saving and labor supply decision based on (3.2), the entrepreneurs’ capital and labor
demand as in (3.5) and especially the banks’ optimal financial contract from (3.11).12
3.4.1.1 Workers’ optimal decisions
Figure 3.2 depicts, as a function of the current period deposit wealth A, the workers’ opti-
mal consumption c(A), the labor supply l(A) and the saving decision A′(A) corresponding
to the policy functions given in (3.4) and the lifetime expected utility V W (A) for given
w and r.13 They are in line with the results from standard lifetime utility maximization:
Households consume more today and save more for tomorrow if their current wealth A is
higher. One has A′(A) > 0 for all A, which means that households always decide to hold
positive annuity deposits. Further, with more A they supply less labor because they are
less dependent on labor income. Their lifetime expected utility, captured by the value
function V W (A), is an increasing function in A, indicating that workers are better off if
endowed with more wealth A.
12We use w = 0.159965 and r = 0.04176, which are the equilibrium values later determined numerically
in the general equilibrium in Section 3.4.2 by using the search algorithm described in Appendix C.5. For
simplicity we suppress w and r in the notation.
13See Appendix C.3.1 for the procedure to solve the recursive workers’ problem numerically.
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Figure 3.2: Solution to worker’s problem
3.4.1.2 Entrepreneurs’ optimal capital and labor employment
For a given level of bank loans b and factor prices w and r, the entrepreneur chooses
optimally capital input and labor employment based on the decision problem in (3.5) as
follows:
k∗ = b
1
r + δ
αk
αk + αl
and l∗ = b
1
w
αl
αk + αl
. (3.33)
Hence, R(b) = 1
r+δ
αk 1
w
αl α
αk
k
α
αl
l
(αk+αl)
αk+αl
bαk+αl a¯.
Figure 3.3 shows this capital and labor demand of entrepreneurs as function of the
bank loans b for given r and w. Capital and labor demand are linearly increasing functions
in b. For the given form of the production function, the capital intensity is independent
of the level of the bank loan b.
The outcomes indicate that the more bank loans firms get, the more input they are
demanding. This implies that the size of production increases in the amount of available
funds in the form of bank loans. Hence, bank loans determine the size of firms. Following
this we will later use the amount of bank loans as the indicator of firm size and discuss
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Figure 3.3: Solution to entrepreneur’s problem
based on this the dynamics of average firm size, growth and variance of growth at different
ages of the firms (see Section 3.4.4).
3.4.1.3 Banks’ optimal financial contract
Figure 3.4 shows (for given r and w) as a function of today’s promised value V E (state
variable), the banks’ profit P (V E), state-contingent future promised value V Es (V
E), state-
contingent repaymentsms(V
E) and the bank loans b(V E).14 Thereby, state-contingency is
captured by the sub-indices with l standing for low and h for high productivity realizations.
The banks’ profit is P (V E) is strictly concave. For V E not close to V Emin, P (V
E) it is
clearly decreasing in V E.
The state-contingent future promised values, V El (V
E) and V Eh (V
E) are strictly increas-
ing in V E. Further, one can see from the subplot of V Es (V
E) that V El < V
E
h and V
E < V Eh .
For values of V E very close to V Emin the lower credibility constraint (CC) is binding. In
other words, without imposing the credibility constraint (CC), V El (V
E) < V Emin would
result for values of V E very close to V Emin, which contradicts c ≥ 0 sometime in future.15
State-contingent repayments ms(V
E), s ∈ {h, l} are non-monotonic; repayments
ms(V
E) first increase in V E and then decreases at higher promised values.16 The lat-
ter means, firms with a high promised value V E have to repay less (even ms(V
E) < 0)
with the intuition that otherwise high V E could not be realized without exploding V E-
14See Appendix C.3.2 for the numerical procedure to solve the recursive formulated lending contract.
15This shows that accounting the credibility constraints is essential.
16Non-monotonicity can arise as a result of the functional forms of the utility, the production and the
profit function, and their relative curvature compared to each other; the banks fulfill higher promised
values V E by both higher future promised utility and higher current consumption (through b cum ms).
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Figure 3.4: Optimal contract
path. Further, ml < mh says that firms with a low productivity shock are spared from
high repayments.
Note that the two subplots V Es (V
E) and ms(V
E) for s ∈ {h, l} reflect the theoreti-
cal results (see Proposition 3.1): Importantly, a postponed reward for reporting a high
productivity state (high mh, high V
E
h ) and a postponed punishment for reporting a low
productivity state (low ml, low V
E
l ) provide the entrepreneurs incentive to report the
actual productivity realization.
Figure 3.4 shows further that the level of bank loan b(V E) is strictly increasing in V E.17
By comparing the level of bank loans b(V E) with the expected repayment pilml(V
E)+(1−
17The specific shape of b(V E) is the result of the functional forms of the utility and the production
function and their relative curvature compared to each other (see (C.9) in Appendix C.2.1). There are
unstable b(V E) for V E-values approaching V Emax due to computational difficulties for values close to V
E
max.
However, for determining the equilibrium this problem is negligible because firms hardly reach promised
V E-values in the region close to V Emax when starting at V
E
0 = −8.36 as derived in the general equilibrium
(e.g., 65 years of always high productivity shock, which would leads to V E > −1 has probability (∆(1−
pil))
65 = 1.2 · 10−22 ≈ 0). Further, the highest V E reached by an entrepreneur in the simulation of our
economy is only −1.74.
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pil)mh(V
E) (see Appendix C.6), one see that for low V E the expected repayments exceed
the level of bank loans. Thus, banks retain earnings from the contracts at such state
variable levels. For higher V E the reverse holds which means that entrepreneurs retain
deposited resources. For all V E, b(V E) is smaller than the efficient level b∗ = 1.1814
defined in (3.15); as stated in Proposition 3.3. b(V E) comes closer to the efficient level
as V E approaches V Emax. The increasing function b(V
E) means that firms with a higher
promised value V E get more bank loans and are thus larger. Hence, the transition function
of the promised value, V Es (V
E), is crucial in generating firm dynamics: For given current
period productivity realization, the future promised value to entrepreneurs, V Es (V
E),
determines the level of tomorrow’s bank loans and thus the evolution of the firm size.
The relative level of bank loans available to a firm in two successive periods given by
b(V Es )
b(V E)
, s ∈ {h, l} depends on the productivity realization: A high productivity shock
entitles the firm to more bank loans in the next period while a low productivity shock
lowers b (see Figure 3.5, which gives a similar pattern as in Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006)).
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3.4.2 General equilibrium
With the solutions of the three optimization problems, we can now determine the general
equilibrium in our economy. The stationary equilibrium values of the endogenous factor
prices (r, w) and the share of entrepreneurs λ are simultaneously found by labor and capital
market clearing and banks’ zero-profit condition. Thus, for determining the equilibrium,
aggregate demands and aggregate supplies of labor and capital and the starting promised
value V W (0; r, w) must be calculated.
The labor supply and part of the capital supply come from workers. In the stationary
equilibrium, aggregating total deposits D and total labor supply LS of all generations
in the economy is computationally equivalent to the aggregation of deposits and labor
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supply of one cohort over its lifetime as is implied by (3.17) and (3.18). The weights
(1−∆)∆τ correspond then to the size of the cohort at the different ages τ . Since workers
are homogeneous within cohorts with identical saving and working decision, it is numeri-
cally straightforward to compute the aggregate savings and labor supply using (3.17) and
(3.18).18
To derive the demand for labor and capital we simulate life paths of entrepreneurs
with stochastic shocks in their productivity and exogenous death.19 Thus, we have simu-
lated the length of life for each entrepreneur and its history of productivity realizations,
θt = {θ1, θ2, · · · θt}. Starting at promised value V E0 = V W (0, r, w), the simulated history
of productivity realizations generates then for each entrepreneurs a lifetime sequence of
promised values
{
V E1 , V
E
2 , · · · , V Et
}
by applying the transition function V Es (V
E) recur-
sively.20 To the sequence of
{
V Ei
}t
i=1
correspond directly a sequence of repayments {mi}ti=1
and a sequence of bank loans {bi}ti=1. Aggregating these at t over all entrepreneurs we
get in the end total repayments M and total bank loans B. The latter determines total
labor and capital demands LD and KD according to (3.33): Because of linearity, (3.20)
and (3.21), coincide with KD = B 1
r+δ
αk
αk+αl
and LD = B 1
w
αl
αk+αl
, respectively.
To determine the general equilibrium, we now use these aggregate demands and sup-
plies. The share of entrepreneurs λ is determined by the labor market clearing condition
(3.27). Namely, λ = L
S
LD+LS
. The factor prices w and r are simultaneously determined
by the capital market clearing condition (3.28) and the expected zero profit condition
(3.30).21 The resulting equilibrium values of r, w and λ are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Equilibrium parameter
Parameters Value
Interest rate r∗ 0.04176
Wage w∗ 0.159965
Share of entrepreneurs λ∗ 0.07679
18See step d) in Appendix C.4 for the aggregation of the supply side.
19See steps a) and e) in Appendix C.4 for the description of the simulation procedure with NE =
10, 000, 000 life paths.
20See Figure C.4-C.6 in Appendix C.7.1 for three different examples of life paths of a 50 year old
entrepreneur: The life path I illustrates a lucky life with many high productivity shocks. Life path II
represents a life with a relatively balanced history of productivity realizations and life path III was driven
by bad luck with many low productivity shocks. One can see that high productivity shocks tend to
increase V E overtime, while low productivity shocks lower it. The transition of V E translates directly
into the evolution of b and m.
21See step g) in Appendix C.4 for the procedure to determine the equilibrium in which the two conditions
are jointly fulfilled and Appendix C.5 for the detailed description of the algorithm to find the stationary
equilibrium numerically. We approximate the labor market clearing up to a residual of magnitude 0, the
residual in the capital market is -0.0036 and the deviation from the zero-profit condition is -0.0030.
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Our equilibrium interest rate is around 4%, which is a common number in literature.
The equilibrium share of entrepreneurs λ is 7.7% and corresponds approximately to the
rate of self-employed labor of around 7% in the U.S. over the last years (data from OECD).
The equilibrium lifetime expected utility and other equilibrium values are given in
Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Equilibrium values
Parameters Value
Lifetime utility V E0 = V
W (0, r∗, w∗) -8.3569
Total labor supply LS 0.2880
Total capital supply D 0.1649
Total bank loans B 0.8769
Total labor demand LD 3.4622
Total capital demand K 2.2790
Total repayments M 0.8626
The lifetime utility of entrepreneurs and workers is V E0 = V
W (0, r∗, w∗) = −8.36. The
total labor supply LS corresponds to about a third of a worker’s labor endowment, which
is in line with standard values from the empirics. Further, from the amount of bank
loans B and repayments M given in Table 3.3 we can calculate the amount of banks’
equity E using (3.25). This indicates is an equity ratio E/K = 15.1%. This number is
above current levels of large international banks, but below the proposed level of 20% by
Admati and Hellwig (2013).
3.4.3 Firm distributions
In this equilibrium, we can derive distributions for firm characteristics from the simulation
of the paths of the entrepreneurs’ lives. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of entrepreneurs
in the economy with respect to different characteristics: Age, promised values, repayments
and bank loans.
Subplot (a) shows the distribution of entrepreneurs’ ages. With a share of 1−∆ = 8%
most entrepreneurs are newborns. Then, one-year old represent a share of (1 − ∆)∆ =
7.36% and so on. Finally, the share of entrepreneurs older than 50 years account for only
0.12% in our economy.
Subplot (b) shows the distribution of promised values V E . We get the histogram
of the distribution of firm promised values Ψ(V E) as shown in Subplot (b) by counting
the number of entrepreneurs in the economy in different bins of V E ∈ [Vmin, Vmax]. The
plot indicates clearly that the mass of the promised values lies around the starting value
V E0 = −8.36. Firm heterogeneity then arises from the different length and composition
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of age, promised values, repayments and bank loans
of productivity realizations over firms’ lifetime. The further away from the starting value
V E0 , the lower is the density of V
E because longer and more heterogeneous life paths
underlie such values.
Subplot (c) shows the distribution of repayments. It follows directly from the distri-
bution Ψ(V E) (because V E is the underlying state variable). Depending heavily on the
current period productivity realization, the levels of repayments are separated into two
groups. This means, the repayments exhibit two distinct sub-distributions because the
difference in repayments of high and low state are relatively large (compare mh(V
E) and
ml(V
E) in Figure 3.4).
Subplot (d) shows the distribution of bank loans. It also follows directly from the
distribution Ψ(V E) (because V E is the underlying state variable). It captures the firm
size distribution measured by the levels of bank loans. From Figure 3.4 follow that for
many V E the optimal level of banks loans lies around the value b(V E) ≈ 1.11 (see relatively
flat part in Figure 3.4). This means, many firms get such levels of banks loans so that the
mode of the distribution of bank loans lies around this value. Thus, the negative skewness
in the distribution of b is the result of the less strongly increasing part of b(V E) seen in
Figure 3.4.
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3.4.4 Firm dynamics
By considering now firm distribution of different cohorts separately (i.e., all entrepreneurs
of the same age τ), the model allows us to get firm dynamics: Average firms’ size, growth
and variance of growth at different ages.
First, using the simulation of life path of entrepreneurs in Section 3.4.2 we generate
the distribution of promised values Ψτ (V
E) of entrepreneurs at different ages.22 The
development of Ψτ (V
E) for selected cohorts with age τ = {0, 1, 2, 4, 10, 25, 120, 198} is
shown in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Development of entrepreneurs’ promised value distributions
The newborns τ = 0 are all identical with the same starting promised value V E0 =
−8.36. Surviving firms then experience either high or low productivity realizations and
are updated with higher or lower future promised value levels, respectively. Over time,
as histories of productivity realizations get more heterogeneous due to the i.i.d. shocks,
the distribution Ψτ (V
E) for larger τ gets more dispersed. In addition, as age advances
cohort size becomes smaller because firms have been exiting with the exogenous death
rate 1 − ∆. Eventually, (almost) all firms of a given cohort exit the market so that the
distribution Ψτ (V
E) of old cohorts consist of very few individual observations.
Following the cohort distribution,
{
Ψτ (V
E)
}∞
τ=0
, we can get firm dynamics such as
average size, growth and variance of growth at different ages τ of entrepreneurs. Such
firm dynamics are shown in Figure 3.8.23
22This maps directly into the distributions of bank loans and repayments. The corresponding distri-
butions of b and m are shown in Figure C.7 and C.8 in Appendix C.7.2, respectively.
23There is a decrease in firm size between the newborns and the one-year olds because the starting
promised value, V E0 = −8.36, is at the right end of the steep part of the b(V E)-function. Therefore, a
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Figure 3.8: Firm dynamics
Figure 3.8 shows in Subplot (a) an increasing average size of firms at different ages.
Firm size is measured in terms of the level of banks loans. Hence, our model predicts a
positive relation between firm size and their age, which is in line with empirical observa-
tions.
In (b) we plot firms’ average growth rates at different ages. We define the growth rate
of a firm at age τ by the percentage change in bank loans relative to last period’s loan,
gτ ≡ bτ−bτ−1bτ−1 , where bτ and bτ−1 are bank loans of today and of yesterday, respectively, of
a firm with age τ . The average growth rate of all firms at age τ is measured by the mean
of gτ among all entrepreneurs in this cohort. The graph shows that firms’ average growth
is positive, but the rate decreases with firm age.24 The same holds for the variance of the
growth rate (i.e., the variance of gτ ) which is shown in Subplot (c). This means that on
average older firms grow less, but in a more stable way.
These patterns are also found by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Gross and Verani
(2013) and Verani (2015), and are observed in industry data (e.g., Evans (1987)). This
suggests that empirical firm dynamics can be explained by the design of the optimal
financial contracts with endogenous borrowing constraints.
low productivity shock lowers b more than a high productivity shock increases b. In addition, since the
history of productivity shocks is not very heterogeneous after one period (i.e., 50% are high and 50%
are low) the decrease from the low productivity shock is directly reflected in the average size. For more
periods the history of productivity shocks of entrepreneurs becomes more heterogeneous and the average
is thus less dependent on single observations.
24The observation discussed in the previous footnote is the reason for the outlier of the average growth
(and also of the variance) in the first year. Note that the less smooth pattern for young firms comes from
the fact that at the beginning firms have less different productivity paths, so that we have in this sense
not enough cases of observations. The less smooth pattern for older firm arises since firms are dying and
not many observations are left.
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3.5 Discussion of dynamic programming
In this section, we discuss problems one could encounter in dynamic programming, mainly
in solving the dynamic contract. They are, among others, starting value problems, ex-
trapolation issues, sensitivities to functional forms and to parameter values, and issues
related to the simulation.
3.5.1 Starting value problems
Dynamic programming problems are sensitive to initial guesses of value function and
policy functions. In general, the convergence of dynamic programming algorithms is
limited to a region close enough to the solution. This issue is especially obvious in the
dynamic contract problem with relatively unconventional constraints. Therefore, our
problem requires proper guesses of the starting values. We tried two ways: First, educated
guess derived from the functional form of the utility function and, second, a “ground
search”. For the educated guess, we consider a contract under perfect information with
constant consumption for all periods and states. Then the value function, P (V E ; r, w),
which can serve as the starting value, is an affine linear transformation of the inverse of
the utility function. In the ground search, we programmed a loop over a broad grid set of
{b(V E), mh(V E), ml(V E), V Eh (V E), V El (V E)}. We calculated for all combinations of the
grid points the corresponding bank’s profits and then checked which of the combinations
of the grid points maximize banks’ profits given that it fulfills all the constraints. These
grid points are supposed to be somewhere in the region close to the solution of the optimal
contract and can thus serve as the starting values. Overall, the initial guesses from the
two ways are both good enough for solving the dynamic contract in our model. In the
end, we used the first way to get the initial guesses as the second way requires relatively
long computation time and a large amount of storing memory.25
3.5.2 Extrapolation errors
In the numerical algorithm we generate a finite number of Chebychev grid points on the
interval of the state variable.26 Chebychev grid points have superior performances in
function iterations in dynamic programming, yet, an extrapolation problem arises: The
interval on which value function and policy functions are defined is larger than the range of
25Note that even with only four grid points for each of the five choice variables there are already
45 = 1024 combinations to be calculated and checked.
26For Chebychev grid points we follow Judd (1998): The m grid points {xk}k={1,...,m} are set according
to the coefficients of the Chebychev polynomial. We compute m Chebychev interpolation points zk =
− cos ( 2k−12m pi) on [−1, 1]. Then we adjust it to our interval [a, b], such that xk = (zk + 1)( b−a2 ) + a.
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the grid points, and thus extrapolation may be needed. With cubic splines interpolation,
extrapolation close to the surroundings of the two grid boundaries is embedded in the code
and thus performed automatically. However, the default extrapolation cannot guarantee
that the image of the policy function remains in the domain of the state variable. To
prevent this, we manually replaced the lowest Chebyshev point with the lower bound of
the interval of the state variable before using it.
3.5.3 Sensitivity to parameter values and functional forms
Given the complexity of the dynamic contract problem, the numerical outcomes and
the convergence of the iterations are sensitive to functional forms and parameter values.
In our case, for example, with log-utility we would see a U -shaped b(V E), which may
not necessarily lead to the same firm dynamics as we observe in Figure 3.8. Further,
convergence of the problem is sensitive to the combinations of parameters. For example,
not all combinations of (r, w) may guarantee convergence of the value function iteration
when calculating the optimal dynamic contract. However, for combinations of (r, w) close
to the equilibrium solution, the dynamic contract problem is in general stable; it always
results in proper optimal contracts.
3.5.4 Simulation issues
To get the equilibrium, we grid-search (r, w)-combinations manually and check for the
equilibrium conditions to hold. To have monotonicity in the aggregation variables of the
simulation and comparability of different outcomes from the grid search, it is important
that the simulation reflects a stationary distribution of life paths for all compared (r, w)-
combinations. Otherwise, one cannot identify whether changes in the zero-profit condition
and the capital market clearing condition come from the effect of updated (r′, w′) or from
a changed combination of life paths. Furthermore, as is described in more detail in the
algorithm in Appendix C.5, we use the observable fact that banks’ profit and the excess
demand in the capital market are both decreasing in r and w. In addition, the gap
between the banks’ profit and the excess demand in the capital market is decreasing in r
and increasing in w. We use these signs and the (at least locally) observable monotonicity
of the two conditions to restrict the region where the optimal equilibrium lies and get the
direction for further searching.
Chapter 3 125
3.6 Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature by modeling a dynamic credit relationship between
banks and entrepreneurs in a general equilibrium model – which determines simultane-
ously the wage and interest rate and the share of entrepreneurs and which delivers firm
dynamics. We have households, who decide, at the beginning of their life, to become
either a worker or an entrepreneur. Workers supply labor and save in the form of an-
nuity deposits. Entrepreneurs run firms and employ labor and capital for production.
Productivity is stochastic and private knowledge to the entrepreneur. The production
costs are financed with bank loans. To overcome the information asymmetry, loans and
repayments are determined in long-term financial contracts with banks. More specifically,
the financial contract between banks and entrepreneurs derived from a recursive formu-
lation determines the optimal level of bank loan, state-contingent repayments and future
promised values given today’s promised values. The contracts are promise keeping and
incentive compatible and fulfill limited liability and credibility constraints. In equilibrium
banks make zero profit from the contract and the labor, the capital and the goods markets
are cleared. The general equilibrium structure allows determining the wage, the interest
rate and the share of entrepreneurs in equilibrium, as well as the size distribution of firms.
Further, we get firm dynamics arising through the optimal financial contracts: The size
of firms, measured by their level of bank loans, increases with the age of firms while their
average growth and the variance of growth decreases with age.
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Portfolio choice
Agent index l is skipped in the appendix. If financial intermediaries take ex-ante a fee in
the form T = pz1d+ pz2(s− d), the expected utility maximization problem is given by:
max
s,{fθ}θ∈Θ,d
EU = log(e0 − e¯0) + δ
µ∑
θ∈Θ
piθ log(eθ − e¯1) + (1− µ) log(eΘ¯ − e¯1)

subject to
e0 + (1 + pz2)s+ (pz1 − pz2)d = y, (A.1)
eθ =

Rθfθ + rd, if θ ∈ Θ
rd, otherwise
(A.2)
s =
∑
θ∈Θ
fθ + d. (A.3)
Denoting by λ the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (A.3) the first-order conditions
of the households’ expected utility maximization problem give:
∂L
∂s
= −1 + pz2
e0 − e¯0 + λ = 0, (A.4)
∂L
∂fθ
= δµpiθ
Rθ
eθ − e¯1 − λ = 0, (A.5)
∂L
∂d
= −pz1 − pz2
e0 − e¯0 + δ
µ∑
θ∈Θ
piθ
r
eθ − e¯1 + (1− µ)
r
rd− e¯1
− λ = 0, (A.6)
∂L
∂λ
= s−∑
θ∈Θ
fθ − d = 0. (A.7)
Using (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6), we have
d =
δ(1− µ)
λ
(
1+pz1
1+pz2
− r/R
) + e¯1
r
. (A.8)
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where R = piθRθ. From (A.2), (A.5) and (A.7), we have
s =
δµ
λ
+ (1− r/R)d+ 1
R
e¯1. (A.9)
In the end we have
d =
δ(1− µ)
(1 + δ)P
(y − e¯0) + (1 + µδ)(1 + pz1)− (1 + δ)(1 + pz2)r/R
r(1 + δ)P
e¯1
=
1− µ
1− pρ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
, (A.10)
where P ≡ (1 + pz1)(1− pρ), p ≡ 1+pz21+pz1 , ρ ≡
r
R
and y¯ ≡ e¯0 + e¯1(1+pz1 )r .
Combining (A.10) with (A.8) and solving for λ, we obtain
1
λ
=
y − y¯
(1 + δ)(1 + pz2)
(A.11)
Using this and (A.10) in (A.9), we have
s =
δ
(1 + δ)
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
µ+ (1− ρ)p(1− µ)
1− pρ
]
+ (1− ρ) e¯1
r
+
e¯1
R
=
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
µ− pρ+ p(1− µ)
1− pρ +
e¯1
r
,
which can be rewritten in the form
s =
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
1 +
(pz2 − pz1)(1− µ)
(1 + pz1)(1− pρ)
]
+
e¯1
r
, (A.12)
where p− 1 = pz2−pz1
1+pz1
has been used.
Finally, (A.7), (A.10) and (A.12) give us
f ≡ ∑
θ∈Θ
fθ =
µ− pρ
1− pρ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
(A.13)
and from (A.1) we conclude
y − e0 = (1 + pz1)d+ (1 + pz2)f
=
δ
1 + δ
(y − y¯) + (1 + pz1)e¯1
r
.
(A.14)
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For the allocation of f on fθ, θ ∈ Θ, we combine (A.2) with (A.5) to get
fθ = piθ
[
δµ
λ
+
e¯1 − rd
R
]
= piθ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
µ− ρ 1− µ
1− pρp
]
= piθf,
where (A.10) and (A.11) have been used for the second equation.
A.2 Corner solution for securities demand
To account for the non-negativity constraint fθ ≥ 0 we have to add ∑θ∈Θ ψθfθ to the
Lagrange function for max EU – with ψθ ≥ 0 denoting the Lagrange multiplier for fθ ≥ 0.
Then, the first order condition for fθ changes to
δµpiθ
Rθ
eθ − e¯1 − λ+ ψθ = 0 (A.15)
with ψθfθ ≤ 0.
Suppose that fθ = 0 for all θ. Then s = d and
e0 − e¯0 = y − e¯0 − (1 + pz1)d
eθ − e¯1 = rd− e¯1
(A.16)
and the first-order conditions
(s) λ =
1 + pz2
e0 − e¯0
(d) δ
µ∑
θ∈S
piθ
r
eθ − e¯1 + (1− µ)
r
rd− e¯1
 = λ+ pz1 − pz2
e0 − e¯0
(A.17)
reduce to
δ
r
rd− e¯1 =
1 + pz1
e0 − e¯0 .
With (A.16) this solves to
d =
1
1 + δ
[
δ(y − e¯0)
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
]
. (A.18)
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Substituting the solution into (A.16) gives us
e0 − e¯0 = 1
1 + δ
[
y − e¯0 − (1 + pz1)e¯1
r
]
eθ − e¯1 = δr
(1 + δ)
[
y − e¯0
1 + pz1
− e¯1
r
]
.
(A.19)
Using this in (A.15) we obtain: ψθ ≥ 0 if and only if
µpiθRθ ≤ 1 + pz2
1 + pz1
r (A.20)
where λ =
1+pz2
e0−e¯0
has been used from (A.17).
Since piθRθ = R, (A.20) reduces to
1 + pz1
1 + pz2
µR ≤ r,
which is equivalent to Rµ(1 + pz1) ≤ (1 + pz2)r.
Hence non-negativity fθ > 0, θ ∈ Θ, requires
Rµ(1 + pz1) > (1 + pz2)r. (A.21)
A.3 Further proofs
Proof of Fact 1.3. With (1.11) and (1.12) the condition yL = bLwL > y¯ = e¯0 +
(1+pz)e¯1
r
takes the form
AxΓxω
−αx
[
bL − e¯1
rAz1Γz1
ωαz1
]
> e¯0 +
e¯1
r
.
The left side of the equation declines in ω. Thus yL > y¯ requires
ω < ω+L
Ax
+
, Az1
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−
 ,
where ω+L is determined by the equation:
bL = (e¯0 +
e¯1
r
)
ωαx
AxΓx
+
e¯1
r
ωαz1
Az1Γz1
.
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Proof of Lemma 1.1. a) Let B1 ≡ AxΓx bLL¯N and B2 ≡ AxΓxAzΓz . Using (1.26) and (1.12), we
have
w¯ = B1ω
−αx(1 + ωk), pz = B2ω
αz−αx .
Then η¯ can be reformulated as
η¯ =
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
=
B1ω
−αx(1 + ωk)− e¯0
1 +B2ωαz−αx
− e¯1
r
,
where (1.18) is used to substitute y¯.
To get the shape of η¯, first notice that
sign
∂η¯(ω)
∂ω
= sign
∂G(ω)
∂ω
,
where G(ω) ≡ B1(1+ωk)−e¯0ωαx
ωαx+B2ωαz
. Differentiating G(ω) we have
∂G(ω)
∂ω
=
L(ω)
(ωαx + B2ωαz)
2 ,
where
L(ω) =B1ωαx
[
k(1− αx)− αx
ω
]
+B1B2ω
αz
[
k(1− αz)− αz
ω
]
+ e¯0B2(αz − αx)ωαx+αz−1.
We have ∂G(ω)
∂ω
> 0 if and only if L(ω) > 0. For αx+αz > 1, L(ω) is an increasing function
in ω. Moreover,
lim
ω→0+
L = −∞, lim
ω→+∞
L = +∞.
Therefore, there exists a unique ω with L(ω) = 0 and: ∂η¯(ω)
∂ω
R 0 if and only if ω R ω. A
rise in k or e¯0 shifts L(ω) upward so that ω declines. The impacts of B1, B2 (and thus
of Ax, Az,
bLL¯
N
) on ω are ambiguous because κx < k < κz imply k(1− αx)− αxω > 0 and
k(1− αz)− αzω < 0.
b) We have
η¯ =
AxΓx
bLL¯
N
ω−αx(1 + ωk)− e¯0
1 + AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
− e¯1
r
.
By eye inspection we get:
η¯
ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+, bLL¯N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−

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Proof of Fact 1.6. According to (1.38), ZS = AzbLL¯
γαzz
γz−γx
ω−αz(kω − γx), where κj = γjω
has been used from (1.9).
We have ∂ω
−αz (kω−γx)
∂ω
= ω−αz
[
(1− αz)k + αzγxω
]
. This term is positive and decreasing
in ω.
A.4 Data survey years 1995-2009
Table A.1: Parameters survey years 1995-2009
Parameter Data Source Description
L¯ 109m CPS # Low-skilled employees
H¯ 41.1m CPS # High-skilled employees
hL 1755.6 CPS Yearly hours of low-skilled
hH 2025.3 CPS Yearly hours of high-skilled
αx 0.44 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in X
αz1 0.54 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z1
αz2 0.79 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z2
Ax 32.46 CPS Technology level in X
PT65 $ 11,213 U.S. Bureau of the Census Real poverty threshold <65
PT 65 $ 10,080 U.S. Bureau of the Census Real poverty threshold >65
LEratio 3.83 LE from World Bank Old-age ratio
rf 0.0151 Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis Real federal funds rate
Az1 141.93 Model calibration·Ax-growth Technology level in Z1
Az2 201.88 Model calibration·Ax-growth Technology level in Z2
δ 0.385 Model calibration Discount rate
µ 0.740 Model calibration Certainty measure
Notes: The table shows the averaged values for the time range of survey years t ∈ {1995, . . . , 2009}.
Averages of αj,t =
κj,tωj,t
1+κj,tωj,t
with κj,t =
hHj,tH¯j,t
hL
j,t
L¯j,t
and ωj,t =
wHj,t
wL
j,t
, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, hHt = hHx,t and
hLt = h
L
x,t. Ax,t =
wLx,t
Γx,tω
−αx,t
x,t
with Γx,t = αx,t
αx,t(1 − αx,t)1−αx,t . PT is the average, real poverty
threshold of a two-people household (nominal values are adjusted by using the CPI-U adjustment
factor to 1999 dollars (i.e., for the base survey year 2000) from CPS with PT65 denoting the relevant
value for households younger than 65 and PT 65 denoting the value relevant for older ones. LEratio
is the average ratio of working-time to retirement: (65 − 20)/(LEt − 65), where LEt denotes life
expectancy in year t; 65 is the retirement age and 20 is the assumed start of the working-life. rf
is the average, real effective federal funds rate (effective federal funds rate adjusted with the CPI-U
adjustment factor from CPS). See bibliography for details on data sources.
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B.1 Derivations
B.1.1 Derivation of the equilibrium
Using (2.7) in (2.10), we have
τˆ (N) = c˜α∗ + cs +
dN2 + fN
I∗w
From (2.6) we know
v∗(N, τˆ(N)) = α∗R˜− γσ
2
PF
2
+ r − τˆ(N),
where σ2PF = α
∗2σ2B. Hence, the equilibrium condition
dv∗(N,τˆ(N))
dN
= 0 reads
∂α∗
∂N
(R˜− c˜)− γ
2
∂σ2PF
∂N
=
2dN + f
I∗w
. (B.1)
B.1.1.1 Derivation of N∗
For α∗(N) = N R˜
γσ2
and σ2B =
σ2
N
, we have σ2PF = N
R˜2
γ2σ2
so that the respective derivatives
are: ∂α
∗
∂N
= R˜
γσ2
and
∂σ2
PF
∂N
= R˜
2
γ2σ2
. Thus, the equilibrium condition (B.1) reduces to
R˜
γσ2
(R˜− c˜)− R˜2
2γσ2
= 2dN+f
I∗w
. It solves to
N∗ =
I∗wR˜(R˜− c˜)− R˜2I∗w
2
− fγσ2
2dγσ2
(B.2)
and can be rewritten in the form of (2.12). The second order condition d
2v∗(N,τˆ(N))
dN2
= − 2d
I∗w
is negative. N∗ gives the maximum and the unique equilibrium. N∗ plugged into the zero-
profit condition (i.e., τˆ (N∗)) gives τ ∗ as presented in equation (2.13).
B.1.1.2 Derivation of N∗D
Use f˜ = (1 + ν)f in (B.2) and rewrite it to get the form in (2.17).
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B.1.1.3 Derivation of N∗D,NC
For α∗(N, ν, ) = (1+ν)N
1+ν(1−)
R˜
γσ2
and σ2B(N, ν, ) =
1+ν(1−)
(1+ν)N
σ2, we have σ2PF =
(1+ν)N
1+ν(1−)
R˜2
γ2σ2
so
that ∂α
∗
∂N
= 1+ν
1+ν(1−)
R˜
γσ2
and
∂σ2
PF
∂N
= 1+ν
1+ν(1−)
R˜2
γ2σ2
. Thus, the equilibrium condition (B.1)
reduces to 1+ν
1+ν(1−)
R˜
γσ2
(R˜− c˜)− 1+ν
1+ν(1−)
R˜2
2γσ2
= 2dN+f˜
I∗w
, where f˜ = (1 + ν)f . The condition
solves to
N∗D,NC =
I∗wR˜(R˜− c˜)− R˜2I∗w
2
− f˜ 1+ν(1−)
1+ν
γσ2
2d1+ν(1−)
1+ν
γσ2
, (B.3)
which, by using f˜ = (1 + ν)f , can be rewritten in the form given in (2.19).
B.1.2 Derivation of σ2B(N, ν, )
A package of N independent financial products has variance σ2N = σ
2/N . There are
(1 + ν) of such packages with correlation ρ = 1. Households are diversification-seeking
and thus put equal weight 1/(1+ ν) on each of the package (argumentation as in Lemma
2.1). The variance of the risky bundle B consisting of N and D = νN assets is therefore
(equally weighted sum of covariances):
σ2B(N, ν) =
1
1 + ν
σ2N +
(1 + ν)− 1
1 + ν
ρσ2N
However, a share  of ρ is neglected:
σ2B(N, ν, ) =
1
1 + ν
σ2N +
(1 + ν)− 1
1 + ν
(ρ− )σ2N
=
1 + ν(ρ− )
(1 + ν)N
σ2
with ρ = 1
σ2B(N, ν, ) =
1 + ν(1− )
(1 + ν)N
σ2.
Clearly, σ2(N, ν, )→ σ2
N
as → 0 and σ2(N, ν, )→ σ2
(1+ν)N
as → 1.
B.1.3 Derivations of analytical results for endogenizing ν
B.1.3.1 Derivation of cost-minimizing ν∗
Minimizing and setting the first order condition (FOC) equal to zero:
∂Ctot(ν,)
∂ν
= 2da2 (1−)(1+ν)−(1+ν(1−))
(1+ν)2
1+ν(1−)
1+ν
+af(1−) != 0⇔ f
2da
= 
1
1−
+ν
(1+ν)3
given in (2.22).
For the SOC follows: ∂
2Ctot(ν,)
∂ν2
= −2da2 (1−)(1+ν)−3(1+ν(1−))
(1+ν)4
, which is positive for ν ≥ 0
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and 0 <  < 1. Thus, ν∗, which is implicitly determined in (2.22), is a minimum. It gives
a unique, positive ν∗ for  ∈ (˜, ˜): Define the implicit function F ≡ 
1
1−
+ν∗
(1+ν∗)3
− f
2da
from
(2.22). There is a unique, positive ν∗ for  ∈ (˜, ˜) because ∂F∂ν∗ < 0⇔ 3( 11− +ν) > (1+ν)
for all  ∈ [0, 1], lim
ν∗→0
F > 0 for  > ˜ = f2da+f and limν∗→∞F < 0 due to limν∗→∞ 
1
1−
+ν∗
(1+ν∗)3
= 0
(i.e., F crosses the zero-axis for positive ν∗ only once).
Graphically the cost-minimization means that the locus, which describes all (N, ν)-
combination providing the same perceived level of diversification a (iso-diversification
curve), and the iso-cost curve are tangent:
N
ν
b
a¯ (“iso-diversification curve”)
c¯ (“iso-cost curve”)
ν∗
N∗
Figure B.1: Iso-diversification and iso-cost curves
Notes: The figure plots an iso-diversification curve for a perceived level of diversification a¯: ν(a¯, N) =
a¯−N
N−a¯(1−) ) with ∂ν(a¯, N)/∂N ≤ 0 and ∂2ν(a¯, N)/∂N2 ≥ 0 because N > a¯(1 − ). The iso-cost curve c¯
captures total costs C¯tot(N, ν, ) with ∂ν(c¯, N)/∂N ≤ 0 and ∂2ν(c¯, N)/∂N2 ≥ 0 by implicit differentiation
of C¯tot(N, ν, ).
B.1.3.2 Derivation of ˜ and ˜
(2.22) holds only for 0 < ν∗ < a−1
1−a(1−)
(i.e., only if the constraints ν∗ ≥ 0 and ν∗ ≤ a−1
1−a(1−)
(because of N∗ ≥ 1) are non-binding): Using ν∗min = 0 in (2.22), we have f2da = ˜
1
1−˜+0(1+0)3
such that ˜ = f2da+f with ˜ ∈ (0, 1). Since ν∗ in (2.22) rises in  if 0 <  < 1 (see below)
this means that for all  < ˜ we set ν∗ = ν∗min = 0. Further, using ν∗ = a−11−a(1−) in (2.22),
we have f
2da
= ˜
1
1−˜
+ a−1
1−a(1−)
(1+ a−1
1−a(1−)
)3
. This gives ˜1,2 =
4(a−1)d+af±
√
f
√
8(a−1)d+a2f
2a(2d+f)
. Since there is
only one positive solution ν∗ determined by (2.22) and ˜1 =
4(a−1)d+af−
√
f
√
8(a−1)d+a2f
2a(2d+f)
<
4(a−1)d+af+
√
f
√
8(a−1)d+a2f
2a(2d+f)
= ˜2 with 0 < ˜2 ≤ 1 for a ≥ 1, d ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0 we have ˜ ≡ ˜2
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(i.e., I can exclude ˜1 because ν
∗ = a−1
1−a(1−˜1)
< 0). This implies that for all  > ˜ we set
ν∗ = a−1
1−a(1−)
. Thus, ν∗max =
a−1
1−a(1−˜)
and for  = 1 we have ν∗ = a− 1.
B.1.3.3 Derivation of comparative statics on ν∗ and N∗
Use the differentiable implicit function F defined in Appendix B.1.3.1. The implicit
function theorem gives ν∗′() = − ∂F∂∂F
∂ν∗
= −
1+ν∗−2ν∗+ν∗2
(1+ν∗)3(1−)2

(1+ν∗)3−3(1+ν∗)2( 11−+ν
∗)
(1+ν∗)6
= (1+ν
∗)(1+ν∗(1−)2)
(2(1+ν∗(1−))+)(1−)
,
which is positive for 0 ≤ ˜ <  < ˜ ≤ 1. Further, the implicit function theorem gives
ν∗′(a) = − ∂F∂a∂F
∂ν∗
= −
f
2da2

(1+ν∗)3−3(1+ν∗)2( 1
1−
+ν∗)
(1+ν∗)6
= f(1+ν
∗)4(1−)
2da2(2+2ν∗+−2ν∗)
, which is positive for 0 ≤
˜ <  < ˜ ≤ 1. Correspondingly, ν∗′(d) > 0 and ν∗′(f) < 0.
N∗ = 1+ν
∗(1−)
1+ν∗
a decreases in  twofold: Directly because of (1 − ) and indirectly
through the negative reaction on the increased ν∗ (remember ∂N(ν,a,)
∂ν
< 0 for  > 0 from
footnote 29 in Chapter 2). Further, dN
∗
da
= 1+ν
∗(1−)
1+ν∗
− aν∗′(a)
(1+ν∗)2
. dN
∗
da
> 0 ⇔ 1+ν∗(1−)
1+ν∗
>
a
(1+ν∗)2
f(1+ν∗)4(1−)
2da2(2+2ν∗+−2ν∗)
where ν∗′(a) has been used from above. By using that f
2da
=

1
1−
+ν∗
(1+ν∗)3
from the implicit function for ν∗ in (2.22), this simplifies to (1 + ν∗(1− )) > 0,
which is fulfilled for any 0 ≤ ˜ <  < ˜ ≤ 1. Thus, the direct positive effect of a on N∗
outweighs the indirect negative effect of a through ν∗ on N∗. For  ∈ (˜, ˜), N∗ increases in
f and decreases in d through the negative reaction on ν∗. Thus, we have the comparative
statics in (2.23).
B.1.3.4 Derivation of comparative statics on M∗
M∗ = (1 + ν∗)N∗ = (1 + ν∗(1− ))a and thus ∂M∗
∂
> 0 ⇔ ∂(ν∗(1−))
∂
> 0 ⇔ ∂ν∗
∂

ν∗
≷ 
1−
where the left hand side is the elasticity of ν∗ with respect to . Using ∂ν
∗
∂
from the
implicit function theorem above and simplifying reduces the inequality to ν∗(3− 1) < 1.
This corresponds then to ν∗ > 1
3−1
for  < 1
3
(fulfilled since ν∗ > 0) and to ν∗ < 1
3−1
for  > 1
3
(not necessarily fulfilled). Furthermore, M∗ = (1 + ν∗(1 − ))a indicates that
M∗ is twofold increasing in a: Due to the direct effect of a and an indirectly through ν∗.
Finally, M∗ increases in d and decreases in f like ν∗ does for  ∈ (˜, ˜). Thus, we have the
comparative statics in (2.24).
B.1.3.5 Derivation of comparative statics on the cost function
For given a and  ∈ (˜, ˜), dCtot(ν∗,)d = 2a2d (1+ν∗(1−))(−(ν∗+ν∗2+ν∗′())(1+ν∗)3 + af(ν∗′()(1 −
) − ν∗). By using equation (2.22) and simplifying, it follows that dCtot(ν∗,)
d
< 0 ⇔
ν∗(1 + ν∗(1 − )) > 0 which holds ∀ν∗ > 0 and ∀ ∈ (˜, ˜). In addition, for  ≥ ˜,
dCtot(N∗,ν∗,)
d
< 0 because dν
∗
d
< 0, but for  ≤ ˜, dCtot(N∗,ν∗,)d = 0 because ν∗ = 0. Further,
dCtot(N∗,ν∗,)
da
= dα
da
wI∗c˜ + 2ddN
∗
da
N∗ + f dM
∗
da
> 0 because dα
da
> 0, dN
∗
da
≥ 0 and dM∗
da
> 0.
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B.2 Comparative statics of fundamentals
Table B.1: Comparative statics of fundamentals
Parameter I∗ I w γ R˜ σ2 c˜ cs f d
on τ∗ + . + - + - - + - -
on α∗ + . + - + - - . - -
on Ks
∗ - + ? + - + + . + +
on Kj
∗ . + + - + - . . . .
Notes: + is a positive and - a negative, ceteris paribus, comparative-static effect. ? indicates an
ambiguous effect, which depends on the parameter values and . indicates no effect. The comparative-
static effects of γ, R˜ and σ2 on τ∗ are derived by using that the parameters satisfy 2fγσ2 < I∗R˜(R˜−
2c˜)w (see Proposition 2.1). Kj
∗ for all j = 1, ..., N∗.
B.3 Equilibria equations
B.3.1 Equilibria with correlated derivatives and neglected cor-
relation
Table B.2: Equilibrium characterizations with derivatives and neglected correlation
D D,NC
τ∗: c˜α∗(N∗D, ν) + c
s +
dN∗D
2+f(1+ν)N∗D
I∗w c˜α
∗(N∗D,NC , ν, ) + c
s +
dN∗D,NC
2+f(1+ν)N∗D,NC
I∗w
α∗: N∗D
R˜
γσ2
(1+ν)N∗D,NC
1+ν(1−)
R˜
γσ2
Ks
∗: (1−N∗D R˜γσ2 )wI (1−
(1+ν)N∗D,NC
1+ν(1−)
R˜
γσ2 )wI
Kj
∗: R˜γσ2wI
1+ν
1+ν(1−)
R˜
γσ2wI
Notes: Kj
∗ for all j = 1, ..., N∗.
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B.3.2 Planned and true utility levels
Utility level in benchmark model:
v∗(N∗, τ ∗) = α∗(N∗)R˜ + r − γα∗(N∗)2 σ
2
N∗
2
− τ ∗
Utility level in model with derivatives:
v∗(N∗D, ν, τ
∗
D) = α
∗(N∗D)R˜ + r −
γα∗(N∗
D
)2 σ
2
N∗
D
2
− τ ∗D
Planned utility level in model with derivatives and neglected correlation:
v∗(N∗D,NC, ν, , τ
∗
D,NC)
p = α∗(N∗D,NC , ν, )R˜ + r −
γα∗(N∗
D,NC
,ν,)2
1+ν(1−)σ2
(1+ν)N∗
D,NC
2
− τ ∗D,NC
True utility level in model with derivatives and neglected correlation:
v∗(N∗D,NC, ν, , τ
∗
D,NC)
t = α∗(N∗D,NC , ν, )R˜ + r −
γα∗(N∗
D,NC
,ν,)2 σ
2
N∗
D,NC
2
− τ ∗D,NC
B.4 Simulation for endogenizing ν
B.4.1 Simulation procedure
This appendix describes the numerical algorithm to simulate the general equilibrium with
endogenized ν:
a) Set numerical values for the exogenous parameters E(R), r, σ2, I, w, γ, I∗, cs, cr, d
and f .
b) For  = 0 set a∗min = N
∗ where N∗ is the equilibrium level of diversification from the
baseline models given in equation (2.12). And for  = 1 calculate a∗max where a
∗
max
is argmaxa αmaxR˜ + r − γα2maxσ22a − αmax c˜wI
∗+cswI∗+d+fa
wI∗
where αmax = max{a R˜γσ2 , 1}.
Nmin = 1 and ν=1 = a− 1 was used.
c) Set the step sizes s for  ∈ [0, 1] and sa for the perceived level of diversification
a ∈ [a∗min, a∗max].1
d) Solve maxα∈[0,1] αE(R) + (1− α)r − γα2σ22a − τ (where σ2B = σ
2
a
was used) to get the
risky portfolio share as a function of a: α˜∗(a) = a R˜
γσ2
.
1Since Ctot is monotone in  and a (see Appendix B.1.3.5) the simulation results are monotone in 
and a.
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e) For each  run the following steps:
(a) For each a run the following steps:
i. Re-set α∗(a) = max{α˜∗(a), 1}.
ii. Minimize Ctot(N, ν, ) = c
rα∗(a)wI∗+ cs(1−α∗(a))wI∗+dN2+f(1+ν)N
with respect to ν and N subject to a = (1+ν)N
1+ν(1−)
, N ≥ 1 and ν ≥ 0.
iii. Store the solution (N∗, ν∗) from 5.(a).ii. In addition store the minimal
costs Ctot(N
∗, ν∗, ) and τ ∗ = Ctot(N
∗,ν∗,)
I∗w
.
iv. Calculate households utility v∗(a) = α∗(a)E(R)+(1−α∗(a))r− γα∗2σ2
2a
−τ ∗
and store it.
(b) Determine the utility maximizing a∗ by picking the maximum value v∗(a∗) of
the household’s utility level stored in 5.(a).iv.
(c) Pick the to a∗ corresponding values ν∗, N∗ and τ ∗ from 5.(a).iii. Derive M∗ =
(1+ν∗)N∗. Calculate the true and the planned bundle variance (i.e., σ∗B
2 = σ
2
N∗
and σ∗B
2(N∗, ν∗, ) = σ
2
a∗
, respectively).
f) Plot the values of a∗, ν∗, N∗, M∗, σ∗B
2, σ∗B
2(N∗, ν∗, ) and τ ∗ in dependence of
 ∈ [0, 1].
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B.4.2 Simulation results: Equilibrium effects of 
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Figure B.2: General equilibria for  ∈ [0, 1]
Notes: Simulation results for parameter values: r = 1.01 (i.e., approximately the fed funds rate in
2010), E(R) = 1.1 reflects a 10% risky interest rate, w = 200, 000 (i.e., approximately the total net worth
of $60,000bn in 2010 divided by number of citizens 300m in the U.S.), γ = 1 (standard risk aversion
parameter), σ2 = 15 (i.e., approximately the VIX volatility index in 2010), cs = 0.015 and cr = .025
(weighted sum corresponds approximately to 2% cost of financial intermediation as estimated in Philippon
(2015)), I = 60, 000, 000 (i.e., approximately the 20% share, who invest in stocks, of all citizens 300m
in the U.S.), d = 5, 000 and f = 200 (i.e., approximately a month and a day salary, respectively, of a
financier in the U.S.), n = 15, 000 (i.e., approximately the number of banks in the U.S. in 2010). α ∈ [0, 1]
was considered. Note that the kink in panel (c) is because for larger  the positive a-effect on N will be
outweighed by the negative -effect on N . For the same reasons there are kinks in the other panels.
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C.1 Timing
The timing of the activities within a period T is as follows (see Figure C.1). At first, a
mass of 1−∆ households is born. An endogenously determined share λ of them decides to
become an entrepreneur and the rest decides to be a worker. The newborn entrepreneurs
sign a lifetime binding financial contract with the banks. The banks give loans b(V E), ac-
cording to the amount entitled by the respective terms of the contract, to all entrepreneurs
in the economy. Entrepreneurs pay the production costs of capital and labor input with
the bank loans and production takes place under uncertainty. (Workers consume and save
by buying annuities from the banks from their labor income and capital returns). After
production, entrepreneurs observe the state of their productivity realization and make
a report about it to the bank. Then, entrepreneurs make state-contingent repayments
ms(V
E) to the banks according to their financial contract and consume the remaining net
production revenue. Further, the contract determines state-contingent promised values
V Es (V
E) as future state variable. Finally, a share 1−∆ of the workers and entrepreneurs
dies and the associated firms exit.
t
T
Banks give
loans b(V E)
Production under
uncertainty
1. Realization of states
2. Entrepreneurs report states
State-contingent repayments
ms(V E), promised values V Es
Figure C.1: Timing of terms of financial contract within one period
C.2 Derivations
C.2.1 Derivations of financial contract properties
The proofs for Proposition 3.1 and 3.2 and Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 follow the proofs on the
optimal social insurance in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) which are based on
Thomas and Worrall (1990).
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C.2.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Using the definition in (3.12) and summing up Cs,s−1 + Cs−1,s we conclude from
(IC): Cs,s−1 + Cs−1,s ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
U(θsR(b)−ms, LE)−U(θsR(b)−ms−1, LE) ≥
U(θs−1R(b)−ms, LE)− U(θs−1R(b)−ms−1, LE) (C.1)
Since θs > θs−1 and given the strict concavity of the utility function in consumption,
(C.1) is satisfied only if ms ≥ ms−1. It then follows from Cs,s−1 ≥ 0 that V Es ≥ V Es−1.
C.2.1.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Without loss of generality, we prove from the local downward constraints Cs,s−1 ≥
0, ∀s ∈ S, that for any i > j, i, j ∈ S, Ci,j ≥ 0. The case of i < j can be proved from the
local upward constraints Cs,s+1 ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, using the same logic.
Proof with mathematical induction: For n = 1, Cj+n,j ≥ 0 holds according to the local
downward constraint. Suppose for n ≥ 1, Cj+n,j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ S holds; we need to prove that
Cj+n+1,j ≥ 0. For simplicity of notation denote i = j + n.
First, Ci,j ≥ 0 and Ci+1,i ≥ 0 are equivalent to the following inequalities:
U(θiR(b)−mi, LE) + β∆V Ei − U(θiR(b)−mj , LE)− β∆V Ej ≥ 0,
U(θi+1R(b)−mi+1, LE) + β∆V Ei+1 − U(θi+1R(b)−mi, LE)− β∆V Ei ≥ 0.
Summing up the two inequalities we have:
U(θi+1R(b)−mi+1, LE) + β∆V Ei+1 − β∆V Ej +
U(θiR(b)−mi, LE)− U(θiR(b)−mj , LE)− U(θi+1R(b)−mi, LE) ≥ 0. (C.2)
Using the strict concavity of the utility function, the fact θi+1 > θi, and mi ≥ mj from
Proposition 3.1, we have additionally the following inequality:
U(θi+1R(b)−mi, LE)−U(θi+1R(b)−mj , LE) ≥
U(θiR(b)−mi, LE)− U(θiR(b)−mj , LE) (C.3)
Adding (C.3) to (C.2) we have
U(θi+1R(b)−mi+1, LE) + β∆V Ei+1 − β∆V Ej − U(θi+1R(b)−mj , LE) ≥ 0.
Namely, Ci+1,j ≥ 0.
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C.2.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. First, we prove by contradiction that the local downward constraints must bind:
Suppose that there exists an optimal contract
{
b,ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
such that for some i ∈ S
the downward constraint does not bind (i.e., Ci,i−1 > 0). Then, the general procedure
is as follows: We prove that there exists a mean-preserving contraction transforma-
tion on
{
V Ej
}
j=i,...,S
such that the new contract
{
b,ms, Vˆ
E
s
}
s∈S
, where Vˆ Ej = V
E
j , for
j = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1, fulfills all constraints. In particular, we make a transformation with∑
s∈S
pisVˆ
E
s =
∑
s∈S
pisV
E
s , and Vˆ
E
j − Vˆ El ≤ V Ej − V El , ∀j, l ∈ S, with at least one pair of
{j, l} giving strict inequality. In this case, under the assumption that P (V E) is strictly
concave, the banks’ profit increases strictly with the new contract. This contradicts the
fact that
{
b,ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
is an optimal contract.
Now we describe explicitly the procedure of performing a mean-preserving contraction
transformation on the contract:
Keeping
{
mi−1, mi, V
E
i−1
}
as before, we decrease V Ei until Ci,i−1 = 0. Since changing
V Ei will influence the local downward incentive constraints for s = i + 1 and sequen-
tially s = i + 2, . . . , S, we decrease for each s = i + 1, . . . , S, V Es such that Cs,s−1 = 0.
As a result we have a new sequence of future promised value{
V Es
′
}
s∈S
=
{
V E1 , V
E
2 , . . . , V
E
i−1, V
E
i
′
, V Ei+1
′
, . . . , V ES
′
}
. Now we add a positive constant,
v¯, to the sequence of future promised value, such that the promise keeping constraint is
regained. Let Vˆ Es = V
E
s
′
+ v¯. We have a new contract
{
b,ms, Vˆ
E
s
}
s∈S
.
First, note that the new contract fulfills the local upward constraints automatically
given the strict concavity of the utility function and the fact that Cs,s−1 = 0 ∀s ∈ S
(see argumentation in the last part of this proof). In addition, the promise keeping
constraint is still fulfilled due to the mean-preserving transformation, and the limited
liability constraints are uninfluenced since b and {ms}s∈S are unchanged. Finally, for any
j = i, . . . , S, V Ej+1 must decrease at least as much as V
E
j to guarantee that Cj+1,j = 0.
Therefore, for any j = i, . . . , S, v¯ ≤ V Ej − V Ej ′, indicating that Vˆ Ej ≤ V Ej and remember
that for j = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 Vˆ Ej = V Ej ,. Since
{
V Es
}
s∈S
fulfills the credibility constraints,
so does the new contract.
Further, notice from the procedure that the gap of the promised values between two
successive states, s and s − 1, is either unchanged or decreased, with a definite decrease
in Vˆ Ei − Vˆ Ei−1. Following this we know ∀j, l ∈ S, V Ej − V El is non-increasing. Thus, the
new contract is a mean-preserving contraction. This contradicts that
{
b,ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
is
an optimal contract: We know that the local downward constraints always bind.
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Given that Cs,s−1 = 0, ∀s ∈ S, rewriting the constraint we have
β∆(V Es − V Es−1) = U(θsR(b)−ms−1, LE)− U(θsR(b)−ms, LE)
Since θs−1 < θs, ms−1 ≤ ms and the utility function is strictly concave, we have
U(θs−1R(b)−ms−1, LE)− U(θs−1R(b)−ms, LE) ≥
U(θsR(b)−ms−1, LE)− U(θsR(b)−ms, LE) =β∆(V Es − V Es−1),
where strict inequality holds for ms−1 < ms. Therefore, we have directly from this that
the local upward constraint is never binding. Namely, Cs−1,s > 0, ∀s ∈ S.
C.2.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. The non-decreasing entrepreneurs’ utility is direct result of the binding local down-
ward constraints.
The non-decreasing profit of banks is proved by contradiction. Suppose for the optimal
contract,
{
b,ms, V
E
s
}
s∈S
, there exists i, j ∈ S, i > j, such that
−b+mi + ∆
1 + r
P (V Ei ) < −b+mj +
∆
1 + r
P (V Ej ).
Substituting (mi, V
E
i ) with (mj , V
E
j ) increases banks’ profit in state i. Since the downward
constraint binds, Ci,j = 0, the terms of contract, (mj , V
E
j ), entitle the entrepreneurs the
same promised value as (mi, V
E
i ). This means that we find an improvement that increases
the profit of the banks without violating any constraints. This contradicts the optimality
of the original contract. Therefore, in the optimal contract the banks’ profits cannot
decline with a higher productivity realization.
C.2.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. We use the Lagrangian. For simplification, we derive the Lagrangian and the
F.O.C. for the case of two states (i.e., S = {l, h} with pih = pi, pil = 1 − pi). The
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Lagrangian is given by:
L = max
{b,ms,V Es }s∈S
−b+ ∑
s={l,h}
pis
[
ms +
∆
1 + r
P (V Es )
]
+ λ1
 ∑
s={l,h}
pis[U(css, L
E) + β∆V Es ]− V E

+ λ2
{
U(chh, L
E) + β∆V Eh − U(chl, LE)− β∆V El
}
+ λ3
{
U(cll, L
E) + β∆V El − U(clh, LE)− β∆V Eh
}
+ λ4chh + λ5cll
+ λ6(V
E
max − V El ) + λ7(V El − V Emin)
+ λ8(V
E
max − V Eh ) + λ9(V Eh − V Emin)
where cij = θiR(b) −mj . λi ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , 9 are the Lagrangian multiplier for (PK),
(IC), (LL) and (CC), respectively. The F.O.C.s are
∂L
∂mh
= pi − (λ1pi + λ2)U ′(chh) + λ3U ′(clh)− λ4 = 0; (C.4)
∂L
∂ml
= (1− pi)− (λ1(1− pi) + λ3)U ′(cll) + λ2U ′(chl)− λ5 = 0; (C.5)
∂L
∂V Eh
=
pi
1 + r
P ′(V Eh ) + (λ1pi + λ2 − λ3)β − λ8 + λ9 = 0; (C.6)
∂L
∂V El
=
1− pi
1 + r
P ′(V El ) + (λ1(1− pi)− λ2 + λ3)β − λ6 + λ7 = 0; (C.7)
∂L
∂b
= −1 + {(λ1pi + λ2)U ′(chh)− λ2U ′(chl) + λ4}θhR′(b)
+ {(λ1(1− pi) + λ3)U ′(cll)− λ3U ′(clh) + λ5}θlR′(b) = 0. (C.8)
These together with the complementary conditions and λi ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , 9 characterize
the conditions an optimal contract needs to fulfill. Furthermore, we use that the downward
constraint always binds (λ2 ≥ 0) whereas the upward constraint forms > ms−1 never does
(λ3 = 0).
From (C.4), (C.5) and (C.8) follows
E(θ)R′(b) + [λ3U
′(clh)− λ2U ′(chl)](θh − θl)R′(b) = 1
Since λ3 = 0 we have
E(θ)R′(b) + [−λ2U ′(chl)](θh − θl)R′(b) = 1. (C.9)
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Since λ2 ≥ 0 we have that E(θ)R′(b) ≥ 1 and thus b ≤ b∗, where b∗ is the efficient bank
loan level defined in (3.15).
Suppose now that the credibility constraints (CC) are not binding so that we have λi =
0, i = 6, · · · , 9. Then, it follows from (C.6) and (C.7) that λ2 = pi(1−pi)(1+r)β (P ′(V El )−P ′(V Eh )),
which is positive for V Eh > V
E
l because P (V
E
h ) is strictly concave. Thus, the level of b(V
E)
is the result of the functional forms of the utility, the production and the value function
and their relative curvature compared to each other.
C.2.2 Derivation of the goods market clearing condition
The goods market is cleared if aggregate output equals the sum of consumption of all
households and aggregates investment (i.e., replacement of depreciated capital in station-
ary case). Remember from (3.29) that the formal condition is λY = λCE + (1− λ)CW +
λδKD. To prove that the goods market clearing condition can be derived from the other
equations, we need only to prove that the RHS of (3.29) can be simplified to λY .
We aggregate the consumption of entrepreneurs CE and workers CW . Plugging in
entrepreneur’s consumption c(.) from (3.7) into (3.24) (using R(b) = R(b(V W )) and ms =
m(V E , θs)) gives aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs:
CE =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ ∑
s∈S
pis
∫ [
θsR(b(V
E))−m(V E, θs)
]
dΨτ (V
E) = Y −M, (C.10)
where the second equality follows from (3.23) and (3.22).
A cohort τ worker’s consumption is cτ = wlτ +Aτ − pAAτ+1 (follows from the budget
constraint (3.3)). Aggregation gives
CW =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ (wlτ + Aτ − pAAτ+1)
= wLS −D +
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τAτ
= wLS −D +∆
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ−1Aτ
= wLS −D +∆ 1
pA
D
= wLS + rD, (C.11)
where the second and forth equality follow from (3.18) and (3.17) and the annuity price
pA = ∆
1+r
from (3.1) is used.
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Entrepreneurs have the bank loans to finance the production costs. We assume that
there is no moral hazard problem (i.e., the money is used optimally for production costs).
Thus, the constraint in entrepreneurs’ decision problem in (3.5) is binding so that we have
b(V E) = wl∗(V E) + (r + δ)k∗(V E). In aggregation this means
B =
∞∑
τ=0
(1−∆)∆τ
∫
b(V E)dΨτ(V
E) = wLD + (r + δ)KD. (C.12)
Plugging (C.10) and (C.11) into the RHS of (3.29) gives:
RHS = λ(Y −M) + (1− λ)(wLS + rD) + λδKD
= λY − λM + (1− λ)wLS + (1− λ)rD + λrE − λrE + λδKD
= λY + λwLD + λ(r + δ)KD − λ(M + rE)
= λY + λB − λB
= λY = LHS,
where the equilibrium conditions (3.27) and (3.28) were used in the third equality and
(3.25) and (C.12) were used in the third. This closes the proof that the goods market
clearing condition can be derived from clearing in the capital and labor markets.
C.3 Numerical procedure for optimization problems
In this section, the numerical dynamic programming procedures for solving the optimiza-
tion problems are described. Specifically, we describe the algorithm for workers’ decision
problem (Section C.3.1) and banks’ optimal contract (Section C.3.2), for given r and w.
C.3.1 Numerical procedure: Workers
a) Use constant r and w.
b) Set a grid for the state variable A. Agrid denote these grid points of A. We set
A = [0, 10] and generate nA = 50 Chebyshev grid points on the interval.1 We
manually replace the lowest Chebyshev point with the lower bound A = 0.
1See footnote 26 in Chapter 3 for an explanation of Chebyshev points.
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c) Give an initial guess for the functional form of the value function, V W (A; r, w)0, of
the policy functions l(A)0 and A′(A)0 and of c(A)0. Notice that in the numerical
exercise functions are defined on the discrete grid points Agrid. Namely, it is a
mapping of each grid point into a number. We use V W (Ai)
0 = − exp(−Ai) − 0.1,
c(Ai)
0 = 0.1, l(Ai)
0 = 0.6 and A′(Ai)
0 = 0 for each Ai ∈ Agrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nA}.
d) Solve on each grid point Ai ∈ Agrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nA}, the worker’s problem in
(3.2) subject to (3.3), c(Ai) ≥ 0, l(Ai) ∈ [0, 1] and A′(Ai) ≥ 0. This gives us
the optimal solution of the system, {c(Ai)1, l(Ai)1, A′(Ai)1} and the corresponding
updated value function V W (Ai; r, w)
1 at Ai ∈ Agrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nA}. We apply the
fmincon-command in Matlab, which finds the minimum of a constrained nonlinear
multivariable function using the interior point algorithm. To calculate the updated
value function, we use spline interpolation (i.e., cubic interpolation of the values
of neighbor-points) on V W (A; r, w)0 to get values for A′(A) which lie between two
Agrid-points.
e) Compare the two successive iterations of value functions, V W (A; r, w)1 with
V W (A; r, w)0, by defining a distance measure dVW . If dVW ≤ VW , then take the cur-
rent iteration of the value function and policy functions as the solution and go to f).
If dVW > VW start over with step c) by updating V
W (A; r, w)0 = V W (A; r, w)1 and
c(A)0 = c(A)1, l(A)0 = l(A)1 and A′(A)0 = A′(A)1 as the new starting values for
the next interation. We use dVW ≡ maxi∈{1,...,nA}
∣∣∣V W (Ai; r, w)1 − V W (Ai; r, w)0∣∣∣.
We set as criterion for ending the iterations the tolerated distance VW = 0.0001.
f) Save the value function V W (A; r, w) = V W (A; r, w)1, the policy functions A′(A) =
A′(A)1 and l(A) = l(A)1 and c(A) = c(A)1.
C.3.2 Numerical procedure: Financial contract
a) Use constant r and w.
b) Set a grid for the state variable V E on the interval
[
V Emin, V
E
max
]
. V Egrid denote
these grid points of V E. We generate nV E = 50 Chebyshev grid points on the
interval.2 We manually replace the lowest Chebyshev point with the lower bound
V Emin.
2See footnote 26 for an explanation of Chebyshev points.
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c) Make an initial guess of the functional form of the value function, P (V E ; r, w)0,
and of the policy functions,
{
b(V E)0, ms(V
E)0, V Es (V
E)
0
}
s∈{h,l}
. Notice that in the
numerical exercise functions are defined on the discrete grid points V Egrid. Namely,
it is a mapping of each grid point into a number. We use P (V Ei ; r, w)
0 = log(−V Ei ),
b(V Ei )
0 = 1, mh(V
E
i )
0 = 3, ml(V
E
i )
0 = 1, V Eh (V
E
i )
0
= V El (V
E
i )
0
= V Ei for each
V Ei ∈ V Egrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nV E}.
d) Solve for each V Ei ∈ V Egrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nV E} the optimal contract in (3.11)
subject to (PK), (IC), (LL) and (CC).3 This gives the optimal contract at each
V Ei ∈ V Egrid, i ∈ {1, ..., nV E},
{
b(V Ei )
1, ms(V
E
i )
1, V Es (V
E
i )
1
}
s∈{h,l}
, and the cor-
responding updated value function, P (V Ei ; r, w)
1. We apply the fmincon-command
in Matlab, which finds the minimum of a constrained nonlinear multivariable func-
tion using the interior point algorithm. To calculate the value function for the
next iteration, we use spline interpolation (i.e., cubic interpolation of the values of
neighbor-points) on P (V Ei ; r, w)
0 to get values for V Eh (V
E)
1
and V El (V
E)
1
which lie
between two grid points.
e) Compare the two successive iterations of value functions, P (V Ei ; r, w)
1 with
P (V Ei ; r, w)
0, by defining a distance measure dP . If dP ≤ P , then take the cur-
rent iteration of the value function and policy functions as the solution and go to
f). If dP > P , start over with step c) by updating P (V
E ; r, w)0 = P (V E ; r, w)1
and b(V E)0 = b(V E)1, mh(V
E)0 = mh(V
E)1, ml(V
E)0 = ml(V
E)1, V Eh (V
E)
0
=
V Eh (V
E)
1
and V El (V
E)
0
= V El (V
E)
1
as the new starting value for the next iteration.
We use dP ≡ maxi∈{1,...,nV E}
∣∣∣P (V Ei ; r, w)1 − P (V Ei ; r, w)0∣∣∣ and set as criterion for
ending the iterations the tolerated distance P = 0.0001.
f) Save the value function P (V E ; r, w) = P (V E; r, w)1 and the optimal contract b(V E) =
b(V E)1, mh(V
E) = mh(V
E)1, ml(V
E) = ml(V
E)1, V Eh (V
E) = V Eh (V
E)
1
and
V El (V
E) = V El (V
E)
1
.
C.4 Simulation procedure for general equilibrium
In this appendix, we describe how the two partial parts from above and the entrepreneurs’
decision are combined to calculate the general equilibrium results.
a) We simulate for NE = 10, 000, 000 entrepreneurs’ life paths with history of pro-
ductivity realizations and age (i.e., realization of productivity state and death /
3For (IC) we put in the constraint only the binding local downward constraint, since by the result of
Lemma 3.2 the local upward constraint is never binding for the optimal contract.
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survival): For each entrepreneur, while surviving, we draw on the interval between
0 and 1 (uniformly distributed) randomly two separate numbers to simulate pro-
ductivity and life shocks, uθ and u∆, respectively: If uθ < pil the entrepreneur faces
a low productivity realization θl and otherwise a high productivity realization θh.
If u∆ > 1 − ∆ the entrepreneur survives, becomes one year older and continues
production; if u∆ ≤ 1−∆ the entrepreneurs dies and the firm exits the market.
b) Give a grid on the range of interest rate and wage and start from a grid point (r, w).
c) Solve the optimization problems for this (r, w): Workers’ decision problem as de-
scribed in C.3.1 and banks’ optimal contract as described in C.3.2.
d) Calculate the aggregate deposits D and the labor supply LS of workers. More
specifically, sum up the weighted savings and labor supply, pAA
′(Aτ ) and l(Aτ )
from c), according to (3.17) and (3.18) for ages τ = 0, . . . , NW . NW is determined
such that
∑NW
τ=0 = (1 − ∆)∆τ ≥ 1 − L with L = 0.0001. This indicates that the
cohorts we aggregate cover approximately all workers in the economy.
e) Set V E0 = V
W (0; r, w) from c). Using the simulation of the life paths from a), deter-
mine the corresponding promised value V E for each entrepreneur using the transition
function V Es (V
E) from c) over its life path. Banks loans and repayments are de-
termined by
{
b(V E), ms(V
E)
}
s∈{h,l}
from c). Aggregations over all entrepreneurs
are then the sums B and M of all banks loans b and repayments m, respectively,
divided by NE to normalize the mass of the population to 1. From B follows ag-
gregate capital demand KD and aggregate labor demand LD directly according to
(3.33).
f) Determine the share of entrepreneurs from the labor market condition, λ = L
S
LD+LS
.
g) Check if the equilibrium conditions (zero-profit and capital market clearing) are close
to zero, specifically:
∣∣∣P (V E0 ; r, w)∣∣∣ ≤ eq,p and ∣∣∣λKD − (1− λ)D − λB−Mr ∣∣∣ ≤ eq,c? If
yes, go to h). If not, restart from c) with a new grid point (r′, w′). When updating
(r′, w′), to get the direction to the new grid point, we use the observable fact that
the banks’ profit and the excess capital demand are both decreasing in r and w and
that their gap increases in w and decreases in r (see Appendix C.5 for a detailed
description of this algorithm). We set eq,p = 0.0037 and eq,c = 0.0037.
h) Save the results.
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C.5 Algorithm to find general equilibrium
When grid-searching for the equilibrium (r, w), we observed (at least locally around the
equilibrium values) that the banks’ profit Π ≡ P (V W (0; r, w)) and the excess capital
demand X ≡ λKD(r, w)− (1−λ)D(r, w)−λE(r, w) are both decreasing in r and w. This
means their partial derivatives have a negative sign:
Πr < 0, Πw < 0, Xr < 0 and Xw < 0 (C.13)
In a (r, w)-diagram, (C.13) implies two properties of the iso-profit and iso-excess demand
curves: (i) Both loci are downward sloping. (ii) A northeast shift of a locus decreases the
corresponding value of the respective iso-curve. The slope of the iso-profit curve and of
the iso-excess demand curve are given by SΠ = −ΠwΠr and SX = −XwXr , respectively.
In addition to (C.13), we observe that the gap G ≡ X − Π is decreasing in r and
increasing in w. From the partial derivatives Gr < 0 and Gw > 0 we know that
Πr > Xr and Xw > Πw. (C.14)
From (C.14) follows for the slopes of the iso-profit and iso-excess demand curves
|SX | < |SΠ| . (C.15)
Thus, the iso-profit curve is steeper than iso-excess demand curve. This indicates single-
crossing property of the two curves.
Using (C.13) and (C.15), we know that (at least locally) there exists a unique equilib-
rium. Furthermore, the properties of the iso-curves indicate the direction for approaching
the equilibrium from any off-equilibrium point.
Figure C.2 exhibits an illustration of iso-profit and iso-excess demand curves and the
algorithm to find the equilibrium. Suppose that for an initial guess of (r, w) the value of
the iso-profit is p¯iA > 0 (a point like A). Then, first, according to (C.13), we increase r
(or w) until the zero-profit condition holds (i.e., on the locus of Π = 0). (Note that, for
a point like B with p¯iB < 0 the opposite argument than for a point like A applies). This
first step could bring us to: (i) a point with negative excess capital demand like C; (ii) a
point with positive excess capital demand like D; or (iii) a point with zero excess demand
indicating the equilibrium Eq.. Second, at a point C with X = x¯C < 0, (C.13) and
(C.15) suggest a south-east shift of (r, w) (i.e., r ↓, w ↑) along the locus of the iso-profit
curve until the excess demand increases to 0 (C →Eq.). Similarly, at a point D with
X = x¯D > 0, a north-west shift of (r, w) (i.e., r ↑, w ↓) decreases the excess demand
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and thus approaches the equilibrium (D →Eq.). This algorithm finds the unique general
equilibrium. In practice, we need to guess the change of (r, w) in each step. Depending
on the accuracy of the guesses, more or less “back and forths” may be needed until the
equilibrium is reached.
w
r
Π = 0
X = 0
b
Eq.
b
C
b D
bB
Π= p¯iB<0
b A
Π= p¯iA>0
X= x¯C<0
X= x¯D>0
b
Figure C.2: Iso-profit and iso-excess demand curves
Notes: Note that we do not know the curvature of the two curves. Below the two solid zero-lines profit
and excess demand are positive and above they are negative.
C.6 Intuition for convergence to stationary equity
level
From the characteristics of the optimal contract (Figure 3.4), we notice that at low levels of
promised values V E expected repayments, pilml(V
E)+(1−pil)mh(V E), from entrepreneurs
to banks exceed the level of bank loans b(V E) and that the opposite holds at high levels
of promised values (see Figure C.3). Intuitively, this means that banks receive a positive
net cash flow from entrepreneurs with low promised values. This positive net flow accrues
to banks’ equity. This is supplied as capital on the capital market and generates returns,
which lead to a further accumulation of equity. In contrast, banks expect a negative net
cash flow from firms with high promised values, which detracts banks’ equity.
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Figure C.3: Bank loans, b(V E), and expected repayments, pilml(V
E) + (1− pil)mh(V E)
With this in mind, we can now intuitively describe the process of development of banks’
equity level from the very beginning of time with no population to the stationary equity
level E:4 Suppose the banks are endowed with E0 at the beginning of time when there is
no population in the economy, yet. As population starts, there is a new-born cohort of
entrepreneurs (and workers) with promised values V W (0; r, w) = V E0 . Entrepreneurs sign
contracts with banks, which entitle them to banks loans and which ask for repayments. At
the beginning of their lives, when entrepreneurs are at low levels of promised values they
must give positive net cash flows to banks. Hence, banks start accumulating equity. With
age, the average promised value of entrepreneurs increases (see firm dynamics in Figure
3.7 and 3.8) and reaches eventually levels where banks loans are larger than expected
repayments. This reduces banks’ equity. In addition, as the economy evolves, there are
more overlapping cohorts – with younger cohort making positive and older cohorts making
negative net cash flows to banks. In aggregation there is an accumulation of total bank’s
equity. Finally, in the stationary equilibrium the accumulation of banks’ equity come to a
halt so that the equity level stays constant. This means, in equilibrium negative aggregate
net payments from entrepreneurs are exactly covered by the interest generated on banks’
equity.
4Assume for simplicity that during the process of development interest rate and wage are fixed at
some level (e.g., the equilibrium level (r, w)).
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C.7 Additional figures
C.7.1 Life paths
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Figure C.4: Life path I
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Figure C.5: Life path II
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Figure C.6: Life path III
C.7.2 Development of entrepreneurs’ distributions
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Figure C.7: Development of entrepreneurs’ bank loans distributions
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Figure C.8: Development of entrepreneurs’ repayments distributions
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